THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY:
A ‘CONFLICT PREVENTION’ PERSPECTIVE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ‘ASYMMETRIC THREATS’

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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzed the European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted in ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ in December 2003 by the European Council and reviewed with a implementation report in 2008 within the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It made its analysis by focusing on two research questions: How does the ESS deal with these new security threats? What makes it different and more promising than the US National Security Strategy (USNSS). At the end, it has come to the conclusion that the ESS, constitutes a more promising approach in terms of a long-term solution for a better and a more secure world, and of winning the ‘hearts’ and ‘minds’ of world societies.

Keywords: European Security Strategy (ESS), security threats, the US National Security Strategy (USNSS).

AVRUPA GÜVENLIK STRATEJISI: ASIMETRIK TEHDITLERLE MÜCADELEDE BİR ÇATIŞMA ÖNLEME PERSPEKTIFI

ÖZET
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Due to the end of Cold War, we are not enjoying a geo-strategically balanced and relatively predictable bipolar world anymore. The end of the Cold War and the greater-than-ever pace of globalization have heightened insecurity for the vast majority of people who are increasingly unable to control the global environment which determines the provision of their most basic needs, and increased the relative impotence of the national states to control their national security. Parallel to these developments, and with the addition of new threats to the global environment, the major issues in ‘security agenda’, which were used as ‘identical’ with ‘national security’ in international relations, have been exposed to radical changes.1 The global community, including regional and international organizations, national states, and NGOs, is now struggling to adapt to the new security issues and a new era, one for which the rules are still to be written. These new security issues, which are now identified under a common definition of ‘human security’ agenda, include drug trafficking (‘the war on drugs’), failed states which may behave aggressively inwardly and outwardly, ethno-political conflicts, trans-boundary crime, hostage taking, terrorism, the migration of diseases and of people across national borders, and environmental degradation.2

Within this new context, without disregarding other challenging security concerns, ‘state failures’ have to be taken as the most important issue, although international security agenda has been occupied by the issues of global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction nowadays. It is more important than the other issues for several reasons. First, ‘failed states’ create environments for ‘intra-state conflicts’ that stimulate wider regional conflicts with significant human, economic, and security costs both to neighboring states and to the global environment. Today, ‘inter-state conflicts’ and the risk of disputes stemming from inter-state conflicts escalating to the global level are fewer in number, and most of the contemporary conflicts stem from within states, and sometimes they spill across borders. Some of them are still continuing to worsen, absorbing economic potential, social progress, and many lives while mortgaging the futures of nations.3 Second, such states can and often do serve as safe havens and staging grounds for terrorist organizations, because they are the countries in which the central government does
not exert effective control over, nor is it able to deliver vital services to, significant parts of its own territory due to conflict, ineffective governance, or state collapse. Third, they can also pose serious challenges to other states or regions in terms of the migration of diseases and of people across national borders, trafficking in illicit goods and drugs, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-boundary crime, and lost trade and investment opportunities.4

Regarding the direct and indirect relationship of ‘state failures’ with intra-state violence (which are giving birth to ethno-political conflicts and civil wars), drug trafficking, trans-boundary crime, regional and global terrorism, the migration of diseases and of people across national borders, and even proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a broader and more comprehensive approach is required. While we need a visionary and long-term oriented strategy, which underline the structural causes of state failures, the way how the US, the only super power in the world, is dealing with these threats is far from such a strategy, and its solutions offered to the current security problems are either myopic and short-term oriented, or shaped around pragmatic concerns.

The EU’s approach to these contemporary security threats, in this regard, is not only significant for the world community, but also it constitutes a promising strategy to combat those threats. It is significant, because the EU is becoming one of the biggest international players in the world political system, especially after the enlargement and the adoption of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU defines and positions itself in the international system as a ‘civilian’, ‘soft (plus) power’ and a ‘norm-exporter’ in order to foster an effective multilateral and multidimensional activism for international peace and security by emphasizing the concepts of global responsibility, world solidarity, and common interests of the humanity.5 It is also significant, because its approach to security threats is fundamentally different from that of United States.

This paper, in this context, will deal with the European Security Strategy (ESS), which was adopted in ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ in December 2003 by the European Council and reviewed with a implementation report in 20086 within the context of ESDP.7 It will make its analysis by focusing on two research questions: How does the ESS deal with these new security threats? What makes it different and more promising than the US National Security Strategy (USNSS).8

The central hypothesis of the paper is as follows: Although there are similarities between the two approaches, the ESS and the USNSS, in terms of addressing the problems, the ESS reflects a philosophical difference between European and American perspectives in terms of how to combat current security threats such as organized crime, terrorism, human trafficking, proliferation of WMD,
and intra-state violence. The ESS associates them with ‘state failure’ stemming from bad governance, corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, lack of accountability, and civil conflict, and by underlining the ‘structural causes’, it offers a more comprehensive solution to these challenges as an extension of its traditional culture of ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘crisis management’ within the contexts of ‘multilateral and multidimensional activism’, combining political, economic, and military aspects, whereas in the USNSS, the solutions to these threats have been overshadowed by references to ‘rogue states’, ‘military power’, and the right of the US to ‘act unilaterally’ under a concept of ‘pre-emption’. In this regard, unlike the obvious myopic feature of the USNSS in those issues, the ESS, constitutes a more promising approach in terms of a long-term solution for a better and a more secure world, and of winning the ‘hearts’ and ‘minds’ of world societies.

The organization of the paper will be as follows: First, it will give short trajectory of how the EU is becoming a one of the biggest global players in the world political system, after the enlargement and the adoption of its ESDP. By doing so, it will focus on the strengths of the EU foreign policy, while not disregarding its weaknesses. In this context, it will also analyze EU’s general strategy in addressing the contemporary security threats mentioned before by using the ESS. Second, it will focus on the American perspective in terms of addressing the same issues by using the USNSS, and its weak features especially in terms of the application. Third, it will examine why European perspective is better, and has a more comprehensive and visionary strategy than the American one by focusing on the theoretical and practical findings to prove its central hypothesis. Fourth, it will examine what needs to be done for a better future regarding the deepening divide in transatlantic relationship in the conclusion part of the paper.

THE EU AS A ‘GLOBAL PLAYER’ AND ITS ‘SECURITY STRATEGY’

European integration has been one of the most important developments in international politics since 1950s. The founders of what became the European Union had little or no ambition to create a new kind of international power. From a stage in which the original European Economic Community was given no external powers beyond authority to represent its member states in international trade negotiations, it has come to a point of a common market with a common external tariff and trade policy, which is now the world’s largest market, equipping itself with the ‘euro’ that has made the EU as a major international monetary power, and with 28 member states and more than 450 million people, after the final enlargement. Enlargement has been one of the most effective EU foreign policy tools, encouraging far-reaching and mostly desirable changes in the Union’s backyard. However, the most important and
surprising effects of this integration has been the emergence of the EU as a global power in the international scene, a development that was almost unimaginable in the 1950s.\(^9\)

The EU’s growing into an international power has significant unique characteristics in world’s history. One of them is that it has created such an environment in the global affairs that all European states, especially smaller ones, seek to use the EU as a ‘multiplier’ of their power and influence in international politics, not forgetting the reality that even the Union’s largest states are medium-sized powers compared to the US or China. According to a logic known as the ‘politics of scale’, the whole – the EU speaking and acting as one – is more powerful than the sum of its parts, or the member states acting individually. This logic has been very much self-styled by the EU, as no other regional organization has ever aspired to have a foreign policy.\(^10\) The other one is that the EU has transformed its international role through its own initiatives. Its international weight has increased each time it has enlarged. Meanwhile, it has accumulated new foreign policy tools, beginning with aid programs for Africa in 1963 and culminating with an ESDP.\(^11\) The EU finally adopted a security strategy, the ESS in 2003, just after the severe internal catastrophes such as ‘the deep divisions displayed over the war in Iraq, the abandonment of stability pact that governs monetary union, the failure to reach agreement on an EU constitution, and the level of mistrust and acrimony evinced throughout the year created a serious crisis for the European integration process’\(^12\), and it has became one of the most powerful and important political players in the international arena.

Although European integration through the enlargement to 28 member states and the emergence of the EU as a global player have been impressive, this does not necessarily mean that it does not have any serious problems especially referring to its foreign policy. Its foreign policy is still hindered by a series of gaps that often prevent outcomes from matching ambitions. First of all, severe tensions persist between member states and the main EU institutions, European Commission and European Parliament, about ‘who speaks for Europe’. A basic problem for the EU is that it has never given a clear answer to Henry Kissinger’s legendary question: “what one telephone number do I call when I want to speak to ‘Europe’?“\(^13\) Another gap exists between the EU’s unity on international economic issues, which is often very impressive, and its frequent disunity on more political issues. On matters involving economics or welfare, such as the issues of external trade policy, environmental diplomacy, and integrated EU presence in international monetary diplomacy, it usually speaks with more or less a single voice. However, it often fails to speak with one voice on matters of ‘high politics’, regarding national sovereignty, prestige, or vital interests. Although CFSP, which has been existed since the Maastricht Treaty,
and meant to cover all aspects of foreign and security policy, there exists no common EU foreign policy in the sense of one that totally replaces or eliminates national policies.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the existence of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the Maastricht Treaty and the EU’s approval of its ESDP with its ESS, it is hard to say that distinctive national foreign policies certainly have disappeared from Europe, even if the EU has become a more important reference point for them. There is no denying that all EU states attempt to put their own national stamp on European foreign policy. France uses the EU to try to enhance its own foreign policy leadership of a Europe that is autonomous from the US. Coupled with keeping its primary position in the UN Security Council as one of the five permanent members, France often tries to use the EU as a power multiplying effect in the international scene to achieve its global ambitions.\textsuperscript{15} Germany has wrapped its post-war foreign policy in a European cloak in order to rehabilitate itself as a foreign power, through ‘Europeanization’ of its foreign policy, the use the EU as a power multiplying effect as France, and its departure from its Atlanticist tradition, especially after Schroder&Fischer-led Social Democrats-Greens coalition government’s being re-elected.\textsuperscript{16} The UK views the EU as useful for organizing pragmatic cooperation on a case-by-case basis. It sometimes displays its Europeanist face, sometimes plays the NATO card, and displays its Atlanticist face, as it happened in the Iraq war, and tries to shape the EU’s foreign policy according to its national pragmatic concerns.\textsuperscript{17} Small states rely on the EU to have a voice in policy debates in the international scene usually dominated by large states, and they see the EU as a vital forum for their countries’ foreign policy actions in order to gain international prestige, improve their reputation in the international community, and exert influence to pursue their value preferences. In addition, neutral European states find the EU provides them with a forum for security cooperation without requiring them to sign on to a mutual defense pact.\textsuperscript{18}

The gap between the Union’s growing economic power and its limited political clout is not a new issue, and it was a source of increasing frustration in the 1990s. One response was the creation of a distinct EU system of making foreign policy, although according to no clear plan. However, despite the gaps examined above, it does not necessarily mean that it always lacks the capability of acting quickly and coherently. To overcome these gaps, the EU has tried to take a lot of measures in its foreign policy so as to match its ambitions to become one of the dominant global players in international scene. In parallel with such trials, it incorporated a nascent European Security and defense Policy (ESDP) over time, thus raising new questions about precisely what kind of global actor the EU was becoming.\textsuperscript{19} Each time the EU was faced with an international crisis, it got
experience to act more quickly, coherently, and decisively. The experiences of Bosnia and of Kosovo, and specifically 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks helped the EU act more united and coherently. For example, following the terrorist attacks against the US on 11 September 2001, the EU agreed a raft of statements or decisions within ten days, including separate and joint statements by all EU institutions directly or indirectly associated with its common foreign policy such as European Commission President, EU heads of states or government, European Parliament, High Representative for the CFSP, and European Council. Although the EU has continued to show multiple faces even when it managed to speak with a single voice after the creation of a new High Representative for the CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the EU’s unified policy response and the terrorist threat in general both seemed likely to lend momentum to the integration of European foreign policy.

The year 2003 has been a turning point for the EU, because it has achieved a historical success in terms of adopting a security strategy for the first time in its 50-year history. The European Council formally adopted ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ as the ESS. The Iraqi crisis has forced the EU to acknowledge that, divided, the union is powerless, and a union of 28 member states and more than 450 million people cannot shut itself off the rest of the world trapped in divisions among its members. The ESS can be characterized as a ‘child of one's time’, constructed under “the political pressure generated by the war in Iraq.” It reached a crucial consensus about a solidarity clause among EU members, because Europeans rapidly learned the basic lesson of the Iraq crisis: they no longer could afford an inward-looking orientation while America was engaged with a global agenda that had serious direct or indirect consequences for the union. With the adaption of the ESS, the EU has evolved from a position of security beneficiary to that of a comprehensive security provider. This situation led to the adoption of new security roles focused on prevention of crisis, conflicts and rehabilitation of fragile societies and to further institutionalization of CSDP based on the agreement of Military and civilians Headline Goals.

The ESS is based upon a comprehensive approach to security stating that the EU and its member states would cooperate to tackle their security priorities, which were not only directly related with the security within Europe itself and its neighborhood, but also related with the worldwide security issues that could affect the world peace in direct or indirect ways both in the short and the long term. Its ESDP is mainly based on two pillars, which are building security within Europe and in its neighborhood, and strengthening the international order based on effective multilateralism. The second pillar of this strategy captures the essence of EU’s rule-based security culture reaffirming that the fundamental framework for international relations and the source of legitimate collective action is the UN Charter. It has a
framework, which emphasizes multilateralism and the rule of law, upholding the
principle of the use of force as a last resort. Strengthening the UN system, and
equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is considered as
European priority. This means that even the ‘security threats’ of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) proliferation and international terrorism should be addressed
through ‘effective multilateralism’. In other words, the EU will face such threats and
challenges by supporting the UN system, strengthening national responses through
EU synergies and by addressing root causes such as poverty, state failures, and weak
governance through community instruments and regional dialogue. In short, the EU
positions itself to represent a strong voice in the international system as a ‘civilian’,
‘soft (plus) power’, and a ‘norm-exporter’ to create an effective multilateral and
multidimensional activism for international peace and security, given its norm-based
approach. 25

Along with other security issues such as drug trafficking, intra-state violence,
trans-boundary crime, the migration of diseases and of people across national
borders, and environmental degradation, which are mentioned in the beginning of the
paper, ‘international terrorism’, ‘the proliferation of WMD’, and ‘failing states’ are
identified as three major threats by the ESS. In such an environment, the EU
recognizes that the traditional line of defense has become a thing of the past. 26 Such
threats are also shared by the USNSS. 27 However, if the security threats are similar,
their management is not. In the EU’s view, addressing these threats cannot be limited
to military force. While not excluding it, the union intends to take a broader
approach, combining political, economic, and civil with military strategies. It sees
global responses as the only effective solutions to terrorism, and stronger
international regimes and conditional aid and assistance as the best methods to
counter WMD proliferation. Without excluding the use of force, the union clearly
rejects a strategy of preemptive strikes. And, while the union recognizes that ‘failed’
or ‘failing’ states are a major source of instability, it advocates the extension of better
governance rather than regime change. It also associates the first two threats with
‘state failure’ stemming from bad governance, corruption, abuse of power, weak
institutions, lack of accountability, and civil conflict, and by underlining the
‘structural causes’, it offers a more comprehensive solution to these challenges as an
extension of its traditional culture of ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘crisis management’
within the contexts of ‘multilateral and multidimensional activism’, combining
political, economic, and military aspects. 28

As it is argued in the central hypothesis of the paper, the ESS, in this regard,
constitutes a more promising approach in terms of a long-term solution for a better
and a more secure world, and of winning the ‘hearts’ and ‘minds’ of world societies,
compared to the USNSS, in which the solutions to these threats have been
overshadowed by references to ‘rogue states’, ‘military power’, and the right of the US to ‘act unilaterally’ under a concept of ‘pre-emption’. However, in order to better understand the comparative superiority of the European perspective over the American one supported with concrete findings, in terms of addressing these issues, it is first required to analyze the USNSS and its main pillars. The paper will do it in the next section.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES (USNSS)

The National Security Strategy of the United States (USNSS) became apparent by its publication in September 2002 and revised in May 2010. Although it addresses the same threats with the ESS, such as drug trafficking, intra-state violence, trans-boundary crime, international terrorism, failing states, proliferation of WMD, the migration of diseases and of people across national borders, and environmental degradation as today’s security risks and challenges, the main concerns and how to deal with them are significantly different than the ESS. It indicates that U.S. foreign policy rests on three main pillars: ‘a doctrine of unrivaled military supremacy’, ‘the concept of preemptive or preventive war’, and a ‘willingness to act unilaterally if multilateral cooperation cannot be achieved’.

The USNSS, in terms of addressing the proliferation of WMD and terrorism, argues that the policy of deterrence is no longer sufficient to prevent a ‘rogue’ nation or a ‘terrorist organization’ from using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and a new policy is necessary to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among rogue states and terrorist groups. This is explained by a ‘first strike doctrine’. The document centralizes the concepts of ‘preemptive’ and ‘preventive’ wars in terms of dealing with the proliferation of WMD and terrorism. Preemptive military force or preemption involves striking first at an imminent and ominous threat, believing that an attack is going to occur. Preventive war is described as the use of force against non-imminent threats in the hope of preventing against future attacks. This new method of using preemptive or preventive force dismisses the utility of deterrence and containment and places considerable faith in predicting the future intentions of states (‘rogue’ states in this context) and non-states (terrorist organizations). It is premised on the belief that terrorists which combine suicidal attacks with other deadly tactics and states that support terrorism and pursue WMD cannot be contained and deterred.

Regarding the USNSS, it can be argued that September 11 events provided the US with the political opportunity to transform its strategic national security doctrine.
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toward a strategy, which emphasizes offensive warfare against so-called rogue states or dangerous nations and regimes, by claiming that it has a moral and political right to use preventive military force against any regime it deems as a rogue state seeking WMD, and/or supporting terrorism. It also asserts a right on the part of the US to act unilaterally if others are not willing to do so. It can be argued that the invasion of Iraq by the US with its allies is an embodiment of such strategy, which places a priority on maintaining U.S. global supremacy, the power to utilize preemptive and preventive force, acting unilaterally if others are not willing to do so, and a firm rejection of deterrence and containment methods, as parallel to the main pillars of the USNSS.

This strategy uses concepts and actions, which do not exist in EU terminology, such as ‘rogue states’, ‘pre-emptive use of military force’, ‘unilateral action’. It indicates us that the EU approach to security is fundamentally different than that of the US. Although there are similar references, which can be found in both security strategy documents, to a broad understanding of security problems, and a multilateral commitment to meeting such challenges, such references in the USNSS are overshadowed by references ‘rogue states’, ‘axis of evil’, ‘military power’, and the right of the US to act unilaterally under a concept of pre-emption. Despite fifty years of shared experience of security in the Cold War under the framework of NATO, and common references to contemporary security challenges, Bush Administration’s rhetoric on the ‘war against terrorism’, ‘axis of evil’, and the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition have prompted most observers to conclude that there are fundamental differences between American and European approaches to security. This may also affirm Robert Kagan’s suggestion which connotes that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars, and they see the world in fundamentally different ways.

On top of these references such as rouge states and axis of evil, the ‘red lines’ has also become an important reference of the national security strategy of United States with the second term of Obama administration. The two most notorious recipients of red line diplomacy during Obama’s second term were Iran and Syria, both around the development or deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In both cases, the United States issued what appeared to be stark ultimatums to each country that once certain red lines were crossed, harsh retaliatory action would be taken. ‘Red line’ policy has particularly come to forefront during the Syrian civil war and Iran’s nuclear programme. The use of chemical weapons by Syria was considered a ‘red line’ by the US in many occasions.

Obama’s red line policy towards rouge states such as Iran and Syria is a clear continuation of previous administration security strategy. Even though Obama was
more conciliatory than Bush towards Iran, the policy of the United States towards Iran’s nuclear programme has not been changed much during Obama’s administration, during which Obama publicly threatened Iran in different platforms with the use of force if Iran did not give up its ambition for uranium enrichment. One of the platforms where Obama seemed determined to use force against Iran was during an interview with the Atlantic and his AIPAC address, where he said, “Iran’s leaders should understand that I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And as I have made clear time and again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary”. The EU and the USA approach towards Iran’s nuclear programme will be discussed in details in the next section in order to have better understanding of their security strategies towards conflict prevention.

THE ESS: A ‘COMPREHENSIVE’ AND A ‘CONSTRUCTIVE’ PERSPECTIVE

Both perspectives, European and American, seem to have reasonable grounds in terms of addressing the problems and dealing with them from their point of view. However, as it is argued as the central hypothesis of the paper in the introduction section, it seems that the ESS constitutes a more promising approach in terms of addressing the ‘root causes’ of such challenges, providing with a long-term solution for a better and a more secure world, and it is true that winning the ‘hearts’ and ‘minds’ of world societies require a more comprehensive vision, than simply pre-emptive attacks and military invasions. Why the solutions offered by the USNASS are unlikely to bring long term peace and a safer world, and why the ESS’ offer seems more promising have to be supported by objective findings.

As it is mentioned earlier in the paper, we live in a period in which most of the security threats are asymmetrical such as drug trafficking, intra-state conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-boundary crime, hostage taking, global terrorism, and the migration of diseases and people across national borders. The traditional way how the international actors are dealing with these challenges has not worked. A new way has to be found in order to combat these security threats in order to have a long-term international peace and a safer world. What we need is a comprehensive and long-term oriented approach which underlines the structural causes of these new threats. The way how the US, the only super power in the world, is dealing with these challenges is not long-term oriented, and does not address the root causes of these problems. This is not to say that all the measures taken by the US
are not worth to take into account. However, it just did not work. The way how the EU deals with the same problems has challenged the conventional American wisdom both in terms of dealing with the intra-state violence, and also dealing with other asymmetric threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime, and global terrorism.

For example, in terms of addressing the causes of intra-state wars, the conventional wisdom emerged among the development actors (the IMF and the World Bank) in 1990s arguing that poverty causes conflict because violence erupts predominantly in poor regions of the world was an American invention. Based on the classical liberal economic theory that suggests prosperity and peace are causally linked, it was assumed that the official development assistance through these development actors by promoting economic growth in developing countries could eradicate the causes of intra-state violence and civil wars, and long term peace would be achieved in those conflict-prone regions. And the traditional meaning of peacekeeping, which is the intervention after the violent conflicts erupt, has been useless, and could not reduce both massive humanitarian and economic losses. It does not necessarily mean that European countries do not have any responsibility in such failures, especially given their massive participation in peacekeeping operations only after the violent conflicts erupt in such cases like Bosnia and Kosovo. However, derived from their bitter experiences of violent conflicts in their backyard and their threats to the regional and global peace environment, and also from their historical experience of re-construction in Europe after two major world wars, the EU has developed a more proactive and visionary strategy, which emphasises ‘conflict prevention’. While the US has been obsessed with the fight against terrorism since 9/11 events, and spent most of its energy and resources in military purposes such as the invasion of Iraq, and totally disregarded this important issue, the EU has developed a very far-sighted strategy of ‘conflict prevention’ in terms of dealing with these problems, which also can address the ways of fighting against the proliferation of WMD and global terrorism.

This development has contributed the revival of the concept of ‘conflict prevention’ to take a ‘proactive’ rather than a ‘reactive’ approach to ‘conflict management’ with an understanding that pro-action is better than reaction, and that crises and conflicts can be better addressed as they emerge, rather than when they have already deepened and widened. It is designed to tackle the problem of an increase in the number of internal wars worldwide. Combined with short-term crisis management that attempt to forestall full-blown conflict including humanitarian intervention and rapid military deployment, it has ‘conflict prevention’ perspective with a particular focus on long-term preventive diplomacy including the measures to tackle the structural root causes of conflicts leading to violent intrastate wars.
Rejecting the conventional wisdom arguing that poverty causes conflict, the EU perspective has argued that the structural root causes of conflicts are complex and multidimensional, and it has to be addressed by a long-term strategy focusing on ‘state building’, ‘democratization’ through cooperation based on ‘conditional economic and development assistance’, and the promotion of ‘good governance’ and ‘institutionalization’, all combined with the creation of ‘early warning systems’.

The EU’s perspective, which rejects traditional developments assistance for economic growth in developing countries, and associates the root causes of such violent conflicts with ‘state failures’, is based on a well-founded philosophy and supported with concrete findings. Despite the heavy development assistance through the UNDP, IMF and World Bank, violent conflicts could not be prevented through economic growth policies in Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Cambodia, Haiti and El Salvador, and millions of people were killed or obliged to migrate for refuge to other countries, and these evidences prove the European argument that development assistance and financial donations are not sufficient to forestall potential conflicts and deadly violent occasions. Because structural causes of such violent conflicts are complex and multidimensional, and cannot be resolved simply through economic assistance. Factors such as declining ‘state institutional capacity’ and ‘political legitimacy’, ‘inter-group strategic dilemmas’ existing between/among ethnic or religious groups, ‘horizontal inequality’ brought by the political, social, and economic disempowerment of certain groups relative to the others through wrong development policies or brought by the legacies of land distribution in the post-colonization period (especially in post-colonial Africa), the ‘lack of equal access’ to food and freshwater resources; ‘the role of belligerent groups’ (in sub-state levels) or ‘elites’ acting concertedly with government forces and their ability to manipulate populations through the instrumental use of ethnicity, religion, history and myths; and ‘small-arms trafficking’ between different groups can be mentioned as some of the most important root causes of the violent conflicts. These factors are all directly or indirectly related with ‘state failures’.

The novelty of the European approach in terms of fighting against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD is to retain its distinctive agenda and to convince others, in particular the US, that the Union’s approach and the values it promotes are important in how the world should contribute to international security and prevent violent conflict. The ESS is a necessary response to the profound changes in the international security environment, requiring security priorities to centre on international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, and the way how the US has responded to such issues. This appropriate responses should be understood in the context of Javier Solana’s comments in the ESS that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own” and that “in contrast to the massive
visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. While “dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, political, economic, military, and other means”, WMD “proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled”. The novelty of the ESS is that it attributes such challenges to the root causes of ‘state failures’ and the ineffective functioning of the multilateral system surveillance.

The ESS’ emphasis on long-term multilateral and multi-faceted action for the fight against terrorism, international crime, and the proliferation of WMD is well-grounded. Because, the root causes of terrorism and international crime including drug trafficking and proliferation of WMD are complex and varied, and it is really hard to identify a single cause and tackle them in the short-term. There may be causes related to culture, values, norms, doctrines and ideology, as well as causes which can be attributed to lack of development, repressive regimes, foreign occupation, lack of self-determination, poor governance and a sense of desperation, alienation and hopelessness, social, political, and economic inequalities and injustices, and resentment of the ‘have-nots’ against the ‘haves’, lack of freedom, repression of human rights, failure to resolve historical grievances, denial of self-determination and closed legitimate avenues of dissent that altogether provide conditions in which terrorism can flourish and which can be exploited by extremists, and lead people to turn to violence.

As it is well seen from the causes mentioned above, terrorism, international crime, and proliferation of WMD by smugglers or terrorist organizations can be associated with ‘state failures’, since social and economic underdevelopment, non-existent or bad governance, ineffectiveness or limited ability to exercise sovereignty, corrupt, brutal or incompetent police forces, unfair justice systems, or ineffective law enforcement, porous borders, underdeveloped financial systems incapable of financial oversight, poverty of resources combined with poverty of prospects, choices, and respect can create ‘black holes’ in state or international system, in which local extremist groups flourish by exploiting the discontent fed by corruption, poverty and authoritarian rulers to enlist local recruits and also plug into international terrorist organizations. The ‘failed states’ or ‘states in the process of failure’, which have ‘black holes’ within their sovereignty and their governance, such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, Georgia, Somalia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria and Colombia provide ideal conditions for local or trans-national terrorists to flourish, because they lack the capacity or will to exercise territorial control and maintain a monopoly of violence. This leaves a power vacuum that terrorist organizations may exploit to maintain safe havens, training
facilities and bases for launching terrorist operations, and also the smugglers may control the border exchanges, while weapons, drugs, illicit diamonds or other illegal imports flow easily, providing the free movement of recruits, weapons and funds that allow the terrorist networks to operate unfettered. They not only smuggle out precious resources like diamonds and narcotics that help fund their operations, but also may also recruit foot soldiers from local populations, where poor and disillusioned youth often harbor religious or ethnic grievances. This does not necessarily mean that terrorists cannot find safe havens and carry out support functions in strong and stable democracies, due to the greater liberties that residents enjoy there, however it can be contained in such states through an effective surveillance system, which the failed states do not enjoy.

As it is well seen from the findings above, without addressing the root causes of the ‘state failure’ and heavy investment in ‘state-building’ including the promotion of ‘democratization’ and ‘effective and good governance’, it is really hard to tackle with the threats of terrorism, international crime, and proliferation of WMD (by terrorist organizations) by simply focusing on the military responses, as the US did. Without doing so, military responses will have a limited impact and can breed more terrorists. A multi-faceted approach is needed including economic and diplomatic initiatives, fair trade, strong alliances, democracy, and a multilateral surveillance system, including intelligence sharing and export controls on weapons, not just military initiatives. The Bush Administration’s expansive conception of the ‘war on terrorism’ that included ‘the use of military force’ and a ‘pre-emptive strike’ against Iraq without being approved by the UN Security Council, has not only lacked the perspective of addressing the root causes of terrorism, but also it has stimulated an escalation of the worldwide anger and hatred against the US questioning the legitimacy of its action, and it has split apart the international coalition of states that supported the US war in Afghanistan and assisted in apprehending suspects, cutting off financial resources, and tracing signals of impending terrorist attacks. The Bush Administration’s largely unilateral war against Iraq has not only created a danger that would undermine the effectiveness of multilateral law enforcement and intelligence operations, but also it might also provoke clashes between governments and oppositions in Arab and Muslim states, with an even more serious risk of instability within a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. This is not only a serious situation in terms of escalating hatred against the US, but also the long-term foreign presence required to maintain order in an occupied Iraq (with a perception of foreign occupation and an illegitimate government) can be either an excuse for terrorism or a cause of it, or both, regarding the root causes of terrorism underlined above.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) of is a case in point of the failure of security strategy of the United States in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in
particular with regards to international terrorism. ISIS, a predominantly Sunni extremist network, aims to spread the ongoing political turmoil in Iraq and in Syria with the ultimate goal of establishing a caliphate - a single, transnational Islamic state. The network emerged in the ashes of the U.S.-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and the insurgency that followed provided it with fertile ground to wage a guerrilla war against coalition forces and their domestic allies. ISIS, which has already taken over Ramadi and Falluja, has shocked the whole world by capturing the second largest city of Iraq - Mosul - swiftly on June 10, 2014 and has gained control of more towns afterwards. Taking over Mosul is a far greater feat than anything the network or group has achieved so far, and is sending shockwaves throughout the region.

The ISIS advance in Iraq is a defining moment that exposes more than a decade of failed security strategy of the United States in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular and leaves the Obama administration with extremely worrying choices. Before the invasion of United States in 2003, there was no terrorist presence in Iraq. By needlessly invading on false premises that Iraq owned a great deal of WMD and in vain hope of installing a democracy, the U.S. destabilized the country and inspired a generation of enemies — at great cost in blood and treasure. A decade after the US invasion, Iraq now looks as fragile, bloody and pitiful as ever.

On the issue of proliferation of WMD, the ESS has a completely different approach than the USNSS has. The EU does not directly associate them with ‘state failures’, however it takes all these new security threats - “terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, the weakening of the state system” together, while acknowledging that the proliferation of the WMD is the greatest threat to European and world security. Acknowledging the fact that acquisition of WMD corresponds to a number of common aims, including deterring regional adversaries, equalizing conventional weapons asymmetries, and achieving high international stature, their proliferation remains as a profound problem for the international community, efforts to newly acquire such weapons breed intensified fears of malign intentions at the interstate level. The ESS argues that although “the international treaty regimes (such as NPT) and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems”, “we are now entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East.” This acknowledgment may also be interpreted as an indirect link with the ‘state failures’ in the very broad sense by using the terms of ‘bad governance’ and ‘corrupt and/or undemocratic regimes’, because the European perspective recognizes the problem of the proliferation of WMD together the ‘weakening’ of the state system and of the multilateral
institutions. On the other hand, it recognizes the most frightening scenario as the terrorist groups acquire WMD. This is important in a sense that the possibility of terrorist acquisition of WMD provides a new dimension to the threat posed by these weapons, as it is mentioned in the ESS, and although terrorist acquisition of such weapons is constrained given the difficulty of their acquisition, it is not inconceivable, and WMD terrorism proposes an acute threat, because terrorists are more likely to use weapons as soon as possible after acquiring them, rather than maintaining them for deterrence as the states do. The ESS’ evaluation of the proliferation of WMD by taking it together with terrorism and state failure makes sense in this context, regarding the root causes of state failures, which provide safe havens for terrorist organization to exploit. Therefore, (according to the philosophy lying behind the ESS), in addition to supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regimes by strengthening the UN system and multilateral control networks with a mixture of intelligence sharing, policing, and other political, economic, and diplomatic means such as economic sanctions, embargos, and trade restrictions, the efforts, which would be given to support ‘state building’ and ‘good governance’ through conditional economic assistance, institutional support, and promotion of democratization, will not only create a better environment for a well functioning multilateral international environment, but also help to tackle the proliferation of WMD.

Iran’s nuclear program of is a case in point of how the security strategy of the EU is more effective than that of the United States. During both Bush and Obama administration, the United States has been very vocal in using military force against Iran for its nuclear programme. Obama who was more open to dialogue with Iran than Bush has indicated several times that he would not hesitate to use of force if necessary. During his address to the annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy Conference on March 4, 2012 Obama outlined his administration’s strategy, which “includes all elements of American power: a political effort aimed at isolating Iran, a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored, an economic effort to impose crippling sanctions, and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency.” He also repeated his position during his interview with the Atlantic where he said, “When I say we are not taking any option off the table, we mean it. As president of the United States, I don’t bluff”.

While military strike was seen most viable option by the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, The EU constantly was against the use of force against Iran, for both legal and practical reasons. Transatlantic differences on how to approach Iran were very deep. They were strategic and not merely related to
differences over how best to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While the EU had been engaging Iran through a range of talks on economic and human rights, the USA had for a long time tried to isolate Iran politically and economically and threatened Iran with the use of force. The USA was also against the EU’s diplomatic efforts from the beginning and stuck to its policy of sanctions and isolation. It also made clear that it would not actively support European diplomatic efforts. The USA was specifically opposed to incentivizing Iran by the EU.

The failure of the US security strategy in Iraq has given the EU’s efforts based on multilateralism momentum towards Iran’s nuclear programme. Efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme were the most ambitious and high-profile action taken by EU to date in the field of non-proliferation. The stakes for international security were high. A nuclear armed Iran could have serious implications for regional and global security as well as for global efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. A military strike to prevent or at least delay Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would escalate regional tensions and possibly result in a wider military conflict. With this in mind, Europeans have taken the lead in finding a peaceful way out of the impasse about Iran’s nuclear programme for over 10 years. They have invested considerable political energy and economic resources ‘to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under the Non Proliferation Treaty’.

Unlike the USA, the EU consistently promoted a non-military solution to the conflict on the basis of improved Iranian guarantees about the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. In dealing with Iran, the EU has effectively revised its policy of ‘effective multilateralism’, as described in the 2003 European Security Strategy. As the conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme unfolded, the EU focused more on maximizing tactical advantages in direct negotiations with Iran, rather than on a diplomatic initiative that would comprehensively address Iranian concerns and interests. With the leading efforts of the EU, Iran reached deal with six world powers on (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), known as the P5+1 on its nuclear programme on November 2013. The EU played an important role in preventing a military escalation of the Iranian conflict by leading efforts on this sensitive issue. This is a major achievement in itself for the EU, given the complexity of the issue and the lack of cooperation of key players, particularly Iran.
Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible.\textsuperscript{60} and “In a world of global threats, … our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions, and a rule-based international order is our objective.”\textsuperscript{61} It is really hard to find any other two quotations that can briefly articulate the philosophy of European security strategy and culture, which is based on ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘multilateralism’. Having suffered more than any continent from the attempts by one actor to dominate all others, and the conflicts which led to the greatest and the harshest wars in the history, no other philosophy and strategic culture could be expected from the EU, and its keenness to stress the core values of multilateralism, and of the UN charter based on the legitimacy of the collective action is a reflection of its recent history of re-construction and rule-and-law-based culture.

There is nothing more natural to have such an ‘idealist’ Europe in international relations that sees ‘constructive’ and ‘preventive’ global responses as the only effective solutions to terrorism, stronger international regimes and conditional aid and assistance as the best methods to counter WMD proliferation. ‘Constructivism’ also requires a careful and responsible political language and behavior, and parallel to this requirement, without excluding the use of force, the union clearly rejects a strategy of preemptive strikes. And it recognizes that ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states (not ‘rogue’), are a major source of instability, which also create the ‘root causes’ of ‘intra-state violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘international crime’, and ‘WMD proliferation’, however it advocates the extension of ‘better governance’ than ‘regime change’ through the use of military force and invasion.\textsuperscript{62} Derived from the US emphasis on a narrower militarily focused approach to security, the EU’s emphasis on ‘comprehensive cooperative security’, its perspective of ‘structural prevention’ and of ‘multilateralism’ is apparently being interpreted by some in the US as incompatible with providing military force projection and as a reflection of EU’s ‘weaknesses’ in its military capabilities\textsuperscript{63}, on the contrary, the ESS constitutes the EU’s strength against today’s security threats by indicating that it reads the world book through the ‘right glasses’.

“What kind of world order do we want? (Was für eine Weltordnung wünschen wir?)” asked Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister, on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.\textsuperscript{64} The ESS is the clear answer of EU, which is ‘constructive’ international relations, investing in ‘peace’ than ‘war’, healing the ‘social diseases’ and ‘threats’ by alleviating the ‘root causes’, rather than taking ‘pain-killers’, and ‘short-term’ or ‘pragmatic’ measures. What kind of world order does the US want? The USNSS is a clear answer to that question: ‘a doctrine of
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unrivaled military supremacy’, ‘the concept of preemptive or preventive war’, and a ‘willingness to act unilaterally if multilateral cooperation cannot be achieved’. This is truly ‘by-passing’ the ‘UN system’, ‘international law’, and ‘political legitimacy’. This is invasion of Iraq, and truly a ‘destructive’ use of ‘military’ and ‘political language’, in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is a use of an ‘arrogant language’ at a time when international cooperation and a greater dialogue between cultures and civilizations are more essential and more required than ever, based on a unified, multilateral, multi-faceted strategy, and when stigmatization of religions and ethnicities should be avoided.

However, there is something wrong in this political behavior, and it is even acknowledged by Robert Kagan, especially addressing the “great philosophical schism” within the West and “mutual antagonism” that threatens to weaken “both sides of the transatlantic community”, “at a time when new dangers and crises are proliferating rapidly”. This divide between the two sides of the Atlantic could have serious consequences, and as Philip H. Gordon mentions Washington is “acting on the false premise that it does not need allies – or that it will find more reliable or more important ones elsewhere” and “it could cost the US the support and cooperation of those most likely to be useful to it in an increasingly dangerous world” given the 50 years of shared history under the framework of NATO and shared values. Washington has underrated the value of its European allies in the ‘war on terror’, and ‘going alone’ policy is not sustainable when such ambitious goals as democratizing the greater Middle East are pursued, and especially when global challenges such as international terrorism are at stake, on the one hand, and ‘legitimacy’ of its action, of its power, and of its global leadership are questioned by even its closest friends on the other.

As Kagan puts it, “the United States cannot ignore this problem” of legitimacy, because “the struggle to define and obtain international legitimacy in this new era may prove to be among the most critical contests of our time”. And legitimacy in “determining the future of the U.S. role in the international system” is not less significant than its “purely material measure of power and influence”. This is not only important for the future of the transatlantic alliance, but also for the future of the UN system, and long-term international security. It is true that both sides of the Atlantic do share a lot of security interests, and although they “diverge on how to tackle these security issues”, “the objectives of their security policies are quite similar”. However, Washington also has to see its wrong direction as by-passing the UN system and weakening the multilateral institutions. This not only creates a basis for world public opinion to question the legitimacy of US action and power, but also weakens the very infrastructure of a strong international control regime especially in the fight against terrorism, WMD proliferation, and international crime,
when it is more crucial than ever. Rather than implementing policies that would undermine the UN system, the US has to make efforts to create stronger, more inclusive, and more authoritative international regimes such as the International Criminal Court to be nurtured and respected in order to create a viable institutional framework (for establishing common databases, exchanging personnel, conducting joint training and operations, sharing experience and expertise, and facilitating transfer technologies) so as to deal with such threats. Instead of unilateral actions and ‘going alone’, ‘consensus’ building and ‘persuasion’ – which were used effectively vis-à-vis Iran regarding its nuclear ambitions– must be the main instruments of international relations rather than the ‘threat’ or ‘use of force’. The use of force should be controlled and multilateral-UN, and only when absolutely necessary. 71

END NOTES


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