‘REFLEXIVE’ GLOBALIZATION AND RECASTING GLOBALIZATION DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

‘REFLEKSİF ’ KÜRESELLEŞME VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERDE KÜRESELLEŞME TARTIŞMASINI DÖNÜŞTÜRMEK

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ABSTRACT

This paper contends that globalization as framed and understood within the theoretical context of mainstream International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) is largely incapacitated to reflect on contemporary changes in world politics and that the advent of ‘globalization debate’ in IR theory and IPE has been unrewarding. Nevertheless, rather than refuting globalization, this study redeems the concept by defining it in such a way that it is able to capture such changes in world politics which often evade traditional categories of analysis in IR. For this purpose, this study, drawing largely on critical sociological theorizing of globalization, attempts to develop a conception and framework of what it calls ‘reflexive’ globalization. Reflexive globalization puts special emphasis on the socio-cultural changes in the world and identifies three aspects of globalization: ‘reflexivity’, ‘relativization’ and ‘deterritorialization’. Thus, the concept of globalization suggested in this study is more complex and holistic than either transnationalism, or interdependence or internationalization, and it rests on a different image of the world. It thereby resists being bounded by the analytical and theoretical limitations of the mainstream IR theory. Reflexive globalization recasts the globalization debate in IR and offers a way of advancing distinct explanations of contemporary changes in the state and the international system.

Keywords: IR theory, globalization, globalization debate, reflexivity

1. INTRODUCTION

International Relations (IR) students increasingly acknowledge that globalization phenomenon has come to influence, albeit in varying degrees, the processes and outcomes of world politics. Even so, they fundamentally disagree on what it means. Despite this widespread appraisal, they have often approached globalization in such ways as to maintain their underlying state-centric, territorial, and methodological nationalist assumptions and propositions about international relations. Realists of almost all stripes, on the one hand, resolutely deny that globalization, viewed as growing levels of interdependence between states, is something new or represents anything novel (Gilpin, 2000). And they, instead, suggest that globalization is nothing but merely the ‘fad of the 1990s’ and ‘made in America’ (Waltz, 1999: 694; 2000). On the other hand, liberal approaches in IR, in
particular transnationalism and complex interdependence schools of thought, are said to be the intellectual pioneers of today’s ‘globalization thesis’. Furthermore, some liberal IR theorists (in particular Robert Keohane and Nye, 2000; Keohane, 2002) even claim that they have already accounted for some of the dynamics—such as transnationalism and interdependence—commonly associated today with globalization even before the advent of the concept of globalization in IR and International Political Economy (IPE). This paper, however, firstly argues that globalization as framed and understood within the theoretical context of mainstream IR and IPE is largely incapacitated to give a distinct account of contemporary changes in world politics and that the advent of ‘globalization debate’ in IR theory and IPE has been rather unrewarding. This is because the debate is largely misguided (Hay, 2007). The concept of globalization as suggested in this study is, however, more complex and holistic than either transnationalism or interdependence or internationalization, and it rests on a different image of the world. It thereby resists being bounded by the analytical and theoretical limitations of the mainstream IR theory. It argues instead in favour of redeeming the concept by defining it in such a way that it is able to capture what is new about world politics and thus to retain its conceptual and analytical novelty and utility.

Secondly, it introduces, following Ulrich Beck most notably, and drawing largely on sociological and cultural theorizing of globalization, the key notion of ‘reflexivity’ to conceptual development. It aims briefly to lay out a conceptual framework for what might be termed ‘reflexive’ one emphasizing principally the qualitative, social and cultural, character of the accelerating and differentiating processes associated with globalization. Such a perspective harnessed through an interdisciplinary approach may contribute to globalization studies in IR and to attempts both to portray a different image of the world and to give a distinct account of new changes in world politics.

In order to realize its main objectives, this paper is organized as follows. It begins with different conceptions of globalization. Then it proceeds in two parts. The first part attempts to explain how limited the analytical and theoretical framework of IR and IPE to shed light on globalization. The emphasis here will be on transnationalism and complex interdependence for they take globalization seriously and claim to precede and explain it. The second part aims to develop a socio-cultural conception and framework of globalization, one which borrows generously from critical sociological (and cultural) theorizations of globalization. It argues that this approach is able to provide a fruitful way of not only questioning the fundamental assumptions on which mainstream IR and IPE perspectives are based, but also of thinking about and explaining novel changes in world politics.
2. MULTIPLE CONCEPTIONS OF GLOBALIZATION AND ‘GLOBALIZATION DEBATE’ IN IR

Defining globalization is not a straightforward matter, nor is it a neutral task. This is so because whether globalization represents a novel world depends largely on how it is conceptualized. Globalization is indeed a highly contested concept with different meanings being attached to it in IR just as in many other branches of social sciences including most prominently economics, sociology, political science and geography. As Jan Scholte (2001: 14; 1999: 10-11) identified, globalization in the vast social science literature—including and above all in IR and IPE writings—has at least five distinct usages. Firstly, it is often equated with ‘internationalization’, that is, the extension and intensification of cross-border interactions. Secondly, it is understood as economic ‘liberalization’, one referring to the removal of restrictions for a more open and integrated world economy. Thirdly, it is viewed as a process of ‘universalization’, referring to the global reach of ideas, objects, and movements. Fourthly, globalization, for some, is little more than ‘westernization’, particularly ‘Americanization’ or ‘McDonaldization’. Lastly, it can also be understood as ‘deterritorialization’ and, it is this conception, argued Scholte, which epitomizes its distinctiveness and novelty.

These definitions depict the language of many in what is called the ‘globalization debate’ in IR. Both parties to the debate, ‘globalists’ (supporters of the globalization thesis, consisting of many liberals and some Marxists) and ‘global-sceptics’ (those rejecting the ‘globalization thesis’ or finding it not so new, represented by almost all realists and some Marxists) (see Held et al., 1999; Held and McGrew, 2000: 1-46), employ abovementioned conceptions when they argue about globalization. Globalists understand globalization mostly in terms of globalization of liberal economic and political ideas, institutions and policies. On the other hand, global-sceptics, often stressing the lingering role of great powers and the inevitability of power politics in international relations, see globalization processes in terms of increased cross-border movements; globalization is nothing more than internationalization or ‘Americanization’. However, all those meanings of globalization and their particular referents, except for globalization as deterritorialization, hardly ever conceive of a radically different world. This is because they simply capture and refer to the ongoing processes of largely political, economic and cultural expansion and/or intensification that already have a long history. Globalization must refer to something else that has yet to be represented. Transnationalism and complex interdependence literature and most IPE writings refer by globalization to particularly the processes of internationalization, universalization, (economic, political and cultural) liberalization and/or westernization. These definitions alone reveal how limited their proponents’ visions of the world and the ways through which those authors attempt to conceive of the changing world.

As mentioned above, in view of Scholte, if globalization as a concept wishes to have an added-value in globalization studies, it must refer to the processes of deterritorialization. As such, it denotes “a shift in geography whereby territorial
places, territorial distances and territorial borders lose some of their previously overriding influence” (Scholte, 2001: 14). Deterritorialization, signifying perceptively some new developments since the 1960s, can provide a distinct representation of the novel changes undergoing in the world that cannot be captured by state-centric concepts of IR. Scholte defines it as the “processes whereby many social relations become relatively delinked from territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as single place.” Globalization refers to an accelerating process of deterritorialization so that “the world has become one relatively borderless social sphere” (2001: 14-15). This view of globalization seems to represent a significantly different image of the world but still paradoxically holds onto a conception of spatially delimited world. This view of globalization has presumably been influenced by studies on globalization particularly in sociology and geography. In fact, globalization, as conceived of by some leading sociologists, such as Anthony Giddens (1990), Roland Robertson (1992), and Malcolm Waters (2001), denotes to those complex processes which increasingly permeate state borders and transgress territoriality. The annihilation of space by time in order to fix the crises of capitalism, argues Harvey (2000), has created ‘a time-space compression’, which constitutes the hallmark of globalization. However, as some critics, in particular some geographers like Harvey, duly noted, the concept of deterritorialization ignores the very territorial/spatial character of, or the role of territory/space in sustaining, many processes of globalization (Clark, 1998; 1999: 37; Brenner, 1999). As it will be discussed below, even this partial conception of globalization as deterritorialization and ‘supra-territoriality’ exists neither in transnationalism or complex interdependence, nor in mainstream liberal IPE which claim to be the protagonists of the globalization thesis in IR.

3. LIMITS OF MAINSTREAM THINKING ABOUT GLOBALIZATION IN IR/IPE

3.1. Transnationalism and Complex Interdependence Approaches

Some leading IR theorists, above all Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, have claimed to be the pioneers of today’s globalization thesis. They (1972; 1989) developed ‘transnationalism’ and ‘complex interdependence’ in IR as new theoretical approaches in the 1970s 1. Their claim is based on the argument that their

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1 Transnational relations are defined by Keohane and Nye (1972: xi) as “contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments.” One might, however, argue that transnationalism and complex interdependence seem to have borrowed some assumptions from earlier students of politics and International Relations (Little, 1996). The contemporary challenge to the state-centric view of the world in IR has its precedents. The writings on the relationship between increasing economic interdependence, declining role of military power and greater potentiality for international cooperation could also be found in the writings of what is called the liberal internationalists, such as Norman Angell and James Shotwell. As Miles Kahler (1997: 23-24) forcefully argued, these liberal internationalists were more ‘materialist’ in their outlook than they were generally thought; they are still often mistakenly called ‘idealists’. In fact, they asserted the primacy of material—economic and technological—developments over ideas and institutions for international cooperation. Similar arguments regarding the role of transnational actors, interdependent relations,
explanations of the changing world politics in the early 1970s through transnationalism and complex interdependence can readily be applied to explain today’s globalization. This also means that the phenomena that globalization refers to are not entirely new (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 104). The scholarship on transnational actors and forces and dynamics of interdependence between states began to thrive at the time in an international environment in which a series of developments brought increasing political and academic attention to international economic issues. This new international environment gave an impetus, in particular, to the study of interdependent relations between states in the world economy and, more specifically, of the role of multinational corporations and international institutions (Cooper, 1968; Vernon, 1971; Keohane, 1984). These liberal scholars claimed to challenge basically three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm. They argued that (1) states were not the only actors; (2) the clear-cut separation between high politics (particularly political and security issues) and low politics (economical, environmental, and other non-military issues) was untenable; (3) a clear-cut distinction between domestic politics and international politics could no longer be sustained (Keohane and Nye, 1972; 1989; Keohane, 1984; 1989). The underlying idea behind these challenges was that the new international reality (growing number of transnational actors and increasing and intensifying interdependence) was no longer compatible with the existing (realist) understanding of state sovereignty in IR.

Given their underlying assumptions about state, international system structure and power, one can however argue that these approaches are severely limited in challenging the realist image of the world. One can detect at least four limitations in their theoretical and conceptual frameworks (neoliberal institutionalism, a theoretical successor to these approaches, suffers from similar limitations). First, the pluralist approach to state (state being not a unitary entity) in the American tradition of political theory and comparative politics was transplanted into the study of world politics by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1972) so that they were able to point out the existence and significance of non-state actors in world politics alongside states. However, they had to continue working within the limits of the unitary theory of state when they come to formulate state interests and their interactions for they did not embrace what the pluralist theory of state entails: the state is neither a coherent nor a unitary actor and is, instead, composed of multiple and often conflicting actors and interests (Hobson, 2000: 2-4). The state with its distinct (sovereign) identity and interests remained the basic foundations of world politics.

Secondly, complex interdependence school in particular has not fundamentally disputed the state-centric outlook of world politics because interdependence, its key explanatory concept, was conceived of a condition growing significance of economic relations and thus declining importance of military power and security issues as well as the eclipse of traditional state sovereignty can be discerned in today’s globalization debate as well.
involving state-power relations and a property of international relations. Interdependence referred to “situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 8). The cases of interdependence often result from dramatically increasing international transactions under anarchy. Therefore, Richard Ashley (1988; George, 1994: 129-134) argued that those pointing out the complex interdependent character of world politics contributed to, rather than challenge, ‘the discourse of the anarchy problématique’ in IR theory—the problem of governance (or cooperation) in the absence of government or sovereign power in the international realm. It is because, he reasoned, they “presuppose a specific structuring of international political authority relations. They start from the premise that the world is to be understood not only in terms of the absence of a central agency of rule but also in terms of the presence of a multiplicity of states, each understood as a sovereign identity presiding over its respective national society and making decisions in the interests thereof” (Ashley, 1988: 227). Starting from the sovereign state necessarily leads to the generic problem of cooperation under anarchy and ultimately ends up privileging the status quo and the current political structure of the international system (Walker, 1993). Similarly, John Hobson (2000: 4) argued that transnationalism and interdependence approaches tended to exaggerate or reify rather than challenge the anarchic international structure.

Thirdly, rather than posing a threat to the international system, the phenomenon of interdependence has come to support the foundations of the states system. Under conditions of complex interdependence, it is expected that states are supposedly bound to create international institutions and ‘international regimes’ in pursuit of their shared national interests. The ‘collective action problem’, the major impediment to cooperation, is solved through these institutions and regimes which, in turn, sustain the existing political structure of the international system (Ruggie, 1982). The world of international institutions involving states, transnational actors, multilateral relations and international regimes, on the one hand, and the world of states on the other hand, continue coexisting in alignment, reinforcing and reproducing each other (Keohane, 1984; Keohane, 1989).

Fourthly, complex interdependence approach conceptualized power in relational terms. Power in the words of Keohane and Nye (1989: 11) is “the ability of an actor to get others to do something that otherwise would not do.” Power is mostly conceived of ‘control over resources’, much less ‘the potential to affect outcomes’. However, Susan Strange (1996: 17) defines power as “the ability of a person or group of persons so to affect outcomes that their preferences take precedence over the preferences of others.” This conception of power is perceived of a structural quality, avoiding the logical trap of binding power to either class interests or national interests or corporate interest. The inherent relational conception of power in interdependence scholarship glosses over the possibility of structural change. They were only able to argue for mitigating anarchy rather than having an entirely different prospect of world politics (Baldwin, 1993; Waltz, 1986).
It is not surprising that a leading theorist of complex interdependence and transnationalism, Robert Keohane, (Miller and Keohane, 1996: 4) began to study ‘internationalization’, understood as “the processes generated by underlying shifts in transaction costs that produce observable flows of goods, services and capital.” Recently, Robert Keohane and his colleague, Joseph Nye, wrote on globalization understood as a process and referring always to flows and contacts that are increasing and intensifying. Therefore, they (2000: 105) argue that they invented a new term to describe the current era of transformation in world politics that cannot be comprehended by interdependence: ‘globalism’, that is, “a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances.” Globalism stands for the processes of accelerating ‘multicontinental interdependence’. It is indeed “the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick” (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 108).

As a result, it can be argued that the view of globalization as simply the intensification of transnational and interdependent relations is often subject to disciplinary practices of the anarchy discourse. Even some sophisticated realists, Buzan and Little (2000: 256-57), see globalization as simply a catalyst that has intensified interaction capacity of the contemporary international system particularly in the international economic sphere. Complex interdependence and transnationalism thinkers presumably refer a great deal to the processes understood as internationalization and liberalization. These approaches could not provide a distinct and analytically explanatory framework to understand globalization in novel terms. Nor does mainstream IPE present a better theoretical framework to make sense of globalization.

3.2. Mainstream IPE Perspectives on Globalization

The so-called globalization debate takes place largely in IPE sub-field of IR (Germain, 2000). Fundamental differences in theoretical orientations in IR/IPE typically generate different conceptions and interpretations of globalization. Three major theoretical traditions in mainstream IPE—Realism, Liberalism and Marxism—suggest different conceptions of globalization. For liberals, globalization is chiefly an economic process, ultimately changing the nature of international political governance. The primacy of economic processes over political considerations is evident in this kind of interpretation (Ohmae, 1990; 1995, see Held et al., 1999). Scholars within a realist tradition, particularly neorealists, however, point out the primacy of political rather than economic or cultural forces and dimensions of globalization. They establish and privilege the dominant role of the state in the origins and development of globalization. In fact, states, particularly the most powerful ones, are the major agents of globalization (Waltz, 2000; Mann, 1997; Evans, 1997). The accelerating pace of international interdependencies particularly in international economy, and the growth of transnational forces can be most accurately described as ‘internationalization’ rather than globalization (Weiss, 1997; 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1996).
Marxism in its some contemporary forms in IR and IPE, such as the world-systems theory, offered a non-state centric conception and spatio-temporal development of globalization. Globalization represents only the most recent stage of capitalist development in world (economy) history; it is not at all new because it is aged with capitalism (Helleiner, 1997; Hirst and Thompson, 1996). Critical Marxist scholarship brought social practices and ideational elements into the study of globalization. According to neo-Gramscians, contemporary globalization is an empirical reality as much as a hegemonic discourse: ‘neoliberal globalization’. As a reality, “neoliberal globalization is the latest phase in a process that originated before the dawning of the Enlightenment in Europe, and accelerated in the nineteenth century with the onset of industrial capitalism and the consolidation of the integral nation state” (Gill, 1995: 400; Gill, 1989). It is nonetheless unprecedented at least in terms of its extensity and intensity in the post-1945 period. As an ideology, it refers to the myth of capitalist progress, market integration, and the triumph of neoliberalism (Rupert, 2000: 16; Gill, 1995). This approach brought ideational elements into the study of globalization but ideas, norms and discourses have often been readily relegated to the status of ideology, serving simply to the interests of the emergent ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Robinson and Harris, 2000; Sklair, 2001).

Located within IR theoretical context, particularly in IPE, globalization as argued by Liberals, Realists and Marxists alike does not portray a new world. There are some inherent features of IPE that pose obstacles in representing the world in entirely different and novel terms. Randall Germain (2000: 69), a critical IPE scholar, pointed out at least three problematic traits of mainstream IPE students: “they embrace a positivist and behavioural approach to the question of acquiring knowledge; they agree on the overall constitution of the international economy as sum total exchange between national economies; and they focus on public policy issues as perceived by state actors.”

The first problematic leads to the adoption of an empiricist and economistic approach to globalization, and this is evident in many and popular accounts of globalization. Analysts following such an approach rely heavily on quantitative techniques and indicators either to support or to reject the globalization thesis (Ohmae, 1990; 1995; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Wade, 1996; Rodrik, 1997). Secondly, the mainstream IPE is arguably statist and territorial in character (Krasner, 1995). That it is defined conventionally either “the study of systemic laws binding economy, civil society and polity, or as the study of mutuality between states and markets” (Gilpin, 1987; 2001) is problematic in the first place, because “[t]he national and the international as well as the relationship between the two are essentialized: fixed in an unchanging set of imaginary boundaries” (Amin and Palan, 2002: 567; Walker, 1993). Thirdly, many students of globalization study policy relevant issues that are perceived by states, i.e., how should the state respond to globalization processes? They may also seek the ways in which unfettered globalization processes can be regulated and disciplined: what would be the mechanisms and institutions of international or ‘global governance’ under globalization? Such an approach can be considered of both reinforcing and reproducing statism and the state-centric view of
the world by taking a ‘problem-solving’ character discounting the long-term prospect of progressive change in international life (Cox, 1986).

A final critique, perhaps the most challenging one, comes from social constructivist scholarship in IR theory. From this perspective, most IPE scholarship, particularly its mainstream neo-realist and neo-liberal wings and classical Marxist approaches are considered as ‘rationalist’ because they treat identities and interests of actors as given and exogenous to interaction (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998; Wendt, 1992, 1999; Rosow and Inayatullah, 1997). Rationalist IPE, as argued, is grounded in a unitary theory of state sealed with territorial boundaries (see Agnew and Corbridge, 1995). Most IPE, except for some Marxist inspired scholarship, thus rests on a territorially delimited view of the world; world politics is understood as intrinsically state-centric and anarchical. It can be argued that it is this problematique that makes it difficult to grasp the reconfiguration of world politics in social, cultural and qualitative terms as well as state transformation in terms of its changing identities and interests. From this critique, one may recognize the need for a more social/cultural approach to globalization to retain the conceptual utility of globalization to observe and make sense of changing world politics and the role of the state in this process.

4. ‘REFLEXIVE’ GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is a historical phenomenon as much as a theoretical concept; in both senses, it is deeply embedded in modernity and modernization processes. Following Ulrich Beck’s (1997) distinction between ‘first modernity’ or ‘industrial modernization’ and ‘second-modernity’ or ‘reflexive modernization’, one can differentiate historically and analytically between first, industrial capitalist globalization and today’s (reflexive) globalization. Viewed from IR perspective, the first modernity, as a consequence of “dismembering of traditional social forms and then re-embedding of industrial ones,” created sovereign states, industrial and territorially delimited national societies and ‘international relations’; the second modernity or reflexive modernization calls for a fundamental change in the very foundations of industrial modernity, and modern (industrial, national and territorial) conceptions, institutions and patterns of international relations for it currently involves complex and multiple processes of “dismemberdling of industrial social forms and then the re-embedding of other modernities” (Beck, 1997: 22-23). More specifically, reflexive modernization is aimed at promoting “a radicalization of

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2 Marxist scholarship in IPE rests on a different ontology, with social classes, not states, being the central actors in the capitalist system. This ontology in the world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein is hierarchical, understood in terms of vertical and exploitative relationship between the core, semi-periphery, and periphery in the world economy. The mainstream IR holds the ontology of international anarchy based on the juridical equality of sovereign states. However, much of Marxist scholarship shares the assumption of rationality with mainstream IR and IPE perspectives for they all hold the interests and identities of actors as relatively fixed and show a tendency to produce economically oriented explanations. Ideational and cultural elements are treated often instrumentally as part of the hegemonic discourses of the dominant, indeed capitalist, social classes.
modernity which breaks up the premises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to new modernities or counter-modernities” (Beck, 1997: 17). Today’s globalization can be read as a constitutive part of this process, the process of disembudding and re-embedding of the ideas, institutions and practices of the industrial modernity in complex and contradictory ways— one domain of industrial modernity concerns the established patterns of relations, institutions and behaviour between states under international anarchy on the basis of the so-called Westphalian principles of territoriality, sovereignty, and nationality etc. This approach, as shall be briefly outlined below, claims to attribute some utility and novelty to the concept of globalization, and the concept thus might provide an avenue to break up the impasse in the globalization debate in IR.

What might be called here ‘reflexive’ globalization 3 is an attempt to locate it in broader and historical processes of industrial modernization and in the current (reflexive) phase of modernization in which we find ourselves. Firstly, this conception emphasized the ‘multidimensionality’ of globalization and the experiences of increasing ‘reflectivity’ on the part of individuals. Secondly, globalization is viewed as ‘deteritorization’, as suggested earlier by Scholte. A third element of this approach concerns ‘relativization’, implying the need to pay heed to paradoxes and contradictions involved in globalization processes. Global-human interactions and the global-local nexus (termed as ‘glocalization’) can be conceived of being a part of this process as well. If understood, however, simply as a socio-cultural process, globalization appears hardly novel at all. As a historical reality, the abovementioned emergent qualities of globalization, as argued, can be traced back as early as to the 1960s (Robertson, 1992).

Reflexive globalization puts a strong emphasis on socio-cultural aspect of globalization among its many—political, economic, military, etc.—dimensions. This scholarship originates particularly from within sociology, cultural studies and critical geography. From a sociological perspective, Roland Robertson (1992: 8) defines globalization as “the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole.” Globalization acquires in this conception a cognitive dimension as to the spatio-temporal view of the world. In the same vein, globalization is defined by Anthony Giddens (1990: 64) as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. … Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space.” Local transformation, or localization, indicates “a reflexive reconstruction of community in the face of dehumanizing implications” of globalization processes in a changing world (Walters, 2001: 5). The emphasis here is on globalizing (and localizing) society and culture with a radically different imagery of space and time (Featherstone and Lash, 1995). The socio-cultural, economic and political life will no longer be delimited or disciplined entirely

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3 Ulrich Beck has used this term rather rarely and, in one instance, he defined “reflexive globalization” or “globality” as “a global everyday experience and consciousness of the global” (2002: 21).
by forces of territoriality. Malcolm Waters (2001: 5) defines globalization as “[a] social process in which the constraints of geography on economic, political, social and cultural arrangements recede, in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding and in which people act accordingly.” Ulrich Beck (2002: 18) defines it almost the same way as:

‘Globalization’ is a non-linear, dialectic process in which the global and the local do not exist as cultural polarities but as combined and mutually implicating principles. These processes involve not only interconnections across boundaries, but transform the quality of the social and the political inside nation-state societies. This is what I define as ‘cosmopolitanization’: cosmopolitanization means internal globalization, globalization from within the national societies. This transforms everyday consciousness and identities significantly. Issues of global concern are becoming part of the everyday local experiences and the ‘moral life-worlds’ of the people. They introduce significant conflicts all over the world. To treat these profound ontological changes simply as myth relies on a superficial and unhistorical understanding of ‘globalization’, the misunderstandings of neoliberal globalism. The study of globalization and globality, cosmopolitanization and cosmopolitanism constitutes a revolution in the social sciences.

As explained above briefly, in an attempt to outline a conceptual framework for globalization, there emerge at least three distinctive aspects of reflexive globalization: ‘reflexivity’, ‘relativization’, and ‘detrerritorialization’. To begin with, one particular feature of globalization distinct from its earlier manifestations is its reflexivity. By ‘reflexivity’ is meant the emergence or development of a worldwide popular consciousness of global interconnectedness. Individuals in contemporary times are highly reflexive to flow of information and act accordingly. The paradox here is that the information flows are so rapid and volatile that uncertainty associated with risks is becoming the norm of people’s lives. Along with other ecological, biological and modernity induced unintended and unexpected hazards, these uncertain modes of life may generate reflexivity to oneself (self-reflexivity), to other peoples (intersubjectivity), and to the nature (ecological consciousness) (Beck, 1992; 2000; 2006: 9).

Relativization implies “a complex interweave of homogenizing with differentiating trends” (Waters, 2001: 196; Robertson, 1992: 29). Globalization does not necessarily mean cultural homogenization. As Claire Sjolender notes (1996: 616), globalization “creates difference and construct ‘others’ among us, despite its homogenizing pretences.” Therefore, we see two seemingly opposing tendencies at the same time: fundamentalism versus cultural homogenization, and ethnic revivalism versus strengthening nationalism (Robertson, 1992: 164-181). In the words of Roland Robertson (1992: 102), contemporary globalization is a form of institutionalizing the two-fold process involving “the universalization of particularism and the particularization of the universalism.” Robertson (1995: 40) thus refutes “the tendency to cast the idea of globalization as inevitably in tension with the idea of localization.” This homogeneity-heterogeneity relationship concerns how space is
changing and how this change is conceptualized. One way of understanding this change as part of globalization is to use the notion of deterritorialization.

Deterritorialization as used in the context of reflexive globalization does not mean the end of spatiality or the decline of the state as a territorial entity but refers to intellectual as well as social and material processes reconfiguring the constructed territorial boundaries around national identities/societies with a view to identity transformation (Harvey, 2000). Deterritorialization may include, for instance, processes of collective identity formation beyond nation-state boundaries (e.g., civilizations or security communities) or of identity fragmentation below nation-states (e.g., ethnic identities and Diasporas). This process, however, goes often together with another one, re-territorialization, which demonstrates the continued relevance and centrality of space under globalization (Brenner, 1999). The globalization debate also ‘represents the spatialization of social theory’ which privileges ‘spatial’ over ‘the temporal mode of analysis’ (Featherstone and Lash, 1995; 1995a: 1). Deterritorialization can also be understood with reference to what Appadurai calls the emerging ‘disjunctures’ between different (economic, cultural, political, and production related) domains of social life (1996: 37-43; 2000: 230-37)⁴.

4.1. Reflexive Globalization and Recasting Globalization Debate in IR

What does reflexive globalization tell us about globalization debate in IR (and across social sciences)? In contrast to the prevailing approaches to globalization in IR (globalists/liberals and global-sceptics/realists), reflexive globalization aims to spell out an entirely different conception of the world and to give novel accounts for manifold changes that have currently been taking place. In doing so, this approach also carries the potential to alter the terms of the globalization debate in IR which seems to be trapped between state-centric and non-state-centric conceptions of the world (Hay, 2007). Unlike global-sceptics, who assert the continuing primacy of the sovereign state containing and defining national society with its powers, reflexive globalization argues for the erosion of sovereign rights of states, and of national politics from below and above, as well as the growth of such relations and structures that evade or encroach upon state boundaries. Unlike many hyper-globalists (like Kenichi Ohmae), those who see the end of the nation-state, national economies and cultures, and those who argue the irrelevance of nation-states and national borders especially in the supposedly fully integrated world economy, reflexive globalization neither readily announces the end of the nation-state nor argues imminently the

⁴ It may be argued that Scholte (1999: 12-14) confined the conceptual utility of both globalization and deterritorialization to ‘supraterritorial spaces’ (referring to ‘circumstances where territorial space is substantially transcended’ like Internet connection or visa credit cards) and arguably opened up another level of analysis (along with individual, national and international systemic levels) that globalization tries to break down (Cerny, 1995; 1996; 2000). Some others, like Ian Clark (1998; 1999: 37), try to re-territorialize globalization. Arjun Appadurai (1996: 27-47), instead, understands deterritorialization in terms of fluid and intertwined spaces that might arguably be able to represent the contradictory dynamics of globalization and developments which evades levels of analysis framework of IR.
disappearance of national identities or cultural differences. Globalization instead involves both homogenizing and localizing tendencies, differentiations and processes of relativization simultaneously. One can observe at once that globalization is abolishing some territorial, national and sovereign boundaries between states while creating some other kinds of boundaries between different forms of political rules/authorities and communities. Consequently, reflexive globalization challenges above all the ontological limitations and epistemological-methodological preferences of ‘methodological nationalism’ in IR and across social sciences (Beck and Sznaider, 2006; Beck, 2006: 24-33). This problem lies at the heart of the contemporary debates over globalization for the reason that:

It equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary focus of social-scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states. And it goes further: this outer delimitation as well as the competition between nation-states, represent the most fundamental category of political organization. (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 3).

This challenge reveals that the globalization debate in IR (and across sciences) is largely misguided and the underlying terms of the debate are rather narrow because globalization is thought to have been taking place outside and in large part against the territorial state. In fact, this appears to be a natural and logical outcome of methodological nationalism or the state-centric ontology (states being the basic actors) and statist assumptions (states being the most powerful actors) of much of IR theory. Globalization, as manifold definitions of globalization in IR and IPE have demonstrated above, appears as a derivative concept and is defined in relation to, and often against, the state; because, the latter is ontologically the primary reference point or the point of departure for much of social scientific and political inquiry. One exemplary consequence of this view of globalization and misguided globalization debate in IR and IPE concerns our understanding of the European Union (EU). The EU in much of IR, IPE scholarship and in the EU studies is often described as a sui generis entity due to the lack of a proper concept to refer to it. IR scholars are paralysed by the fact that the EU evades traditional categories of social and political analysis. This is because it performs some modern state functions without really conforming to the ideal-typical characteristics of the modern (sovereign, territorial, national) state. This seems to be partly due to narrow and impoverished understanding of globalization—one referring to phenomena outside and against the state (the sovereign state is subject to externally derived forces of globalization but it is still able to remain without being modified and transformed internally)—as much as the common methodological convention of launching analysis from the state in IR. One should ask what type of entity the EU is rather than what type of state? Rather than trying to fit the EU into existing state-based conceptual apparatuses or pre-given conceptions of IR, the approach advocated here locates it to the processes of contemporary globalization and attempts to define it what it really is or is becoming.
Rather than seeing the EU as a unique entity in a world of sovereign states, reflexive globalization takes it as exemplary to new forms of ‘political communities’ and structures of political rule in times of the second modernity (Linklater, 1998; Beck and Grande, 2007). The EU is exemplary of the ways in which the processes of reflexive globalization affect and bring about novel and structural changes in world politics. It is indeed the Europe’s reflexive globalization that contributes to “the structures of a new, transnationally interconnected society that breaks out of the container of the nation-state and simultaneously transforms its basic institutions” (Beck and Grande, 2007: 31). From the perspective of reflexive globalization, the EU and the ongoing process of ‘Europeanization’ forces IR and the EU scholars to think beyond the conceptual and ontological-methodological strictures of the mainstream IR and IPE in order to capture new forms of political communities and structures of political rules that are increasingly characterizing world politics.

Relexive globalization also contributes to our understanding of multitude processes, conceived of not isolate but rather intimately intertwined developments, in the context of ongoing reflexive globalization. Thus, what happens within states cannot be easily confined to the domain of the national nor can they be readily used to buttress mainstream frameworks for analysis. As Saskie Sassen put it:

One of the features of the current face of globalization is the fact that a process, which happens within a territory of sovereign state, does not necessarily mean that it is a national process. Conversely, the national (such as firms, capital, culture) may increasingly be located outside the national territory, for instance, in a foreign country or digital spaces. This localization of the local, or of the non-national, in national territories, and of the national outside national territories, undermined a key duality running through many of the methods and conceptual frameworks prevalent in social sciences, that the national and the non-national are mutually exclusive. (Cited in Beck, 2002: 23)

4.2. The State and International System under Reflexive Globalization

One might also ask to what extent reflexive globalization claims to represent a new world of (globalized) politics. Is globalization—understood here as the intensification of information and cultural flows, increasing consciousness of the world, recognition of difference, reflecting on and responding to the side effects of modernity and partial processes of deterritorialization—able to change the existing international systemic structure? Reflexive globalization argues that states are in the process of disembedding and re-embedding of their identities, provisions and (sovereign) rights under globalization. Indeed, we have seen in history the expansion and globalisation of certain fundamental rules, values and norms, such as the rules of diplomacy, the rules of warfare, positive international law, the idea of nationalism, the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention, which exemplify only some dimensions of (first or industrial modernization) globalization (Watson, 1992; Bull, 1977). The globalization of human rights (including internationalization of human rights on the one hand, and mounting challenges to western conception of human
rights, on the other) currently constitute a well-versed important theme of reflexive modernization/globalization. Changes through reflexive globalization may come through state transformation with a view to modifying and reconstituting the identity, functions, responsibilities and sensibilities of the state.

Globalization is not something that is purely external to the state but deeply internal to it (Clark, 1998; 1999). The state transformation is constitutive of globalization and globalization is what states and non-state actors make of it (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002) 5. Drawing on the propositions of social constructivist theories in IR, international political structures are defined here in largely social and cultural terms (Wendt, 1992; 1994; 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The international political structure is largely the structure of political identities and interests (Hall, 1999). A structural change therefore comes through changes not simply in the distribution of material capabilities; but it takes place, instead, with a re-distribution of ideas, identities, and interests. Reflexive globalization may facilitate changes in ideas and identities through reflexivity, increasing cultural and information flows, or through responses to the adverse effects of the ecological and biological interdependence crises of the world risk society. It takes the view that the contemporary globalization represents a novelty to the extent that the identity of the modern state is reconstituted and thus its interests are redefined.

Rationalists treat states as some types of agents with pre-given and fixed identities and interests (Wendt, 1992; 1999; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998). They do not problematize the identities and interests of actors. This approach to state and international relations might be useful to explain a world in which states have relatively stable identities and interests. However, this assumption under globalization processes becomes problematic; Wendt (1994: 392) explains this by arguing that "if it so dominates our thinking that we automatically treat whatever is external to territorial state actors as 'not-state' and therefore anarchic. This may obscure the emergence of state powers at the international [or global] level that are not concentrated in a single actor but distributed across transnational structures of political authority and constitute a structural transformation of the Westphalian states system." Likewise, Ian Clark (1999: 103) notes that "[s]tate transformation in conditions of globalization entails an necessary change of state identity and is a precondition, or at the very least a concomitant, of wider systemic change, not something that occurs as an incidental by-product of it." Globalization as a novel approach represents transformation in the nature of the state so that international political structures constituted on the basis of particular state identities and interests can also change. The socio-cultural practices and manifold processes of reflexive globalization may foster this cultural/structural change.

A collective identity formation process, transcending national-territorial boundaries, might also be seen as one current aspect of globalization. From this perspective, a changing form of state does not necessarily require a territorial shift,

5 The state as understood here refers to “a structure of political authority that performs governance functions over a people and space” (Wendt, 1994: 392).
but a shift in identity or ideas as to what constitutes political community. As Martin Shaw (1997; 1999) argued, the states in the western bloc during the Cold War were not ideal-typical nation-states. They, in fact, constituted ‘one state’ (or what he called ‘western conglomerate state’), because the boundaries were no longer drawn around distinct national communities. These communities were defined more than anything else in terms of inter-bloc relations. Under the heightened processes of globalization after the Cold War, the western type of state has arguably become a global form of state power, a type of state capable of projecting its powers all over the globe. Likewise, the present international order can be explained with respect to a fundamental state transformation—the emergence of the globalized state. It is the one that responds to and thus shapes the globalization processes while reconstituting its identity, provisions and functions accordingly (Clark, 2001; Armstrong, 1998).

5. CONCLUSION

The globalization debate in IR (and IPE) has presented an opportunity to question the underlying (above all ontological and methodological) presuppositions, and reconsider and assess the limits and capabilities of mainstream disciplinary perspectives in explaining complex and novel processes of changes in world politics. Nevertheless, IR has thus far not faced up with this challenge successfully. The current state (indeed stalemate) of IR theory is illustrative of this challenge. Some leading IR theorists have begun to admit the state-centric and rationalist limitations of the mainstream IR theory in explaining the phenomenon of 9/11 (Keohane, 2002a). The debate as played out mainly between realism and liberalism (or between globalists and global-sceptics) does not go far enough to confer upon the concept of globalization any explanatory—let alone descriptive—powers. An interdisciplinary approach, which borrows generously from the critical sociology and geography of globalization, helps not only to identify the novel dimensions of globalization empirically and conceptually, but also to establish its capacity to help IR scholars to rethink about changes and challenges in world politics in novel terms. Here the conception of reflexive globalization may enhance our collective capacity for critical reflections on the side effects of industrial modernity and emerging (social, political, spatial, economic) forms of the second modernity, or of ‘alternative modernities’. This approach to globalization does not reify the existing social structures, one of which is the sovereign states system. In this context, Alexander Wendt (1999: 375) ponders whether the states system itself can achieve reflexivity or not? The possibility of reflexivity under and through globalization at the international (state-to-state) and global (humanity) levels can both provide new perspectives for imagining and representing the world as well as presenting novel ways through which the world politics is designed and practiced.

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