THE GENESIS OF BUREAUCRACY IN ENGLAND AND THE U.S. OF AMERICA

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I. SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON THE CLASS CHARACTER AND FUNCTIONS OF BUREAUCRACY

A. The Concept and Definition of Bureaucracy:

Bureaucracy can be defined as "...the administration of the bourgeois state through the agency of a permanent army of privileged officials." As such, it represents the ultimate stage in the process of the severance of all "visible" ties between state and society; constitutes the most accomplished form of bourgeois administration and appears as an administrative relation peculiar only to bourgeois society.

B. The Anti-Feudal Character of Bureaucracy:

The origins of bureaucracy date back to the fall of feudalism and the collapse of the absolute-monarchic state edifice characteristic of this socio-economic formation. From amidst the develop-


(2) This reference to the annihilation of all "visible ties" between state and society conceptualizes the disappearance of all forms of responsibility and accountability on the part of the organs of state power. The permanent army of privileged "public" officials, identifying itself with bourgeois state power, detaches itself from society for the sole purpose of administering society, becomes independent of the masses (i.e. non-elective, irrevocable and irresponsible), and enjoys liberal pecuniary privileges. This process can also be defined as the transformation of the organs of state power "from servants of society into lords over society".

(3) For further info. on the "bourgeois" character of bureaucracy, see. Fişek, op. cit., pp. 60 and 63-70.
ment-clogging morass of all forms of feudal rubbish and the shambles of the absolute-monarchic state structure, emerges the acute need to wage a ruthlessly systematic and highly centralized struggle against all remnants of feudal society. The motley pattern of undeveloped small-holding, created by bourgeois revolutions and representing bourgeois property in all freshness of its youth, provides the most suitable and proper basis for a highly centralized, ubiquitous and omniscient state apparatus. Ascending from this basis, the newly established military-bureaucratic apparatus serves the bourgeoisie as a mighty weapon in nascent middle-class society's struggle for emancipation from feudalism.

C. The Anti-Proletarian Character of Bureaucracy:

With the removal of the final traces of feudalism and the inevitable intensification of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the military-bureaucratic apparatus sheds its anti-feudal mantle and assumes, more and more, «...the character of the national power of capital over labour...»

Thus, bureaucracy, in the course of its genesis, is transformed from «...the means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie... [into] ...the instrument of the ruling class...»

Following the acquirement of an anti-proletarian character, the bureaucratic apparatus makes full use of the means placed at the disposal of bourgeois state power and increasingly «...enmeshes, controls, regulates, superintends and tutors civil society, from its most comprehensive manifestations of life down to its most insignificant stirrings, from its most general modes of being to the private existence of individuals...» The indispensable service rendered bourgeois society by bureaucracy, is described by Graham Wallas as follows:

The creation of this service [bureaucracy] was the one great political invention in nineteenth-century England.

(4) Ibid., pp. 57-89.
(6) Ibid., p. 333.
(7) Ibid., p. 284.
D. Bureaucracy in England and the U.S. of America:

Karl Marx, in his *Eighteenth Brumaire*, and Frederick Engels, in his «Introduction to Marx's *Civil War in France*» characterize the United States of America and England as two rare exceptions in bourgeois society, the pattern of two purely capitalist countries *without a bureaucracy*. Viewing the matter in retrospective, it becomes fairly obvious that bureaucracy, in large measure, has remained an institution alien to these two countries until, at least, the turning of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. This apparent «time-lag» in the emergence of bureaucracy can be explained with reference to the *original function* (i.e. removal of all feudal hindrances to bourgeois development) and *dual nature* (i.e. anti-feudal and anti-proletarian) of the organs of centralized bourgeois state power. On the eve of the bourgeois revolution, quite contrary to the position adapted by their French counterparts, the feudal landowners of England complied with the course of history and, to top it off, became the first bourgeois of the kingdom. In America, on the other hand, feudalism, from the very beginning, remained an «unknown» entity and society started off from a purely bourgeois basis. This peculiar feature of the development of capitalism in England and America has enabled these bourgeois societies to accomplish a more or less «smooth» break with the past, *without the extra assistance of a superstructural lever*, i.e. bureaucracy.

Four decades after the passing remarks of Marx and Engels, on the subject of bureaucracy in England and America, Lenin wrote:

> Today in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this distinction of Marx's becomes unreal, and England and America, the greatest and last representatives of Anglo-Saxon Liberty, in the sense of the absence of militarism and bureaucracy, have today

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(10) Written on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Paris Commune (March 18, 1891) and originally published in the 1891 German separate edition of Marx's *Civil War in France*. Marx's mentioned work was written April-May, 1871, and was endorsed at a session of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association, May 30, 1871.

completely rolled down into the dirty, bloody morass of military-bureaucratic institutions common to all Europe, subordinating all else to themselves, crushing all else under themselves.

The United States of America and England, today, are the two Meccas of bureaucracy. This article proposes to deal with the genesis of bureaucracy in the said countries, placing special emphasis on the social and administrative tenets which brought about the circumstances sketched above.

II. THE GENESIS OF BUREAUCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A. The Civil War, A Turning Point:

When «...a million of men, nearly equally divided into two hostile camps.» 12 pitted the slave-owning landlords of the South against the industrial bourgeoisie of the North, America, both North and South, Federal and Confederate, had no military and bureaucratic organization, so to speak. It is common knowledge that an army formed of drafted civilians cannot settle down into a regular army, a smoothly-functioning standing army at that, unless it is trained and supported by the vast intellectual and material resources available to the centralized organs of state power. The American Civil War (1861-1865), in its earlier and even later stages, was fought out solely by volunteers. Shortly after the outset of the war, the very small nucleus formed by the existing regular army proved quite incapable of absorbing the steadily increasing flow of volunteers. With the exception of a handful of men keeping watch over the Indians, there appeared to be nothing worth calling a «militia». Nothing, whatsoever, remained of the vitally essential connections between the front and rear guards. Under these circumstances and in the face of prolonged war, the entire military structure, based on an ungainly and unwieldy body of drafted civilians, came tumbling down. Engels describes the effects of the civil war as follows: 13

The former wars of the Union never put the military strength of the country on its mettle... But when a civil war called forth more than a million of fighting men, the whole system broke down, and everything had to be begun at the beginning. The results are before us.

(13) Ibid., p. 357.
Two immense, unwieldy bodies of men, each afraid of the other, and almost as afraid of victory as of defeat, are facing each other, trying at an immense cost to settle down into something like a regular organization. The waste of money, frightful as it is, is quite unavoidable, from the total absence of that organized groundwork upon which that structure could have been built.

The American Civil War, acting as the midwife of history, thus surfaced the urgent and pressing need for the creation of the indispensable organs of centralized bourgeois state power, a public power which would subordinate to itself, not only the mementoes of the past, but, also, all messengers of the future. To be exact, these organs of bourgeois state power are bureaucracy and the standing army.

B. The Creation of America’s Standing Army:

America’s highly favourable geographical position and the suicidal nature of waging large-scale warfare against this country, coupled with the vast natural wealth available to the American bourgeoisie, are the major causal factors bringing about a «time-lag» in the creation of the standing army. A military organization, composed entirely of a volunteer army and a handful of militia for watching over the Indians, numbering not more than a few hundred in peacetime and reaching a maximum of thirty thousand in time of war, could more than meet the «internal and external security» requirements of eighteenth and early-nineteenth century America. The civil war, as explained earlier, wrote finis to this situation. A brief evaluation of the factors delaying the creation of a standing army and a recapitulation of the objective conditions hastening its arrival, is due at this point.

According to the marxist-leninist theory of state, both the standing army and bureaucracy are necessitated by external and internal factors. For one thing, the further development of bourgeois society demands the immediate centralization of state power; the existence and utilization of centralized organs of state power enables the ruling class, i.e. the bourgeoisie, to wage a systematic and ruthless struggle against all feudal hindrances to bourgeois development. Secondly, parallel to the development of capitalism, the working-class movement sheds its sporadic character and the anti-thesis of modern industry, the proletariat, becomes a contender for power, on a highly-organized and national basis; the presence of organs of centralized state power enables the ruling class, i.e. the
bourgeoisie, to dispel, in a certain extent and for the time-being, all threats to the rule and existence of its class. Thirdly, with the advent of the era of imperialism, the search for new markets and the protection of acquired ones (including the «home» market), becomes, more and more, the essential item on the agenda of the bourgeoisie; the smooth functioning of the centralized organs of state power in general and the standing army in particular enables the ruling class, i.e. the bourgeoisie, to reach beyond the already out-dated boundaries of the «nation-state form of exploitation», to dispel the threat of an attack by hostile foreign powers and finally, in accordance with the strength at its disposal, to embark upon a crusade of imperialist expansion. These, in a nutshell, are the objective requirements for the creation of a standing army. The question now arises: How far does America, in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, meet these requirements?

In searching for an answer to this question, the first thing that leaps to the eye is the near-impossibility of mounting a successful invading attack against America. This is primarily due to America’s geographical position and the relative technological backwardness of the instruments of warfare in the nineteenth century. For one thing, America is fortressed by two vast expanses of ocean, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and in the final analysis appears as nothing more than an oversize island. This geographical tenet, coupled with America’s vast terrain, proves a much more formidable obstacle to invading armies than any troops America can bring against them. The instruments of warfare available to nineteenth century Europe and America, on the other hand, dispel the probability of an attack «...with more than 30,000 or 40,000 regulars at the very worst.» Add to this the limited but continual flow of regulars from America’s academies of war and the relative ease with which this nucleus of regulars can militarize a volunteer army of around a hundred-thousand, and it becomes apparent why the military strength of America was never put on its mettle until the second half of the nineteenth century. The fact that America’s earlier wars brought together a total of not more than 300,000 fighting

(14) Ibid., p. 357.
(15) West Point (U.S. Military Academy) was established in 1802, Annapolis (U.S. Naval Academy) in 1845 and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in 1876.
(16) Reference made to the war against England (1812-1815) and the Mexican War (1846-1848), the first being fought out by 280,000 and the second by 70,000 fighting men, a total of around 350 thousand. The
men, accounts, to a large extent, for the prolonged absence of a standing army corresponding to the bourgeois period of economic development.

The bourgeois basis from which society started and the vast natural resources of North America have also contributed to the delay in the creation of a standing army. The absence of feudal hindrances to bourgeois development, the natural outcome of a purely bourgeois take-off, «indefinitely» postponed the centralization of state power and enabled bourgeois society to do without the «anti-feudal stage» of this power. The immense expanse of country and the practically «inexhaustible» reserves of natural wealth, on the other hand, occupied the American bourgeoisie for quite some time. The time-consuming struggle to exploit and exhaust these natural resources, a predominant and incessant struggle on the part of the bourgeoisie, waged from East to West, North to South, delayed the intensification of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and, furthermore, postponed the inevitable transition from capitalism into imperialism. 17

It took a large-scale war, a class war at that, to write an end to the voluntary-army form of military organization. When the contradictions between the slave-owning landlords of the South 18

American Civil War, on the other hand, was fought out by a total of nearly two million fighting men, with the number of dead estimated as 281,881.

(17) The Spanish-American War (1898) can be considered as the first sign, excepting the Hawaii Operation (1893), that the «nation-state form of exploitation» is drawing to its end for America and that «imperialist expansion» is emerging as the order of the day. Incidentally, the Spanish-American War was fought out over Cuba and, hence, for control of the Panama Canal.

(18) The term «slave-owning landlords», used reservedly in describing the plantation owners of the southern states, must not be confused with its ostensible «counterpart» in the Roman Empire. As Marx once remarked, it is generally the fate of completely new historical creations to be mistaken for the counterpart of older and even defunct forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness (Marx-Engels, op. cit., p. 521). The system of slavery prevailing in the states of the confederacy came into being much as an accident. True, the realization of surplus product is based on the exploitation of slave-labour and society appears to be divided into two major classes, i.e. the slaves and the slave-owners, but, when it comes to the question of using that surplus product, the picture that ultimately appears is strictly «bour-
and the industrial bourgeoisie of the North broke out into open hostilities, when an unwieldy mass of more than a million fighting men faced each other on a range of battlefields from Missouri to Chesapeake Bay, when the number of dead and wounded on the casualty-lists surpassed the total number of fighting men in all previous wars,\(^{19}\) the Museum of Antiquities had already opened its doors to this out-of-fashion form of military organization. The creation of a standing army, trained and supported by the vast intellectual and material resources available to the bourgeois military-bureaucratic apparatus, had finally become the order of the day.

True, the civil war surfaced the pressing demand for the creation of a military-bureaucratic apparatus, but, an objective need is one thing, the subjective realization of that need yet another. It is common knowledge that this military-bureaucratic apparatus, this «...appalling parasitic body...»\(^{20}\) can be maintained only through public debts and heavy taxes. The ideological attitude towards the state, however, is that of «No Government Is Good Government». This ideological-mental «blockade», the ability of local militia to suppress all manifestations of the working class movement and, finally, the limited nature of America’s military operations preceding the First Imperialist War,\(^{21}\) are the major factors responsible for yet another «time-lag» in the creation of a standing army. Only after the advent of the era of imperialism and America’s entry into the Second Imperialist War, do we arrive at the critical turning-point in the translation of «objective need» into «subjective realization». A regular army of around 200,000 in 1940... The passing of the «million» mark shortly afterwards... A slight drop during the 1947-1950 period... Yet another upsurge with the Korean War and, finally, the establishment of a firm foothold at the minimum figure of one million regulars...

This, in short, is the historical sketch of the past three decades.

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\(^{19}\) cf. n 16.


\(^{21}\) America’s wars and military operations preceding the First Imperialist War (1914-1918) are the following: The War of Independence (1775-1783), The English-American War (1812-1815), The Mexican War (1846-1848), Operation Hawaii (1893), The Spanish-American War (1898), Operation Boxer (1900), Operation Panama (1903), Operations Dominicana (1904 and 1916), Operation Nicaragua (1911), Operations Mexico (1914 and 1916), Operation Haiti (1915).
C. The Genesis of Bureaucracy in America:

Roughly three decades after Marx wrote his *Eighteenth Brumaire*, the bureaucratization of bourgeois state power, as a slow but steady process, got under way. Today, a century later, we observe a dynamic state of co-existence between the «spoils system», which accounts for the absence of bureaucracy in nineteenth-century America and remains a memento of colonial times, and the «merit system», which is the bourgeois name for bureaucracy, with the equilibrium being steadily and increasingly disturbed in favour of the latter.

In order to reach a sound and proper perspective, we can divide the genesis of bureaucracy in America into five distinguishable periods, the first three of which bear a basic resemblance:

- **Pre-1776** Period of colonial rule, with «hierarchic investiture» as the basic regulating principle of state administration.
- **1776-1829** Period of co-existence between «hierarchic investiture» and «spoils», with the equilibrium shifting rapidly in favour of the latter.
- **1829-1865** Period of unrestricted and unmitigated «spoils».
- **1865-1883** Period of pressures and agitation for the bureaucratization of bourgeois state power.
- **1883-** Period of a slow but steady bureaucratization of the state apparatus.

1. The Pre-1776 Period and Colonial Rule:

When the American War of Independence (1775-1783) wrote an end to British colonial rule, the basic principle regulating the functioning and organization of the state apparatus had been «hierarchic investiture». A widespread administrative practice in medieval (feudal) society, where the suzerain and/or his authorized representatives fully monopolize all appointing power, investiture can be defined as the act of investing a person with the land or installation into an ecclesiastic office. The system of investiture is further characterized by a complete dependence of those in the lower rungs of the hierarchic ladder on their temporal and spiritual lords. In the case of colonial America, this spiritual and temporal lord is His Majesty, the King of England, as represented by the King’s Governor.

Under British colonial rule, «...at the hands of the British aristocracy public office was treated as the special preserve of a privileged..."
class..." and remained «off-limits» to all other classes and strata of society. This antiquated feudal practice, superimposed on bourgeois society and based on the principle of strict loyalty to the Crown, soon emerged, at local level, as a more or less permanent source of friction and conflict. Viewed from this point, it can be said that the pre-1776 period provided the necessary settings for an incessant struggle between the King's Governor and the local legislatures, with the latter, as organs of public opinion controlled by the nascent American bourgeoisie, striving hard to restrict and curb the «appointing powers» of the former, a direct offshoot of the British aristocracy.

In the absence of a pressing objective demand for the bureaucratization of state power, the system of investiture, with its implicated provisions for immediate and instant removal, has prevented the organs of public power from acquiring a «permanent», i.e. bureaucratic, character.

2. *The Advent of Spoils, 1776-1829*

The War of Independence abolished the existing monopoly over American public office, hitherto enjoyed by the British aristocracy. The search for measures to prevent the reappearance of this monopoly, finally culminated in the principle of «rotation in office» and hierarchic investiture was eventually superseded by universal suffrage, as a means of selecting administrative officers. This democratic approach to the problem, however, was to be transformed into an absurd fetish in later years. As Stahl correctly points out, «...the devices which had been invented to eliminate the special privilege of a class became themselves the instruments of a new type of favoritism...» With the acknowledgement and adoption of this new administrative principle, i.e. the spoils system, we observe America entering a new stage in the genesis of her bureaucracy. Fish, describing this new stage, remarks that by around 1821, in all states, from North to West, the spoils system «...either was established or there existed an element eager to introduce it...»


(23) Engels uses the term «aristocracy» to differentiate between the feudal barons and the ex-feudal landowners of England, who have retained their titles of nobility but have become the first bourgeois of the kingdom.


Marx, in his *Eighteenth Brumaire*, accounts for the absence of bureaucracy in America with the presence of the so-called «spoil system». This system, which made a profitable business out of politics, which placed America’s administrative-executive apparatus in the hands of a group of political adventurers and speculators, which regarded party affiliations, blood (kinship) bonds, friendships and other equally repulsive criteria superior to the objective requirements of a position, derives its all-important characteristic from the complete absence of a bureaucracy with permanent posts or the right to pensions. It is common knowledge that bureaucracy, as the most accomplished form of bourgeois administration, is distinguished from all previous administrative forms by the «permanent» nature of its army of privileged public officials, an irresponsible army which is not subject to election or recall. The spoils system, on the other hand, both explicitly and implicitly, demands and gets a complete post-election dismissal of former office-holders, filling public office with the subsidizers, workers and followers of the new party in control. Far from facilitating the creation of bureaucracy, this system has proved to be the major road-block on the course of its genesis.

Yet, the spoils system, through and through, appears to be the only genuine answer to the demands of the American bourgeoisie in the early nineteenth century. Academic reflections on the merits and demerits of this system, reflections which disregard conditions of time and place, are relegated to mere nothingness in view of the all-important fact that the ruling classes of America, in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, demanded nothing more than «non-interference» from the government. In the absence of feudal hindrances to bourgeois development and in the course of a struggle to exploit and exhaust America’s vast natural resources, the barest minimum of state interference could spell nothing but expediency and convenience for the ruling class. A military-bureaucratic apparatus, on the other hand, no matter how small and insignificant, would still require taxes for its maintenance and would, by its very nature, weigh heavily and sappingly on the shoulders of the ruling class, as an undesirable and unnecessary burden. The will of the American bourgeoisie, thus voiced, was readily and rapidly translated into reality, taking the form of the «spoil system».

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The first president to exercise patronage power was Thomas
Jefferson, elected 1801. Stahl remarks that Jefferson, after heading a new party coalition to power, was confronted with "a civil service almost wholly Federalist and ousted 25 per cent of the civil officers." From Jefferson to Andrew Jackson, a period of twenty-eight years, the spoils system operated quite efficiently and such adverse side-effects as "the discontinuity of public service," i.e. the absence of an omnipotent and omniscient state machine, never took the form of acute pains. This is due to the simple fact that the same political party retained control over the administrative-executive apparatus throughout the period and the post-election possibility of mass dismissal was never converted into actuality.

The most important piece of legislation in the 1776-1829 period is the Four Years Law, enacted 1820. With the promulgation of this law, the President was relieved "...of the embarrassing necessity of dismissing competent officials by providing for their automatic retirement at the end of four years." Viewing the period in retrospective, it can be truthfully claimed that the arrival of the spoils system was performed more in the manner of a fait accompli than a delicate operation handled with kid-gloves. As such, the 1776-1829 period represents a clean break with the past and appears to be the preliminaries of the succeeding period of unrestricted and unmitigated spoils. Again as such, it is the beginning of a period where government employees enjoy no tenure of office and where the sole requirement for government positions is affiliation to and financial backing of the political party controlling the executive-administrative apparatus.

Recapitulating briefly, the American War of Independence and its aftermath, in an effort to curb the appointing powers of the King's Governor, swung from one extreme to the other, replacing the primitive form of patronage (investiture) with a more complex and accomplished form, the spoils.

3. The Full-Moon of Spoils, 1829-1865:

Andrew Jackson's Inaugural Address, delivered 1829, heralds the shedding of all administrative fetters and marks the beginning of a new era in the genesis of bureaucracy. In his first annual message President Jackson said:

(27) Ibid., p. 30.
(28) Ibid., p. 31.
The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience.

This quoted ideological outlook of the American bourgeoisie and the objective course of events in the period succeeding Jackson’s election to office, provide us with a highly-interesting case study in the «unity of opposites». The 1829-1865 period, and particularly the Jacksonian era, is characterized by a tremendous extension of patronage power, the firm entrenchment of the practice of «rotation in office», the preponderance of political affiliations as the basic criterium for appointment to public office and, finally, the ultimate subordination of administration to politics. In short, the political and administrative (i.e. superstructural) soil has been so cultivated that the possibilities of a retreat into the «past» (investiture) and a march into the «future» (bureaucracy) have been fully and completely annihilated. Yet, on the other hand, the same period is characterized by a pace of bourgeois development hitherto unseen, this, in turn, creating those objective conditions which inevitably and unavoidably bring about the bureaucratization of bourgeois state power.

Throughout this period of unmitigated and unrestricted spoils, we witness measures being taken by the ruling classes to prevent the creation of a bureaucracy with permanent posts; yet, the same ruling classes locomote a rapid pace of bourgeois development which, in the final analysis, brings the level of development of productive forces commanded by the bourgeoisie into an intensified conflict with the ageing state edifice controlled by the bourgeoisie. Again, in this period, we observe an increased overlapping of the political and administrative structures and, at the Zenith of this process, the emergence of a state of full subordination on the part of the latter, i.e. administrative. At this stage of our analysis, it remains to be asked how the new system operates. Since the basic administrative principle of the period appears to be the spoils system, what could be more logical than attempting to reach a proper understanding of the era by striving to grasp the modus operandi of spoils?

It is common knowledge that the American bourgeoisie, shortly after the War of Independence, went all out in its efforts to exploit and exhaust the country’s vast expanse of natural resources. The
ruling classes of America, throughout the course of this exploita-
tive and exhaustive crusade, have remained loyal to the ideological
heritage of the struggle waged by their European counterparts
against feudalism, i.e. no government is good government. No one
period in the entire history of America claims so strict adherence
to this ideological attitude, as does the 1829-1865 period. Yet, the
bourgeoisie cannot abandon its precious control over the state
machine; even if it were for future use, the bourgeoisie is com-
pelled, by the very interests of its class, to retain hold of this highly-
specialized instrument of class-warfare. The spoils system, as the
solution and offspring of this contradiction, represents a seemingly-
precarious bourgeois control of state power and realizes a peculiar
(characteristic) division of labour whereby the fields of economy
and politics are sharply delineated. Within the framework of this
division of labour, politics in general and political agitation in
particular fall to the lot of «professional» politicians, i.e. careerists
who make a business out of politics. These political activists, who
devote their entire time to political work, do not appear to be par-
ticularly wealthy and have to be provided for, so to speak. Accord-
ing to Fish, 29 the modus operandi of the spoils system and the na-
ture of the organic bond between the political and administrative
structures become apparent at this point. The administrative-execu-
tive apparatus, in general, and the civil service, in particular, emer-
ges as a special payroll for party workers, politicians and all others
who speculate on government positions as a reward for political
activity. Giving full and free play to the principle of «all spoils to
the victor», the political party acquiring control over the state
machine embarks on a spree of mass dismissals in the civil service
and replaces the supporters of the losing party with those of its
own. In return, the new position-holders subsidize the activities of
their party and provide for the «professional» politicians carrying
out the party’s day-to-day work. Under the circumstances described
above, the practice of creating new government positions, whenever
additional sources of revenue are required, becomes quite common-
place.

Summing up, the spoils system reigned supreme throughout the
1829-1865 period, with party affiliations constituting the sole re-
quirement for public office and with the obvious result that «party
obligations» and «obligations to the state» became synonymous.

(29) Fish, op. cit., pp. 156 ff.
Engels provides us with the following analysis of this state of affairs:

Nowhere do «politicians» form a more separate and powerful section of the nation than precisely in North America. There, each of the two major parties which alternately succeed each other in power is itself in turn controlled by people who make a business of politics, who speculate on seats in the legislative assemblies of the Union as well as of the separate states, or who make a living by carrying on agitation for their party and on its victory are rewarded with positions... It is precisely in America that we see best how there takes place this process of the state power making itself independent in relation to society, whose mere instrument it was originally intended to be. Here there exists no dynasty, no nobility, no standing army, beyond the few men keeping watch on the Indians, no bureaucracy with permanent posts or the right to pensions. And nevertheless we find here two great gangs of political speculators, who alternately take possession of the state power and exploit it by the most corrupt means and for the most corrupt ends — and the nation is powerless against these two great cartels of politicians, who are ostensibly its servants, but in reality dominate and plunder it.

4. Pro-Bureaucracy Agitation Begins, 1865-1883:

Due to the material and ideological conditions described above, the possession of state power had never come to be regarded as the principal spoils of the victor in the class struggle. That the American bourgeoisie remained unaware of the full significance and implications of this possession, is made quite evident by the bourgeois attitude towards it. State power was acclaimed, not as a welcome instrument to be ruthlessly manipulated against all opponents of the ruling class, but, as a convenient collection of government positions, a payroll which would enable the bourgeoisie to subsidize, at a minimum cost to itself, the ruling political party.

When the American Civil War ended in victory for the armies of the North, i.e. the industrial bourgeoisie, this was a sign that the bourgeoisie had overstepped the limited horizons of its monopoly over economic power and had laid hold of the state machine, i.e. political power. Bourgeois society, however, was not yet ready (at

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(31) i.e. a dominating and time-consuming effort on the part of the American bourgeoisie to exploit and exhaust the country’s vast natural resources; the absence of feudal hindrances to bourgeois development; a delay in the intensification of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, etc.

least ideologically) for the bureaucratization of state power. The eighteen-year period, from 1865 to 1883, is characterized by the advent of pro-bureaucracy agitation and the beginning of the death-struggle between the executive and the legislature, a struggle which inevitably and ultimately results in the defeat of the latter. In theoretical reference to this last point, it is worth mentioning that the administrative-executive apparatus, in order to detach itself from society and to stand over society, in order to clog the vital pores of society's existence, has to, by its very nature, restrict, amputate and ultimately annihilate all independent organs of public opinion. In the face of accelerating centralization and bureaucratization of state power, the first to fall before the onslaught of the executive is the legislature. This is quite natural, since «supremacy of the legislature» reflects the joint, but weak, command of various sections of the bourgeoisie, whereas «supremacy of the executive» stands for strong government and unbridled rule of one section of the ruling classes.

Before proceeding any further, reference must also be made to two ideological currents which have imposed adverse effects on the genesis of bureaucracy in America. A memento of Jeffersonian thought, the first current derives its distinguishing feature from the identification of democracy with spoils and demands state neutrality towards the various classes and strata of society. According to this line of thought, the administrative (spoils) and political (democracy) systems support and supplement one another. As such, this ideological attitude provided a convenient «smoke-screen» behind which the forces and processes of bourgeois development were given full and free play. With the intensification and concentration of capital, and an ensuing proletarization of the petty-bourgeois masses, this ideological outlook underwent an ostensibly radical transformation and took the form of a demand for state intervention in order to protect the existing state of equilibrium among society's various classes. As such, it provided the necessary impetus for a more or less organized anti-trust movement which, eventually, gathered under its banners all those discontented and doomed elements of bourgeois society, i.e. artisans, handicraftsmen, small-holding peasants etc. These pressures, exerted by those basically petty-bourgeois elements which had been sentenced to an early death by the turn of events and aimed at veering

(33) «Intensification of Capital» and «Concentration of Capital», as used here, are two specific stages in the development of capitalism.
off the objective course of bourgeois development, have not been wholly ineffective. Anti-trust legislation in general and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 in particular appear to be the outcome of these organized pressures. In concluding, it can be claimed that the identification of democracy with spoils and the narrow-sighted insistence on retaining the original functions of the executive, out-fashioned functions at that, have delayed the creation of bureaucracy.

The second general current visualizes the state as the «root of all evils» and insists that the best form of government, so to speak, is one that does not govern. As such, it takes the form of «enmity towards the state» and appears to be the ideological hand-me-down of the struggle waged by the European bourgeoisie against feudalism. This current rests on the absurd belief that market forces, given free play and left on its own, will provide a maximum amount of welfare for a maximum number of persons. The American bourgeoisie, even after the crisis of 1870, remained (partially if not totally) blind to the fact that historical processes were undergoing a rapid transformation, that state intervention in the economy had become the order of the day, that antiquated ideologies and attitudes were weighing heavier and heavier on the shoulders of the ruling classes and, finally, that the impending creation of bureaucracy was something to be hastened and not hindered. Yet, bureaucracy feeds on direct and indirect taxes. Well aware of this fact, the bourgeoisie (or rather, several sections of it) vehemently insisted on preserving their original attitudes.

Viewing the 1865-1883 period from the standpoint of the genesis of bureaucracy, it can said that the first messengers of impending bureaucratization of state power were two enactments, dated 1853 and 1855, «...whereby the clerks of the five major federal departments were...distinguished by specific salary rates, and appointed upon the basis of examinations.» The second all-important turning point appears to be the beginning of the death-struggle between the executive (The President) and the legislature (Congress), with systematic efforts on the part of Congress to restrict those rights which had gone with the President since after colonial times, i.e. appointment to and dismissal from public office. Earlier, president James Madison had argued that the executive, as appointing body, had, by implication, the right to dismiss. On that

(34) Stahl, op. cit., p. 33.
same occasion, Congress had toed the line that the legislature, being in the position of confirming appointments, had, again by implication, the right to confirm dismissals. Throughout the course of these debates, the president had received the backing of the judicial organs, especially the Supreme Court. The matter was again brought to head when President Johnson, succeeding the assassinated Lincoln in office, embarked on a series of mass dismissals and recommended for appointment «names that were highly offensive to the controlling forces in the Senate».

The ensuing short-lived struggle ended in victory for Congress and culminated in the promulgation of a Tenure of Office Act (1867). Yet, the victorious rejoicings of Congress, like the struggle preceding its ostensible victory, were to prove short-lived; Senate, by imposing upon the executive a congressional prerogative to authorize or reject the dismissal of any officeholder whose appointment had been confirmed by that body (i.e. Senate), had taken the first major steps in the direction of creating a state machine with permanent posts and, in doing so, however unconsciously, was hastening itself to an early death. In short, the Tenure of Office Act served the legislature as a highly-effective means of curbing the powers of the executive, but, in the final analysis, by cultivating the administrative-executive apparatus with the seeds of permanence, broke the ground for the ultimate defeat of the legislature and heralded the dawn of bureaucracy.

In the wake of this mounting struggle of giants, the next step in the severance of all existing ties between state and society came somewhat as an anti-climax. This piece of federal legislation, dated 1876 and, in later years, incorporated into the Civil Service and Hatch acts of 1883 and 1939, dealt a further blow to the spoils system by prohibiting all governmental office-holders from receiving, requesting and donating money and/or property for political purposes.

The decisive turning-point in the genesis of bureaucracy was reached in 1877, when the coal fields of Pennsylvania provided the settings for a series of workers’ uprisings. As if they were waiting for this notice, the proletarians of America, from North to South, East to West, rose like one, armed or unarmed, in rebellion against capitalism. This strike-wave, sweeping the face of the American continent for a period of nine years, 1877 to 1886, proves beyond doubt that the objective conditions for the creation of bureaucracy, not

(35) Ibid., p. 34.
to mention a standing army, have fully matured. The 1870 crisis, earlier, had shockingly revealed that market forces, quite contrary to popular belief, could not provide maximum welfare for a maximum number of persons. The 1877-1886 strike-wave brought about the startling revelation and realization that the same market forces, left on their own, operated not as the protectors, but, on the contrary, as the grave-diggers of bourgeois society. The first organized action in favour of the bureaucratization of bourgeois state power came in 1877, with the establishment of the New York Civil Service Reform Association. Yet, the American bourgeoisie, with the death-bed agonies of capitalism still before its eyes, remained incapable of shedding, immediately and instantly, that cumbersome ideological burden which had been conditioned and steered by centuries of struggle against feudalism in Europe, i.e. enmity towards state intervention in the economy. The effects of this ideological stance, ranging from indifference to active resistance, are fully demonstrated by the fact that the number of affiliates to the New York association, four years after its establishment, remained at a ridiculously-low thirteen. 36

5. Creation of Bureaucracy, 1883 Onwards:

As the saying goes, a small spark starts a prairie fire. True to the word, public opinion swayed in opposition to the spoils system and, with no other place to go, swung to the side of bureaucracy when President Garfield was assassinated in 1881 by a disappointed office-seeker. It can therefore be justifiably claimed that the post-1883 period actually commenced in 1881.

Garfield’s assassination provided disillusioned and dwindling pro-bureaucracy agitation with the necessary impetus and enabled the more progressive sections of the ruling classes to capitalize on those «beloved sentiments» so appealing and tantalizing to the bourgeois mind, i.e. inviolability and protection of man’s birthright to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The wave of indignation, to put it mildly, culminated in the Civil Service Act of 1883, which elaborated certain measures to ensure tenure of office, prohibited the subsidizing of political parties by governmental officeholders, established a standing civil service commission directly

36 Stahl states that the thirteen associations, scattered from Massachusetts to Missouri, were later affiliated with the National Civil Service Reform League (Ibid., p. 35).
responsible to the President for the regulation of administrative affairs, etc.

Throughout this period we observe a systematic and ceaseless struggle between two seemingly-hostile ideologies, both basically bourgeois, but representing, so to speak, two different stages of bourgeois development. The first of the two represents the status quo ante, the yesteryear of bourgeois society in all freshness of its youth; rants and raves about the evils of state intervention, continually harps on such ancient themes as «enmity towards the state» and finds, in the existence of state power, a convenient scapegoat with which to explain away the ever-increasing miseries of its followers; shuts its eyes to the profound changes brought about by the motivating forces of history; and, finally, gathers under its banners all those discontented and exiting elements of bourgeois society, the petty-bourgeois and the semi-proletarians who have been created and doomed by the objective laws of capitalist development. The second current represents the present and future of bourgeois society and, as such, is the ideological outlook of the big bourgeoisie, of monopoly capital. The big bourgeoisie is fully aware of the fact that historical processes are undergoing a rapid transformation and that the bureaucratization of bourgeois state power, in the light of these newly-arisen circumstances, would not prove to be the «root of all evils», but, on the contrary, would function as an highly efficient means for protecting bourgeois society from the perils of economic crisis and for averting the objectively-possible threat of proletarian power. Woodrow Wilson, America’s twenty-seventh president, provides us with the following brief glimpse of monopoly capital’s train of thought, as related to the question of their future state: 37

Our peculiar American difficulty in organizing administration is not the danger of losing liberty, but the danger of not being able or willing to separate its essentials from its accidents. Our success is made doubtful by that besetting error of ours, the error of trying to do too much by vote. Self-government does not consist in having a hand in everything, any more than housekeeping consists necessarily in cooking dinner with one’s own hands. The cook must be trusted with a large discretion as to the management of the fires and the ovens.

In view of the objective realities of the time, this statement on the part of Wilson, i.e. the big bourgeoisie, is sheer realism. The

problem of bureaucratizing state power is an all-important matter, the order of the day at that, and cannot be handled properly by resorting to the use of meaningless abstractions. What really matters is not state intervention, in itself, but, on whose behalf the state shall intervene. As long as the state intervenes on behalf of the ruling classes in general and the big bourgeoisie in particular, for the specific and singular purpose of lengthening the life-span of bourgeois society, well and above-board.

Yet, the struggle waged by the more progressive section of the ruling classes (i.e. the big bourgeoisie) to free bourgeois society from the yoke of an antiquated ideology had its ups and downs, and a certain period of time had to elapse before a new state of equilibrium could be established between society and its executive-administrative edifice. This further delay is illustrated by the fact that thirty-seven years after the promulgation of the Civil Service Act, only nine Union-member states possessed similar legislation.\(^{38}\) It took another economic crisis, the biggest so far, that of 1929, for all ideological barriers preventing the creation of bureaucracy to take their last curtain-calls.

With the 1929 crisis, curtains fall for Adam Smith's omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, invincible, invisible etc. «hand». The new developments, finding an ideological platform in the formulations of Keynes and a somewhat «diluted» realization in the New Deal, rest mainly (if not completely) on the simple principle that *surplus production be absorbed by state entry into the market*. The acknowledgement of the necessity of state intervention in the economy, has contributed greatly to efforts for the creation of bureaucracy.

Viewed in retrospective, it appears that the process of bureaucratizing America's state machine, a process which gained momentum and reached the peak of its acceleration in the post-1935 period, has proceeded along three distinct and ultimately merging channels. The first step taken in this direction was the *professionalization of the performance of governmental duties*, i.e. the creation of a caste of «professional» administrators as differentiated from the «elected representatives» of the people. With (a) the establishment

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\(^{38}\) The nine Union-member states, with the exception of New York where similar legislation was adopted immediately and instantly, are Massachusetts (1884), Wisconsin and Illinois (1905), Colorado (1907), New Jersey (1908), Ohio (1912), Connecticut and California (1913), Maryland (1920).
of specific wage-rates; (b) the raising of the level of salaries, so as to recruit «those best suited for office»; (c) the granting of rights to pension; and, finally, (d) the firm entrenchment of the «continuity or service» and «tenure of office» principles, a permanent army of privileged public officials came into being. The second step revolved around the coordination and functional departmentalization of administrative activity, this, in turn, leading to the definite establishment of lines of responsibility, the creation of new government positions, the extension of specialization, the replacement of the old and simple division of labour with a much more complex form, etc. Finally, THE EXECUTIVE, by and large at the expense of the legislature, was increasingly invested with additional powers, this in turn resulting in the complete enslavement and subordination of the legislature to the administrative-executive apparatus. Since the numerical expansion of the «permanent army of privileged public officials» can be considered a more or less accurate indication of the extent of bureaucracy, the following two tables, I believe, will provide fine reading.

The Expansion of Bureaucracy in America, 1900 to 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE I: Civil Service/Working Pop.</th>
<th>TABLE II: Rate of Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Total In Govt Employ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,109,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,672,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,264,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>3,243,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4,061,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5,150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The reports of the two Hoover Commissions (1949 and 1955), the recommendations of the Sixth American Assembly (1954) and the report of the President’s Commission on National Goals (1960) are further prominent milestones in the genesis of bureaucracy. Stahl remarks that of the two Hoover Commission reports, particularly the second placed a great deal of emphasis on «...such matters as career development, improvement of managerial competen-
nce, and clear separation of the career service from the political policy corps.»³⁹ Developments of this nature, characteristic of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, have gone to create and cement bureaucracy, at a pace hitherto unknown.

What is the situation in America today? What results can be gleaned from our rather sketchy account of American administrative history? It is my belief that an analysis, however brief, of the Eisenhower administration (1952-1960), the point of culmination of a process continuing since colonial times, will provide us a valuable insight into the nature and functioning of bureaucracy in America. There have been those who, after scrutinizing the Eisenhower administration, rejoice at a «revival of the past», at the «repetition» of the 1776-1865 period when state power, ostensibly, rpt. ostensibly, did not exist. The Eisenhower administration has furnished material for such unfounded wisecracks as «A Presidential System Without a President», «A President Who Reigned But Not Ruled», «Ike Proved America Could Be Administered Without A President» etc. On the contrary, the Eisenhower period represents the logical outcome, the inevitable synthesis, of a process lasting well over a hundred years and, as such, reflects the simple fact that state power has finally and completely been concentrated in the hands of an enormous administrative-executive apparatus, an apparatus which administers the «joint» affairs of the ruling classes on behalf of its most powerful segment, i.e. the big bourgeoisie. Adopting Woodrow Wilson’s quaint expression, the Eisenhower administration is a coeks' administration. It is here that the state has broken all «visible ties» between society and itself. It is here that the state, emerging from society and gradually detaching itself from society, has undergone a final transformation which enables this former servant of society to lord over society. Yet, the «Eisenhower Administration» is a singularly unfortunate one, for it is here that its ostensible head proves incapable of dazzling the public eye with the illusory «leviathan’s mirrors» of a strong, gallant and dashing personality, so characteristic of many a predecessor. And when the presidential mantle falls on the shoulders of a person who is unable to manipulate these trick-mirrors and create a façade brilliant enough to obscure the background, we fleetingly glimpse the incessant palpitations of a gigantic machine at work, a machine oblivious of what goes on under the spotlights, a machine which jumps at the will and bidding of its owner, a machine called bureaucracy. It is

here in the Eisenhower period, for the first time in American history, that this enormous military-bureaucratic apparatus, so reminiscent of the Abominable Snowman of the Himalayas, has been caught out in the open.

III. THE GENESIS OF BUREAUCRACY
IN ENGLAND

A. Some General Remarks on Bureaucracy in England:

   England has remained, until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, one of the two rare exceptions in bourgeois society, a purely capitalist country without an omnipresent bureaucracy. Yet, that same England, within the short space of a half-century, lost this distinction and became, so to speak, the «Mecca of Bureaucracy».

   The apparent «time-lag» in the creation of bureaucracy and the extraordinary pace of accelerated development following it can only be explained with reference to those objective conditions eventually and inevitably bringing about the centralization of bourgeois state power and the specific peculiarities accompanying England’s transition from feudalism to capitalism. To begin with, it is common knowledge that «...the long fight of the bourgeoisie against feudalism culminated in three great, decisive battles.» In the course of these battles and with the exception of England, the centralized organs of bourgeois state power, i.e. bureaucracy and the standing army, came to serve bourgeois society as the mightiest anti-feudal weapon in its arsenal. This superstructural steam-shovel, after clearing the social soil of all feudal hindrances to bourgeois development, undergoes a rapid transformation and becomes, in the hands of the bourgeoisie, a deadly means for subduing all manifestations of the working-class movement. The dual character, i.e. anti-feudal and anti-proletarian, of those tasks and duties coming un-

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(40) Marx's observation to this effect holds true until the turning of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. From this point on, the state machines of both England and America enter a period of rapid bureaucratization, undergoing profound structural changes in the process.

(41) The first was the Protestant Reformation in Germany which erupted into two insurrections of a political nature, the Franz von Sickingen uprising in 1523 and the Peasants' War in 1525; the second appears to be the 1689 «compromise» in England; the third is the Great French Revolution of 1789 (Marx-Engels, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 103).
der the responsibility of bourgeois state power accounts, quite matter-of-factly, for yet another distinct characteristic of bureaucracy in its relations with bourgeois society, that of indispensability. As such, bureaucracy, both in the earlier and later stages of its genesis, serves bourgeois society in general and the ruling classes in particular, as a highly-effective means for preparing, securing and cementing the class-rule of the bourgeoisie.

A question now arises. Why did England, of all places, the most «bourgeois» of the bourgeois societies of its time, never come to place the creation of bureaucracy on its order of the day? This leads us to one further question. What were the specific features accompanying England’s transition from feudalism to capitalism and how, in the final analysis, did these features effect the creation of bureaucracy? An attempt to display the class forces and contenders for power in pre-nineteenth century England, a brief analysis of the class forces pitted against one another on the battlefields of class warfare, a comprehensive sketch of the ideological attitude adopted by the opponents and proponents of bourgeois rule, etc., will provide us with a proper understanding of why and how things came to a head as late as the third quarter of the nineteenth century and will enable us to lay bare the inner workings of England’s transitory progress from feudalism to capitalism, for it is in the readily-distinguishable peculiarities of this transition that the key to the puzzle lies.

Viewing the centralization and eventual bureaucratization of bourgeois state power in retrospective, one observes the existence of three characteristic periods, with the first two bearing a certain basic resemblance, and all three portraying those objective conditions which, in the final analysis, delayed the appearance but, at the same time and in doing so, inevitably and unavoidably broke the ground for the accelerated break-through of bureaucracy in England. The periods referred to are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1689</td>
<td>Period of fall of feudalism and the prevalence of conditions which do not necessitate the creation of bureaucracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1689-1848</td>
<td>Period of compromise between bourgeoisie and ex-feudal landowners (aristocracy), with bureaucracy still absent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848-</td>
<td>Period of steadily accelerating bureaucratization of bourgeois state power.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(42) Reference made here to the historical period beginning with the «enclosure movement» and extending well into the nineteenth century.
B. FIRST PERIOD, The Fall of Feudalism

War, that simple instrument of the historical process, appears throughout the ages as a «precipitating factor», par excellence. Sure enough, just as a four-year civil war, centuries later, was to prove instrumental in bringing about the termination of the system of slavery prevailing in the southern states of the American Union, so, it took a large-scale war, a war spaced interruptedly over a period of thirty years, the War of Roses, to bring feudalism in England to an abrupt and unexpected end. But with two basic differences! Firstly, contrary to the situation in America where a stronger and more progressive segment of society, i.e. the industrial bourgeoisie, had subdued and subjected to itself a weaker and reactionary section of that same society, i.e. the landed estate, the downfall of feudalism in England came as feudalism's, or rather the feudal barons', own doing. Secondly, whereas the American Civil War precipitated the urgent objective necessity of creating the highly centralized organs of bourgeois state power, i.e. a military-bureaucratic apparatus, the War of Roses removed that necessity altogether.

The War of Roses (1455-1485), that acknowledged starting-point of the downfall of feudalism in England, remains to this very day a feat unparalleled in the annals of class warfare, the unique example of class-suicide; for it was here that the feudal landlords of England divided themselves into two hostile camps, the House of York (white rose) and the House of Lancaster (red rose), and blindly fought it out for dynastic control, massacring one another in due process and bringing society to the brink of extinction. Engels, in his «Special Introduction to the 1892 English Edition of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific», provides the following portrayal of the consequences of this social hara-kiri:

Fortunately for England, the old feudal barons had killed one another during the Wars of the Roses. Their successors, though mostly scions of the old families, had been so much out of the direct line of descent that they constituted quite a new body, with habits and tendencies

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(43) For a detailed account of the fall of feudalism and the transition from feudalism into capitalism in England, refer to:

(44) Reference made to the American Civil War, 1861-1865.

far more bourgeois than feudal. They fully understood the value of money, and at once began to increase their rents by turning hundreds of small farmers out and replacing them by sheep [the enclosure movement].

As distinct from the attitude adopted by their French counterparts, whom we observe quixotically pitting themselves against the inevitable laws of bourgeois development, the ex-feudal landowners of England, as of now called the aristocracy, complied fully with the objective course of history and eventually became, so to speak, «the first bourgeois of the kingdom.»

This convenient and timely process of transformation on the part of the landed elements of society, a process which facilitated a characteristically smooth transition from feudalism into capitalism, continued, with the unavoidable ups and downs of pace, from Henry the Seventh’s ascension to the throne until the end of the seventeenth century. In summing up, the nature and consequential effects of the War of Roses can be lumped together so as to constitute three general observations. To begin with, the feudal barons of old had been killed off during the War of Roses and had been replaced by the aristocracy, i.e. those descendents of the feudal landowners who, from the standpoint of habit and attitude, are more «bourgeois» than «feudal». Secondly, these ex-feudal landowners, instead of countering bourgeois development, foresaw and complied with its inevitable course. Thus the aristocracy, by its very nature, shouldered the burdensome historical mission of accomplishing a more or less smooth transition into capitalism and, by way of inference, sought to benefit, directly or indirectly, from the economic spoils

(46) Ibid., p. 105.

(47) An accelerated pace in the transition from feudalism into capitalism is particularly characteristic of the reign of Henry the Eighth, 1509 to 1547. This monarch, in a period when the Roman Catholic Church operated as the great international centre of feudalism, spearheaded an all-out attack against the institutions and remnants of feudalism, confiscated the landed estates belonging to the Church and ultimately, in a successful attempt to break the economic and political power of feudalism, declared war on Catholicism. In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that the Roman Catholic Church, before the start of Henry the Eighth's crusade, a crusade which created flocks and flocks of new bourgeois in England, held in its possession one-third of the lands in the Catholic world.

(48) Henry VII, first Tudor king, ended the War of Roses, brought peace to the Houses of York and Lancaster, and broke the economic and political powers of the feudal barons by levying heavy taxes.
rural bourgeoisie. As such, the conditions had seemingly ripened for a large-scale, pro-bourgeois purge, a purge which would culminate in civil war. The 1642-1649 upheaval, brought on by the ever-increasing demands of nascent bourgeois society and fought out by the yeomanry of the countryside, reached its decisive turning-point with the establishment of a standing army, Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army, and eventually succeeded in sending Charles I to the gallows.

From the civil war, which ended in temporary victory for Parliament and the bourgeoisie, to the «Glorious Revolution», which once and for all confirmed the identification of state power with bourgeois rule, there exists a forty-year period of incessant struggle and intermittent change in the power structure of society, a period which involves every single segment of society in the bitter struggle to take over and retain control of the state machine, with no one class being able to permanently seize upon state power and wield it for its own purposes. Bourgeois victory in the civil war is succeeded, eleven years later, by the Restoration movement and the

(51) «The newly-established alliance between the urban and rural bourgeoisie» refers to the concessionary and conciliatory alliance which realized the compromise of 1689. The terms «rural bourgeoisie» and «aristocracy» are used, more or less, synonymously (for reasons see n 23).

(52) The yeomanry constitute that «unfortunate» segment of the peasantry, the middle and small free-holders, who are first created and then destroyed by the inevitable laws of bourgeois development. The revolution in England, like all bourgeois revolutions, was fought out and won by these ex-serfs, i.e. the yeomanry, who, then, embarked on the voyage to extinction. A hundred years after Cromwell, remarks Engels, the yeomanry of England, who had done all the fighting a century ago, had almost disappeared (Marx-Engels, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 104).

(53) The victory of Parliament in 1649 was short-lived, eleven years to be exact. From 1649 onwards, several Royalist insurrections occurred, all of which were ruthlessly suppressed by the armies of Cromwell. Following Cromwell’s death, however, the Duke of Albemarle was instrumental in returning Charles II to the throne. The so-called Period of Restoration, 1660 to 1689, is characterized by the abolition, in favour of the monarchy, of all powers hitherto enjoyed by Parliament. Ultimate and permanent victory for Parliament came twenty-nine years after the Restoration, with the realization of the «Great Compromise» of 1689.

(54) The question of the «class content» of the Restoration movement has yet to be answered. It can be reservedly claimed, however, that the Royalist camp bringing about the Restoration was mainly composed of the same far-from-homogenous elements who losingly fought out the 1642-1649 civil war, i.e. feudal elements already on the road to
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unswayed domination of Royalist elements; Parliament, imme-
diately after the civil war and in an attempt to cement its newly-ac-
quired powers, purges the state machine of all Royalist elements,
only to be ousted from control and to lose every single foothold in
the state apparatus when the Royalists, in the wake of the 1660
Restoration, justifiably embark upon a counter-purge. Describing
the period, Finer remarks that every single position in the state
apparatus soon became «...a pawn in the struggle between Parlia-
ment and the King.»\(^{55}\) In summing up, it can be said that these
narrowly-spaced alternations in the power structure of society,
these violent disturbances in the relations between state and so-
ciety which continued until the compromise of 1689, have been
instrumental in the destruction of even the faintest possibility of
bureaucratizing the state machine.

C. SECOND PERIOD, The «Great Compromise» of 1689:

In view of the long and bitter struggles characterizing the pe-
riod of «Great Rebellion»,\(^{56}\) the compromise of 1689, i.e. the estab-
ishment of a concessionary alliance between the bourgeoisie and
the aristocracy, being already an accomplished fact, came much as
an anti-climax. «...The comparatively puny event entitled by Liberal
historians 'The Glorious Revolution'...»\(^{57}\) signifies nothing more than
the fact that this alliance of the urban and rural bourgeoisie, now
that its constituent members have reached a «gentleman's agree-
ment» on how the economic and political spoils are to be divided
in the future, has readily and conveniently seized upon state po-
wer.

Yet, the alliance itself appears to be anything but insignificant.
For one thing, its existence is a sure-fire guarantee that society, in
the course of its transition from feudalism into capitalism, will not
be torn asunder by an undesirable class war. Secondly, it goes to
show that once the «sovereign» is deprived of all his absolute po-
ers and is dispossessed of the backing of any one class, bourgeois
society, nascent and mature alike, can go on administering its af-
fairs through the agency of the monarchic state edifice, without

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\(^{55}\) Finer, op. cit., p. 31.

\(^{56}\) The so-called «period of Great Rebellion» starts with the civil war,
1642, and continues until the compromise of 1689.

rpt. without losing anything from the desired level of efficiency; on the contrary, state power haloed with the divine powers and rights of a monarch who, in actuality, reigns but not rules, may easily succeed where other forms of state power, particularly those lacking a «divine and spiritual halo», inevitably fail. Thirdly, it represents an awareness of the fact that unless strict measures are resorted to, the repetition of such undesirable events as the 1660 Restoration may well become commonplace. Finally, it reflects the obvious fact that, since feudalism is on the path of gradual extinction and since many a feudal institution is being rapidly absorbed into the workings of the capitalist system, a bureaucratic apparatus, a machine which resorts to the systematic and incessant use of force as a means of hastening feudalism's departure, has yet to appear on the «shopping-list» of the bourgeoisie. The objective conditions bringing about the compromise of 1689 have, undoubtedly, imposed «delaying» effects on the creation of bureaucracy. A brief analysis of these effects is due at this point.

Parliament, in order to provide permanent protection for its newly acquired powers and to further divest the monarchy of anything resembling an «independent will», had immediately embarked upon a «witch-hunt» directed against those office-holders with royalist sentiments and affiliations, purging the state apparatus dust-free, from the higher rungs of the hierarchic ladder to the lowest, in due process. But, by using public office as a «pawn» in its struggle against the monarchy, Parliament soon proved to be instrumental in replacing one form of patronage with another. The practice of patronage, as made apparent by referring to the spoils system in America, inevitably causes a delay in the appearance of a bureaucracy with permanent posts.

The second source of delay in the creation of bureaucracy is provided for by the concessionary nature of the alliance controlling state power and by the «unspoken» provisions of its characteristic division of labour. The regulatory principles of the alliance, based on an acknowledged atmosphere of cooperation and co-existence,

(58) Throughout the period of absolute monarchy, the basic principle regulating the organization and functioning of state administration had been «investiture». With the acknowledgement of the supremacy of the legislature and the establishment of Parliamentary control over administration, «loyalty to Parliament» succeeded «loyalty to the monarch» as the sole requirement for filling government positions.
and that simple understanding which goes with its peculiar division of labour are portrayed by Engels as follows: 59

The compromise of 1689 was, therefore, easily accomplished. The political spoils of «pelf and place» were left to the great landowning families, provided the economic interests of the financial, manufacturing and commercial middle class were sufficiently attended to. And these economic interests were at that time powerful enough to determine the general policy of the nation. There might be squabbles about matters of detail, but, on the whole, the aristocratic oligarchy knew too well that its own economic prosperity was irretrievably bound up with that of the industrial and commercial middle class...

To return to our British bourgeois... What should the British bourgeois do without his aristocracy, that taught him manners, such as they were, and invented fashions for him—that furnished officers of the army, which kept order at home, and the navy, which conquered colonial possessions and new markets abroad?

This brief but comprehensive analysis enables us to observe the alliance at work. The division of labour, a very simple one at that, rests on the understanding that the political and administrative positions in the state apparatus are to be left, solely and entirely, to the ex-feudal landowners, i.e. the aristocracy, while the management of economic affairs is to come under the direct and exclusive monopoly of the urban middle class, i.e. the bourgeoisie, with a further implicit understanding that the latter shall be the predominant guiding force of the alliance. This state of harmony and synchronized progress has removed the necessity of having to force the landed elements of society into submission.

The third factor, causing delay, is directly related to the anti-feudal and anti-proletarian character of the military-bureaucratic machine. For it is here, in this period of compromise, that the ex-feudal landowners conveniently transform themselves into capitalistic farmers and the proletariat, that anti-thesis of modern capitalism, has not yet come to exist on a large-scale; consequently, bourgeois society can go on managing without an «anti-feudal» apparatus and does not feel the pressures of having to wield its organs of state power into an «omnipresent anti-proletarian force».

Yet, throughout the period succeeding the compromise of 1689, despite the prolonged absence of bureaucracy, we observe a gradual severance of the «visible ties» between state and society, i.e. the detachment of the state from society. Excepting the Ministers

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of State, who maintain contact between Parliament and the admin-
nistrative-executive apparatus, all holders of public office are exclu-
ded from politics in general and Parliament in particular; all high-
ranking postal officials are prohibited from taking part in elections
in 1712; customs, excise and postal officials (constituting one-sixth
of the total electorate at the time) are disfranchised in 1782, etc. 60
These measures, to cite a few out of many, taken in the direction
of severing the ties between politics and administration, have, in
the final analysis, proved instrumental in creating those necessary
pre-conditions of the appearance of a bureaucracy with permanent
posts.

A century after the «Glorious Compromise», Europe witnessed
its third (and incidentally most violent) bourgeois upheaval. The
French Revolution of 1789, while resorting to a systematic use of
revolutionary violence in tearing down and ultimately annihilating
all feudal hindrances to bourgeois development, was indirectly respon-
sible for preparing the eventual upsurge of the British bour-
ggeoisie. For one thing, a near-complete state of chaos prevailed in
post-Revolution France. This enabled the bourgeoisie of England, aided
and abetted to the full by the reactionary monarchies of the
Continent, «...to destroy French maritime commerce, to annex French
colonies, and to crush the last French pretensions to maritime ri-
valry.» 61 The French Revolution was further instrumental in pre-
cipitating the first signs of unrest in the concessionary alliance
between the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. One segment
of the alliance, that segment which benefitted most from its concili-
atory and concessionary arrangements, while making full use of
the opportunities provided by the state of chaos in France, fiercely
pitted itself against the French Revolution and the direction it had
taken. As Engels justly points out, 62 the «deplorable» violence and
terrorism accompanying the anti-feudal progress of the French
Revolution, its attempt to wipe the aristocracy off the face of the
map and to carry bourgeois rule to its extremes, etc., inevitably went
against the grain of England's ruling alliance, so to speak. Yet,
there appeared in Parliament a relatively ineffective minority,
a minority who sided with the French Revolution and its route of
progress, a minority who had started to feel the adverse side-effects

(60) Finer, op. cit., p. 32.
(62) Ibid., p. 108.
of England's peculiar (characteristic) transition from feudalism into capitalism, a minority composed mainly of the upper strata of the petty-bourgeoisie, a minority who had become fully aware, as of late, that they were getting «the raw end of the deal» and that sole responsibility for their ever-worsening state of misery rested with the concessionary character of the ruling alliance. Thus, the French Revolution of 1789, however unconsciously, had sown the first seeds of unrest, seeds which would eventually and inevitably flower into the dismissal of the aristocracy and evolve into those objective conditions necessary for the creation of bureaucracy.

With the French Revolution still in progress, the earth-shaking inventions of Watt, Arkwright and Cartwright 63 had furnished the ruling classes of England with the essential prerequisites of initiating an industrial revolution. This so-called «Industrial Revolution» forced upon society a radical change in its power structure, i.e. a violent shift in its centre of gravity of economic power highly favourable to the industrial bourgeoisie, with the obvious consequence that the growing industrial forces of society were able to break free of their fetters. Engels depicts the changes, wrought by this shift, as follow: 64

The wealth of the bourgeoisie increased considerably faster than that of the landed aristocracy. Within the bourgeoisie itself, the financial aristocracy, the bankers, etc., were more and more pushed into the background by the manufacturers. The compromise of 1689, even after the gradual changes it had undergone in favour of the bourgeoisie, no longer corresponded to the relative position of the parties to it... The political power still left to the aristocracy, and used by them to resist the pretensions of the new industrial bourgeoisie, became incompatible with the new economic interests. A fresh struggle with the aristocracy was necessary; it could end only in the victory of the new economic power [industrial bourgeoisie].

The Reform Act of 1832 and the repeal of the Corn Laws 65 appear to be the preliminary steps taken in the direction of breaking

(63) James Watt invented the steam-engine in 1765, Richard Arkwright the spinning-wheel in 1769 and Edmund Cartwright the power-loom in 1785.


(65) England's grain-import restrictions, taking the form of the Corn Laws, had, for many years, protected the big landowners and contributed to their prosperity. The landed elements of society were dealt a severe blow in 1846, with the adoption of a law providing for the abolition of grain-import restrictions in three years. The Corn Laws were repealed, accordingly, in 1849.
down the political and economic resistance of the English aristocracy, and, at the same time, *heralding the dawn of unfettered bourgeoisie rule*. Yet, just as the «industrial revolution» proved incapable of realizing a complete dismissal of the aristocracy from the arena of economic struggle, so, the Reform Act of 1832 failed to annihilate the aristocracy's monopoly over political and public office. The staunch resistance put up by the aristocracy at this point, surprisingly, encountered a meek and matter-of-factly submission on the part of the class monopolizing economic power, i.e. the bourgeoisie. The following passage provides valuable insight into this curious fact:  

*Even the victory of 1832 left the landed aristocracy in almost exclusive possession of all the leading Government offices. The meekness with which the wealthy middle class submitted to this remained inconceivable to me until the great Liberal manufacturer, Mr. W. A. Forster, in a public speech implored the young men of Bradford to learn French, as a means to get on in the world, and quoted from his own experience how sheepish he looked when, as a Cabinet Minister, he had to move in society where French was, at least, as necessary as English! The fact was, the English middle class of that time were, as a rule, quite uneducated upstarts, and could not help leaving to the aristocracy those superior Government places where other qualifications were required than mere insular narrowness and insular conceit, seasoned by business sharpness.*

The growing inconvenience of having to perform state interference in public life by means of *ad hoc committees*; an ever-increasing pressure in the direction of replacing these temporary arrangements with permanent organs of centralized state power; the farsighted, «pro-bureaucracy» recommendations of such prominent bourgeois thinkers as Bentham and Burke; the incessant and ultimately pro-bureaucratic agitation carried out by industrialists like Forster, etc., characterize this new period and can be received as evidence of the fact that, *slow but sure, the creation of bureaucracy is becoming the order of the day*. Yet, despite these efforts and

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(67) Fully aware of these inconveniences, the bourgeoisie took steps in the direction of creating permanent organs of state power. The most prominent of these steps are the following: establishment of factory inspection (1833), establishment of a central administrative authority to administer educational grants-in-aid (1839), establishment of municipal police forces (1835) and of the country police (1839), appointment of local Boards of Health (1831), opening of a State statistical department (1837), etc. (Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 36).
pressures, the turning-point in the creation of bureaucracy is not reached until 1848. Only then, in 1848; two years after the repeal of the Corn Laws and even before the political and administrative apparatus can be snatched away from the aristocracy; with the breath-taking appearance of a new contender for power, the PROLETARIAT, on a range of battlefields from England to France, Italy to Germany, Hungary to the Balkans, do we observe the bourgeois of England dashing helter-skelter to the convenient superstructural shelter provided by the state edifice. It is there, and only there, under the omnipresent tentacles of a military-bureaucratic apparatus, that the bourgeois of England can seek and find comparative safety from the proletarian «bogy-man».

D. THIRD PERIOD, The Dawn of Bureaucracy:

When the urgent demand for removing the proletarian threat to bourgeois rule coincided with the further bourgeois desire to abolish the aristocracy’s monopoly over public office, the superstructural soil had apparently been cleared of all possible hindrances to the bureaucratization of bourgeois state power. The first organized effort in the direction of creating an omnipresent and permanent state machine is the 1848-1853 investigation, which eventually culminated in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854. The importance of this report arises from the «pro-bureaucracy» nature of its analytical approach and, consequently, its proposals and demands, i.e. the abolition of all forms and practices of patronage, the acknowledgement of «objective» examinations as the only method of filling public office, the establishment of an independent and permanent Civil Service Commission to regulate and attend to administrative affairs, etc. As such, it represents the «rediscovery of America» but, on the other hand, constitutes an important milestone in the genesis of bureaucracy. Yet, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report derives its most distinguishing characteristic, not from this or that, but, from a complete state of awareness, on the part of the

(68) In stating that the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 was a «rediscovery of America», we have in mind two basic considerations. For one thing, the administrative recommendations of Edmund Burke (1782) and Jeremy Bentham (1810) were much in the same direction. Secondly, the Great French Revolution of 1789, shortly afterwards (1798 to be exact), had created its centralized organs of bourgeois state power, i.e. bureaucracy, the standing army, political police. England’s paragons of insular and chauvinistic narrow-mindedness remained oblivious, for more than a half-century, to these goings-on.
authors, of why bourgeois society needs a military-bureaucratic machine. Quoting from co-author Trevelyan: 69

I wish... briefly to explain the circumstances which led up to the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and myself on the organisation of the Civil Service. The revolutionary period of 1848 gave us a shake (my italics), and one of the consequences was a remarkable series of investigations into public offices, which lasted for five years, culminating in the Organisation Report.

It was not conceivably possible, however, to terminate once and for all, by a mere scratch of the pen, a practice which had weighed heavily upon and dominated British administration for many a century, i.e. the practice of patronage. Similarly, a wholesale purge of those aristocratic elements holding public office, and the severance of the existing ties between the political (legislative) and administrative (executive) organs of state power, remained out of question, at least for the time being. A National Civil Service Commission, established 1855, remained inactive and ineffective for some time to come. Finally, the crucial turning-point in the so-called «institutionalization of the civil service», i.e. bureaucratization of bourgeois state power, was reached in 1870 when, by Order in Council, the following administrative principles were activated: (1) as of that day, «open-competition examinations» are to constitute the obligatory form of filling public office; (2) as of that day, the Treasury, 70 as the central coordinating body, is to be vested with additional powers and is to be held responsible for organizing and maintaining the bureaucratic state machine; (3) by way of exception, however, the Civil Service Commission may dispense with the entrance examination, etc. From this turning-point on, the process of bureaucratization attains its maximum velocity and with the publication of each and every report, 71 providing a convenient bour-

(69) Finer, op. cit., p. 47.

(70) England's Department of the Treasury provides an interesting case-study in the genesis of bureaucracy. The Treasury, with its powers of coordination and financial control, powers permeating every corner of the state machine, proved to be the guiding force of England's transition, from a country without bureaucracy, into the Mecca of Bureaucracy. The tremendous potentials of the Treasury were first acknowledged in 1867, «...by giving its permanent head the title of Permanent Secretary and with a salary higher than that of other heads.» (Thomas Balogh, «The Apotheosis of the Dilettante», Crisis in the Civil Service, ed. Hugh Thomas, Anthony Blond Ltd., England, 1968, p. 14).

(71) These investigation commissions and their respective reports, in order of appearance, are the Playfair Commission, the Rudley Commis-
geois solution to each and every administrative problem, the centralized organs of bourgeois state power stand out in bolder and bolder relief, becoming increasingly independent of and irresponsible towards that same society from which they had recently emerged.

The period stretching from the 1870 crisis to the end of the First Imperialist War (1918) is characterized by the appearence, in England, of a «new caste of mandarins»²² and a significant step-up in the pace of bureaucratization, with the obvious result that «...the power-equation between the bureaucracy and the elected political representatives of the governed was in this way drastically changed.»²² This period of bitter struggle, a period of alternating gains and setbacks, is eventually climaxed on September 4, 1919, when the Lloyd George-Churchill combination, in an attempt to wield the existing state machine into an instrument capable of implementing the 1906-1912 reforms, enacts the recognition of the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury as the Head of the Civil Service. With this final act, accompanied by a seemingly-innocent provision that «all future appointments to public office shall be underwritten by the Prime Minister and the Head of the Civil Service»,²⁴ the process of bureaucratization is complete and England’s permanent army of privileged public officials, an army steeled in tradition and the protection of tradition, emerges as the newest and sole heir to that mythical tenet, what the bourgeois lovingly call Administrative Capacity.

The firm establishment of bureaucratic relations of administration and an increase in the roles and responsibilities attached to the

(72) Liberal thinker Thomas Balogh, in an attempt to guide bureaucracy out of its present dilemma, provides us with a fairly characteristic example of «correct diagnosis-wrong prescription». Balogh’s proposals boil down to a «reorganization of the British system of education» (cf. Balogh, op. cit., pp. 11-52).

(73) Balogh, op. cit., p. 15.

(74) The striking feature of this provision lies in the fact that it relegates the Prime Minister to the position of «figurehead». Within the complex framework of a bureaucratic apparatus, it can not be expected of the Prime Minister, or the departmental minister for that matter, to know the requirements and intricacies of any one public office. Accordingly, all responsibility and de facto appointing powers rest on the shoulders of the upper echelons of the permanent army of public officials in general and the Head of the Civil Service in particular, with the political figureheads retaining, de facto, a rarely-used right of veto.
state machine is inevitably accompanied by a corresponding expansion in the apparatus itself. The following tables, for England, illustrate this fact.

The Expansion of Bureaucracy in England, 1901 to 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total In Govt Employ</th>
<th>Per Cent Of Total Work. Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>885,000</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,379,000</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,511,000</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,677,000</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,129,000</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Rate Of Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-1911</td>
<td>% 7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1921</td>
<td>% 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1931</td>
<td>% 1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1938</td>
<td>% 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-1950</td>
<td>% 2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Historically speaking, bureaucracy, as a form of administration, appears to be the special by-product of bourgeois development and serves bourgeois society as a mighty weapon in its struggle to abolish feudalism, on the one hand, and to suppress all manifestations of the working-class movement, on the other. In doing so, bourgeois society first creates and then destroys the «independent organs of public opinion»; this process is accompanied by an increasing centralization of state power, with the organs of this power gradually detaching themselves from society. Bureaucracy is a form of administration characteristic only of bourgeois society, a sign that all «visible ties» between state and society have finally been severed.

England and America provide two interesting case studies in the genesis of bureaucracy, for it is there that we observe a prolonged absence of the bureaucratic state machine. This prolonged delay in the appearance of bureaucracy can be explained with reference to an absence of feudal hindrances to bourgeois development. The ultimate appearance of bureaucracy in both countries go to prove that bourgeois society, whatever the reasons of delay, cannot go indefinitely without a bureaucracy and must come, sooner or later, into possession of this indispensable organ of bourgeois state power.

(75) For further information on «The Changing Role of Bureaucracy», refer to Fișek, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-70.