Logical Behaviorism

Norman Malcolm, Ilyas Altuner
1.950 403

Abstract


The paper deals exclusively with the doctrine called ‘Logical Behaviorism’. Although this position does not vogue it enjoyed in the 1930s and 1940s, it will always possess a compelling attraction for anyone who is perplexed by the psychological concepts, who has become aware of worthlessness of an appeal to introspection as an account of how we learn those concepts, and he has no inclination to identify mind with brain. There, of course, are other forms of behaviorism, and of reductionism, which is might have discussed in this essay. From Carnap’s point of views, it will serve its purpose if it leads the reader into the writings of Wittgenstein, who is easily the most important in the philosophy of mind. It should not be expected, however, that the reflections and observations of his Philosophical Investigations or his Zettel will somehow add up to another theory. To use his metaphor, philosophical work of the right sort merely unties knots in our understanding

Keywords


Logical behaviorism, Wittgenstein, Carnap, asymmetry, attitudes and behaviors

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18491/bijop.25795

References


Carnap, R. (1953). Psychology in Physical Language. Logical Positivism (ed. A. J. Ayer). Glencoe, Illinois.

Malcolm, N. (1964). Behaviorism as a Philosophy of Psychology. Behaviorism and Phenomenology (ed. T. W. Wann). Chicago.

Shoemaker, S. (1963). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Ithaca, New York.

Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human Behaviour. New York.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. New York.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mantıksal davranışçılık, Wittgenstein, Carnap, bakışımsızlık, tutum ve davranışlar.