Explaining the Long Peace: Systemic Stability and Change through Security Regimes

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ABSTRACT This paper explains ‘the Long Peace’ during the Cold War years and the peaceful transformation of the international system in the early 1990’s. It does so through laying out the effects of institutions in general and the United States-Soviet security regimes in particular on superpower and interbloc relations. It argues that security regimes institutionalized the Cold War, stabilized the international system, and provided some specific principles and norms for managing interbloc relations through which the major powers were able to change the international system peacefully. The creation of security regimes in the first place and later their effect on the systemic change, however, became possible thanks to learning occurred in the United States and Soviet foreign policies in the 1960’s and mid-1980’s, respectively. The relative peace—the Long Peace—since 1945 and the peaceful transformation of the international system in the early 1990s demonstrate that institutional cooperation matters and, in fact, institutionalism better explains international relations in the era concerned than structural theories such as realism.

KEYWORDS ‘The Long Peace,’ the Cold War, regime theory, security regimes, learning, systemic change

THE STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

This paper basically reflects on two questions: First, why there was a ‘long peace’ in the post-war era—that is between 1945 and 1990—and, second, why the post-war international system changed so peacefully in the early 1990’s. The paper explains these two questions by an institutionalist approach and holds that the United States-Soviet security regimes created during the Cold War, not only stabilized the security environment during the Cold War but also helped change the international system. The dependent variable, then, is both the continuity and the change of the international system whereas the
independent variable is “institutions” in general and the United States-Soviet security regimes in particular.

One of the aims of political science is to find out reasons for systemic stability and for social forces that cause change. If we know such reasons and forces, then, we can decrease the uncertainty surrounding us—i.e., we may have more control over our environment. The paper thus contributes to this general aim of political science through laying out the important role of institutions in both systemic stability and change. As such the paper also argues against systemic theories such as realism that explain changes through structures. In other words, it stresses the role of man and human-made institutions in the policy-making process.

In the second place, the paper is a contribution to the neoliberal-neorealist debate in international relations. Neorealists, generally speaking, have been skeptical of international cooperation arguing that states are concerned about the cheating problem as well as relative gains in a relation. On the other hand, neoliberals have criticized neorealists for their misreading the history and for stressing a particular definition of anarchy. For neoliberals, anarchy is not the absence of a central authority to punish states in case of use of force but the absence of an authority to enforce commitments resulting from particular agreements. Institutions, therefore, can solve the problem of cheating and make international cooperation possible. The paper, then, makes a contribution to this argument through stressing the importance of United States-Soviet security regimes in improving interbloc relations in general and bilateral cooperation in particular.

Finally, the paper provides some suggestions on the future organization of interstate relations. Security institutions are capable of stabilizing international system and they constitute a good means to ‘peaceful change.’ Therefore, security regimes as well as security organizations such as NATO should be maintained and, in fact, improved in the post-Cold War era. In sum, the broad aim of the paper is not to explain the historical development of United States-Soviet security regimes per se, but to suggest that institutions may play an important role in systemic stability and in peaceful change of the international system. The paper draws on various literatures such as international relations theories, learning theories, decision-making theories, security studies, security regimes, United States-Soviet relations, and European history.

A REVIEW OF THE ANSWERS GIVEN TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Given that the dependent variable is the systemic stability and systemic change in the post-war era and the independent variable is institutions in general and United States-Soviet security regimes in particular, reviewing the existing answers given to the research questions means at least two things from our standpoint: reviewing how scholars have explained the long peace in the postwar era, and reviewing what scholars have thought about the security-regime argument and about its applicability to interstate relations. I will take up these issues below.

Realism, liberalism, the argument of peace-loving democracies, and the theory of obsolescence of war have claimed explanation to the absence of war in the post-war era. John Lewis Gaddis, for example, divides the reasons of peace into two main groups: structural and behavioral. Accordingly, bipolarity and independence (not interdependence) are the main structural characteristics of the post-war system that facilitated the peace. To Gaddis, bipolarity has contributed to the stability and helped the main actors refrain from the use of force. Also the two main actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, had enough resources to pursue an independent policy; they were not dependent on each other and thus there were limited ties that could cause a friction between the two states. Gaddis gives three characteristics of the era as the behavioral reasons for the peace: nuclear weapons, the reconnaissance revolution, and the rapprochement between Marxism and liberalism. Nuclear weapons contributed to deterrence and made it impossible for a superpower to attack an ally of the other superpower, since there was the possibility of mutual destruction. The reconnaissance revolution was the most important development in eliminating any misperception between the major powers. Moreover, the satellite technology made it possible to gather information about military maneuvers and military capability of the other pact and thus eliminated any misunderstanding that could lead to a major war, as happened in the First and the Second World Wars. As for the rapprochement between the two ideologies, Gaddis argues that the Soviet Union, with Khrushchev, adopted the policy of Peaceful Coexistence and renounced the destruction of liberalism as an aim of socialism. In other words, the Soviet Union conceded to the status quo. Also the United States and the European powers pursued a less conflictual policy toward the Second World that heralded a new era: Detente and the Helsinki process.3

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Another realist scholar, John J. Mearsheimer, provides three reasons for the relative peace in the post-war era: bipolarity, roughly equal military power between the superpowers, and nuclear weapons. Bipolarity was preferable to multipolarity for at least two reasons for Mearsheimer. First, there are less conflict dyads and, second, the balance is easier to maintain in a bipolar world. There was only one conflict dyad, the United States-Soviet direct conflict, that could cause a Third World War in the post-war era. In a multipolar world, however, there would be many conflict dyads and, therefore, even a conflict between a major power and a small power or a conflict between two small powers would result in a war. Moreover, it is easier to maintain peace in a bipolar world since there are only two main camps in the balancing process and, unlike a multipolar system, not every state was trying to maintain a balance with every other state. In the second place, roughly equal military power between the superpowers had been a stabilizing factor in the era. Each superpower, not only in terms of nuclear capability but also in terms of conventional capability, was equally powerful. When this characteristic of the era coupled with bipolarity, small powers lost their relative importance in the balancing process. In other words, unlike the early-twentieth-century power politics, a small power did not have the capability to create a major transformation in the system. Finally, Mearsheimer argues that nuclear weapons contributed to the long peace. Without nuclear weapons, the major powers would not have consented to the status quo and thus any minor shift in one’s relative military capability might have led to a major conflict.4

Another argument that realists developed in explaining the systemic stability is ‘hegemony,’ which is defined as a situation in which a major power has enough resources, on the one hand, to create and enforce international cooperation and, on the other, is willing to do so.5 For example, in his *War and Change in World Politics*, Robert Gilpin argues that hegemonic wars can explain major developments in history. Accordingly, the international system remains stable as long as major powers consent to the status quo. However, if a major power decides that expected gain is more than expected loss—*i.e.*, if there is a net gain—then, it may attempt to change the system through waging a hegemonic war. Thus, for Gilpin, the existence of a hegemon, and that is the United States in the post-war era, was the main reason for the systemic stability.6

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In sum, realists argue that bipolarity, nuclear weapons, economic independence of the superpowers, and the existence of a hegemon may explain ‘the long peace,’ that institutions did play a marginal, if any, role in this regard, and that systemic change may occur as a result of a transformation in major powers’ relative capabilities. As such realism can explain neither the relative peace after 1945 nor the peaceful change of the post-war bipolar structure in the early 1990’s.

Richard Ned Lebow elaborates on these points. He criticizes realists for the vagueness of realists’ definitions such as power, balance of power, and national interest. Lebow argues that Morgenthau’s definition of power is different from Waltz’s, and that the Soviet Union was a superpower right from the beginning of the Cold War according to Morgenthau’s definition whereas it was a minor power up until the 1960’s according to Waltz’s definition. Moreover, given that the Soviets did not develop nuclear weapons capability until 1957, one cannot explain the long peace by demonstrating the existence of nuclear weapons. Basically the Soviet Union was not a nuclear power in the early years of the Cold War. The hegemonic stability theory has also been widely criticized for its simplicity. In ‘Exploring the Myth of Hegemonic Stability,’ Isabelle Grunberg, for example, concludes that “civilizations and individuals derive their own specific patterns and symbols from early childhood and their attraction to the mysteries of cosmic phenomena. This imagery has contributed to the theory’s appeal and may help explain our failure to move beyond the theory and develop more accurate models of International Relations.”

Besides realism, the theories of peace-loving democracies and of obsolescence of war have also offered explanation to the long peace. According to the former, democratic governments do not go to war against each other since they are restricted by their constituencies and they respect human rights of the people living in democracies. The obsolescence of war theory, on the other hand, holds that the devastating characteristic of weapons as well as “the political, social and technological trends” made war obsolete in the modern era. However, both theories have major flaws. For one thing, not all states

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in the post-war era were democratic; and there were only three major conflict dyads throughout history: the United States-France, the United States-Britain, and France-Britain. Moreover, there were some cases where the democratic governments did fight or threaten each other such as the Finland case during the Second World War, the United States-Britain conflicts in 1812 and 1895/1896, the Fashoda crisis in 1898, and the Ruhr crisis in 1923.11 In other words, the theory of peace-loving democracies is lacking historical data. For another, unlike argued by the proponents of the obsolescence of war theory, the stability cannot be a product of the characteristic of weapons since war was a constant in interstate relations.

As for the liberal theories of the post-war era, they can be classified as follows: functionalism, neofunctionalism, and neoliberal (rationalistic) institutionalism. In *A Working Peace System*, David Mitrany argues that, before moving to cooperation in conflictual issues, states should cooperate in technical issues and that a world society is the *sine qua non* for a world government. As such he prescribes pooling sovereignty in some issue areas in order to spur international cooperation and rejects universal institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations arguing that blueprints should wait for their turns. In sum, forms follow function.12 Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, stressed the importance of regional and supranational institutions in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In *The Uniting of Europe*, Ernst B. Haas developed the ‘spill-over theory’ that correlates Mitrany’s theory of ramification.13 Yet Haas modified his theory later and argued that regionalism would not develop universal cooperation at all and that neofunctionalism, in fact, became obsolete.14 Taken together, both functionalism and neofunctionalism failed to address the absence of war in the post-war era; they rather stressed cooperation in some specific issues or in particular geographic areas.

**REGIME THEORY AND SECURITY**

New institutionalism, or rationalistic institutionalism, is capable of explaining the long peace and the peaceful transformation of the international system. With the advance

of new institutionalist thought in the mid-1970’s, realist arguments have been widely
challenged and the concept of regime has been introduced in order to demonstrate the
existence of international cooperation in the absence of a world government.15

The most widely accepted definition of the international-regime concept is that of
Krasner: a regime is “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectation converge in a given area of Inter-
national Relations.”16 Regimes facilitate interstate cooperation and overcome the defec-
tion problem, when and where states fail to cooperate fearing that the other party would
resort to cheating.17 Regimes perform this function by providing information about the
behavior of the participants, which is called detection, and by helping decentralized en-
forcement of the agreements.

Regime theory, however, has rarely been applied to security issues for at least two
reasons. First of all, the dominance of realism in the international relations discipline and
its skepticism toward the prospects of conflict management in an ‘anarchic’ international
environment have discouraged scholars to conduct research on the subject and, second,
the idea that “security regimes are far more difficult to create than are those in the inter-
national economy” has been widely argued in academic circles.18 Robert Jervis, for
example, holds that states face a security dilemma and, therefore, “security regimes with
their call for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive
to decision makers.”19 From the perspective of security dilemma, “many of the policies
that are designed to increase a state’s security automatically and inadvertently decrease
the security of others.”20 Decision makers, then, would not like to tie their hands while
some nations increase their security at the expense of those states cooperating within se-
curity regimes.

Jervis gives four conditions for the formation and maintenance of a security regime:
“First, the great powers must want to establish it. Second, the actors must also believe that
others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. Third, even if all ma-

15. Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, “Toward and East-West Security Regime:
ajor actors would settle for the *status quo*, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion. Fourth, war and individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly. Jervis’s formulation reflects two sets of factors, to which realists generally point in the creation of regimes: “the distribution of power and the pursuit of egoistic self interest.” Accordingly, if major powers achieve optimal outcomes while pursuing their self interests, they would be less inclined to the creation of a security regime. “Only under special conditions, when the pursuit of egoistic self-interest creates anomalies, does the possibility of regime creation increase.” Jervis also makes a distinction between defensive and offensive measures, and argues that when the former is more effective than the latter, there will be less need for regimes, and vice versa. And technology is a major determinant in this offense-defense balance: “when weapons are highly vulnerable, they must be employed before they are attacked.”

However, the more we distance ourselves from realists’ dilemmas, the more possible it becomes to acknowledge the existence of security regimes. Put differently, the major deficiency in realists’ argument in general, and in Jervis’s analysis in particular, is that security is considered indivisible. States are thought to be in a dilemma whether to live in peace and give economic and political concessions or to wage a war against the major challenger. Yet, there are many choices at the disposal of states between these two extremes, and analytic reasoning requires taking into account these choices in the decision-making process. We can solve the dilemma by admitting that there are many components of security, such as arms control, nonproliferation, and conflict management. In other words, it would be more accurate to think in terms of security regimes or limited regimes rather than a security regime.

Having outlined scholars’ contending views regarding security regimes, I will next turn to the discussion of United States-Soviet security regimes. Three questions must be answered in this regard: First, can regime theory be applied to United States-Soviet relations in the security domain, second, assuming the answer to the first question is affirmative, to which issue areas can it be applied, and finally, how change in a bilateral regime can be possible? Jervis thinks that a form of cooperation between the superpowers that has kept the peace for more than three decades does not mean that there is a security regime. He gives the following reasons: First, “narrow and quite short run self-interest can account for

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most of the restraints in bilateral relations,” second, “the precedents are neither unambiguous nor binding,” and finally, “states change or break the rules as their power and interest change”—i.e., it is not clear whether they prefer the status quo.25

However, as suggested above, Jervis considers security as an indivisible issue area. “It is difficult to describe the overall nature of the United States-Soviet security relationship as a security regime. But Jervis stopped short. The two countries largely agree upon broad and specific injunctions in a number of subissues within the security relationship.”26 Thus, as Nye argues, rather than focusing on whether the overall United States-Soviet relationship can be categorized as a security regime, “we should more fruitfully consider it as a patchwork quilt or a mosaic of subissues in the security area.”27 Alexander George agrees with Nye. In the introduction to a volume about security cooperation between the superpowers, he argues that “the United States and the Soviet Union perceive that they have a strong interest in managing their rivalry in order to control its costs and risks.”28

According to George, it is more useful to regard the security dimension of United States-Soviet relations as embracing many issues. It is possible, therefore, to explain United States-Soviet relations from a regime perspective. In order to conduct such a research, however, we should “move away from the holistic notion” of the superpower conflict and not regard security as a “comprehensive, indivisible issue-area.”29

Below I will deal with diving security into sub-issues and explaining the issue areas on which the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed some specific principles and norms. However, we first need to explain how—rather than why—superpower regimes were created in the first place and how these regimes can help change not only interstate relations but also the international system.

FOREIGN-POLICY LEARNING AND UNITED STATES-SOVIEV SECURITY REGIMES

In decision-making studies, learning is differentiated from adaptation. Steven Weber, for example, argues that learning occurs through critical periods which “begin when funda-


 Accordingly, the Soviet Union’s hard line during the Cuban missile crisis not only demonstrated its readiness to challenge the United States even though the United States had nuclear superiority at that time but also led the American policymakers to understand that nuclear advantage could not be a potent or fungible source of power in international politics. The crisis, therefore, forced the United States to question the rationality of using force, conventional as well as nuclear, against a nuclear power such as the Soviet Union. The possibility of escalation of a conventional battle in the Caribbean into a nuclear exchange had urged President Kennedy to choose “the most moderate of military options available to him.”

After the Cuban missile crisis the Kennedy Administration stressed the necessity for developing stable relations with the Soviet Union and for launching strategic plans with non-nuclear options. On the other hand, the Soviet main strategic rationale did not change in the aftermath of the crisis. Although the Soviet Union noticed that ‘a nuclear holocaust’ might be possible, its basic approach to security issues in general, and nuclear weapons in particular, remained the same—that is, “superpower war might be avoided; but if war were to come, the side with greater military power would still prevail.” The willingness to wage a nuclear war necessitated to develop new strategies in support of national interests and led the Soviets to adapt their foreign policy in this regard. Concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements for nuclear nonproliferation was one option.

The shift in U.S. foreign policy helped epistemic communities access to critical decision-making positions and redefine American interests through integrating U.S. values with the values of other nations. This learning in U.S. foreign policy resulted in the creation of security regimes between the superpowers and also laid the basis for future cooperative relations as well as multilateral regimes with regard to arms control and nonproliferation. Thus, learning and regimes are interconnected; “learning may lead to the creation of regimes. In turn, regimes may promote further learning.”


Thanks to the increasing reciprocity in negotiating behavior between the superpowers, the Partial Test Ban Treaty finally became a reality in July 1963. Accordingly, nuclear tests were not to be conducted in the atmosphere, in outer space, or underwater. The Treaty became a turning point for United States-Soviet cooperation and set the stage for a treaty with regard to nuclear proliferation which was the most urgent at that time. For one thing, France and China had already made substantial progress in nuclear technology (China exploded its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964) and, for another, the alliances were further weakening, that is, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany might become nuclear powers. Under these circumstances, slowing proliferation and canceling nuclear-sharing programs, such as the Multilateral Force (MLF), would be in the common interest of the superpowers.

The United States and the Soviet Union, therefore, launched a policy of global control in regard to nuclear weapons, prohibited the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space through the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. According to the NPT, the nuclear powers agreed not to assist non-nuclear states except for peaceful nuclear programs. In addition, the superpowers agreed in principle that they should begin talks for the limitation of strategic arms. The United States and the Soviet Union also signed an agreement in 1963 about installing a direct communication link, namely the ‘hot line,’ between the respective capitals that would provide means not only for crisis management but also for crisis prevention. Thus, by 1969 a nonproliferation regime and a regime in the area of control problems were created and the basis of a regime regarding arms control was formed.

Few scholars attempted to review all the security regimes that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather, most of them concentrated on a specific issue area. Jonathan Dean, for instance, regards “Berlin in a divided Germany” as a security regime. The original structure of this regime was “established by the European Advisory Commission, which started its work in London in January 1944 as a joint commission between the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union to coordinate postwar policy in Europe.”35 This regime changed a couple of times due to the participation of France in the regime and the changing character of the superpower relationship.

Alexander George, on the other hand, defines two different regimes between the United States and the Soviet Union: crisis management and crisis avoidance. The basic rule of the former regime has been that “neither superpower shall initiate military action against the forces of the other superpower.” He later gives five other corollary rules to this basic rule. In crisis avoidance, however, there is a partial regime. Although the superpowers managed to create a crisis prevention regime in Europe, they were “less successful in making arrangement for moderating their competition and regulating their involvement in the Third World.”

That both the superpowers had vital interests in Europe was the reason for the regime existence in this area. Thus, they were cautious in their relations toward each other in Europe.

Another prominent scholar who has reflected on the United States-Soviet security regimes is Dan Caldwell. He reviews superpower relations from 1947 to the Nixon-Kissinger era in three periods (acute Cold War, 1947-1962; limited detente, 1963-1968; and detente, 1969-1976), and on three issue areas (crisis management, strategic military relations, and economics). He concludes that the United States and the Soviet Union established regimes in crisis management and arms control issue areas. Two developments in the international system were decisive in creating these regimes: the number of actors in the system and the distribution of power among the major actors.

Besides the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control issue-areas, which have extensively been research topics in regime studies, confidence-building and security-building measures (CSBM’s) as well as NATO conventional force levels in Central Europe have also been considered security regimes in bloc politics. The CSBM regime has been defended on the ground that “it stabilizes the security situation in Europe in at least three ways: (1) it decreases the likelihood of a conventional surprise attack, (2) it raises the obstacles to intra-bloc intervention, and (3) it improves crisis stability.”

John Duffield, on the other hand, conducted research on NATO conventional force levels in Central Europe. Having found these force levels stayed stable for more than three decades, he asserts that this is yet another example of a security regime between the

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superpowers and the two blocs. Duffield concludes as follows: “regime theory explains why the allies adhered to a particular set of force levels. International regimes may arise whenever it is possible for states to realize joint gains through collaboration. The United States and the Soviet Union during much of the Cold War shared important common interests, notably a mutual desire to avoid nuclear war that enabled them to engage in institutionalized forms of cooperation.”

In sum, the 1960’s was the era of burgeoning superpower security regimes that helped stabilize the international system. The Cuban missile crisis started a critical learning process in United States. foreign policy that created regimes and changed the interbloc relations. In the face of increasing cooperation in security issues, the MLF was shelved within NATO, and detente became a political goal of the West. These developments laid the foundation of the long peace. In the 1970’s and the 1980’s, the United States-Soviet security regimes expanded, and the institutionalized cooperation between the superpowers regarding security issues prevented detente from vanishing in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. And, as I will explain below, learning occurred in Soviet foreign policy with Gorbachev, made it possible to change the international system peacefully in the 1990’s.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE SYSTEMIC CHANGE

The above analysis shows that the United States and the Soviet Union were capable to create, preserve and strengthen security regimes in such critical areas as Berlin, crisis management, crisis avoidance, arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, confidence-building and security-building measures. It is the argument of this paper that these regimes did not only help stabilize super-power and inter-bloc relations in the post-war era, but also changed the international system in the early 1990’s.

The U.S. foreign policy learning process was critical for the regime creation in the first place. The systemic change, however, would not have been possible without the learning occurred in Soviet foreign policy in mid-1980’s. The demise of totalitarianism in Europe and, more importantly, the major changes within the United States—Soviet security regimes, took place thanks to this learning in Soviet foreign policy.

Transnational networks between western and eastern scientists, scholars, and politicians did play a major role in the Soviet Union’s learning process. The establishment of

transnational networks between the East and the West date back to the late 1950’s. Businessman Cyrus Eaton had started the so-called Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, in which American and Soviet scientists participated with the aim of exchanging ideas on nuclear weapons and arms control. As such, transnational communication gradually increased. Among many western organizations active in transnational efforts, the most important were the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Federation of American Scientists, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the National Resources Defense Council. Gorbachev’s coming to power in 1985 created a series of policy windows through which members of these organizations, or the epistemic community, would gain access to the Soviet leadership and be able to help redefine foreign policy.

Following Gorbachev’s coming to office, what started as an assessment of Soviet defense interests turned out to be an overall assessment of Soviet attitudes toward both East Europe and the West. The Soviet Union started to respect inalienable political rights of the East European people and took security concerns of democratic states into consideration in her foreign policy formulation; that is, it integrated its values with those of East European states and of the West. Gorbachev’s spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, called this policy ‘the Sinatra Doctrine.’ He explained: “You know the Frank Sinatra song ‘I Did It My Way?’ Hungary and Poland are doing it their way.”

The learning occurred in Soviet foreign policy transformed principles and norms of some bilateral security regimes which in turn resulted in the transformation of the international system. “Since the international system is an ensemble of institutions and since institutions are practices constituted by norms, the analogy of a game that is determined by its rules proves helpful for understanding the system’s persistence and changes. In other words, fundamental change in the international system occurs when some (or all) of its constitutive norms are altered.”

42. Dan Caldwell, American-Soviet Relations, p.27.
43. It is not surprising to learn that The Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 was awarded jointly to Joseph Rotblat and Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and, in the longer run, to eliminate such arms” (http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1995/).
‘Divide Germany and respect spheres of influence’ was such a constitutive norm of the post-war system. With the Soviets’ consent to the reemergence of civil societies in Eastern Europe and thus to the demise of the informal empire, this norm became obsolescent. Consequently, the European security regime as well as the international system changed. Germany was unified and Eastern European countries started to harmonize their political, economic, security, and defense policies with those of the West, replacing “the tight power distribution of the Cold War [with] a loose distribution.” As a result of this systemic change, multilateral security regimes that began to burgeon in the mid-1970’s have expanded the principles and norms of the post-Wall European security regime, which started to get determined by the direct participation of all European states. Thirty-four heads of state or government, at the CSCE summit of November 1990, adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, declaring that the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended.

The second major change in United States-Soviet regimes was the adoption of ceilings to conventional weapons in Europe by the superpowers. This change also led to the establishment of a Europe-wide regime in deterrent forces by the members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the same summit meeting that the Paris Charter was adopted, the leaders also signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and institutionalized the relative conventional power of European states, making a surprise attack less likely in Europe. The treaty covered the area from Atlantic to the Urals and allowed the Warsaw Pact and NATO to possess the same amount of military equipment. Moreover, the Soviets were obliged to cut their conventional forces in Eastern Europe and in the western Soviet Union by half because of the treaty’s clause banning any party from possessing more than two-thirds of the overall allotment of a pact. In 1992, as an important supplement to the CFE Treaty, the parties also signed the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the so-called CFE-1A agreement, which “constitutes a nonbinding commitment on the part of the signatories to limit their manpower deployments in the area covered by the CFE treaty.”

48. Although Koslowski and Kratochwil associate themselves with ‘constructivism,’ both regime theory and the constructivist approach attach great importance to norms, leaving us enough room for maneuver to apply this theory to the effect of regime change on the change of the international system. However, it is critical to note that regimes and international systems are not identical concepts, nor do all changes in regimes’ norms and principles lead to a change in the international system (Ernst B. Haas, “Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981,” International Organization, 37/2 (1983), p.191).
In short, learning in Soviet foreign policy changed the previous Soviet understanding on security and defense issues and resulted in the transformation of principles and norms of United States-Soviet security regimes which in turn paved the way for the systemic change. And, as a result of the newly established regimes and of expanding regimes at the multilateral level with the participation of both the superpowers, the Soviet Union (and later Russia), beginning with the early 1990’s, has no longer been capable of launching a surprise attack in Europe, nor has its power been considered a threat to the West.

CONCLUSION

Security regimes institutionalized the Cold War, stabilized the international system, and provided some specific principles and norms for managing interbloc relations through which the major powers were able to change the international system peacefully in the early 1990’s. The creation of security regimes in the first place and later their effect on the systemic change, however, became possible thanks to the learning process in United States and Soviet foreign policies in the 1960’s and mid-1980’s, respectively. The relative peace—the Long Peace—since 1945 and the peaceful transformation of the international system demonstrate that institutional cooperation matters and in fact institutionalism better explains international relations in the era concerned than structural theories such as realism.

Superpower relations, to a great extent, shaped interbloc relations during the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union were, of course, competing with each other for world resources and for a more secure environment. Yet this was an institutionalized competition. The Cold War was not a state of nature in Hobbesian sense, rather it was institutionalized. The superpowers were able to create security regimes in such issue areas as nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, crisis management/crisis avoidance, confidence building and security-building, Berlin, and conventional force levels in Europe. We cannot, therefore, explain the long peace and the peaceful transformation of the international system by studying, say, United States-Third World relations or transatlantic relations. What determined the character of these relations was the extent of cooperation between the superpowers in the security realm. From the end of the Second World War to the Cuban missile crisis, we observed the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as the ideological division of the world. However, as the Cold War unfolded, the superpowers were able to establish security regimes and this led to the interbloc detente and the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy.
Institutions, then, have played a major role in stabilizing the international system, in the peaceful change of that system, and in creating a new international order. The existence of security regimes was not the only reason for the Long Peace; however, it was one of the most important reasons. The existence of nuclear weapons, bipolarity, the balancing process, and economic independence of the superpowers did, to some extent, contribute to the relative stability in the second half of the Twentieth Century. However, it would be naive to argue that they would maintain peace in the absence of institutionalized cooperation between the superpowers. In fact security regimes have gained a life of their own and shaped interests and objectives of political actors throughout the Cold-War era, and even after that. Learning in domestic politics was an inevitable part of this process, since learning was the cause of both the creation and the transformation of the security regimes in the era concerned. Thus, learning at the state level is crucial for both regime-creation and change in regimes which in turn may stabilize and sometimes even transform the international system. This was what we observed in international relations from 1945 to the early Twenty-first Century.