Abstract

What, on the view of many epistemologists, underlies the rationale for internalism is the deontological thought that epistemic justification proceeds in terms of how well our believing that \( p \) stands \( \text{vis-à-vis} \) relevant epistemic duties. However, in “Deontology and Defeat”, Bergmann argues that the view that justification is to be analyzed in deontic terms does not motivate internalism, as many are inclined to suppose. I argue that Bergmann’s argument fails to show this, for the reason that his argument is based on equating \( S \)'s belief that his second-order belief that \( p \) is epistemically irrational with the notion of epistemic defeat, the presence of which is sufficient but not necessary for epistemic irrationality.

Keywords

Deontology, Epistemic defeat, Justification, Internalism, Bergmann.
Epistemologists generally agree that knowledge entails epistemic justification. But they are far from agreed on how to explicate the notion of justification. Internalist and externalist approaches to justification represent a basic division in contemporary epistemology. Broadly, internalism is the idea that epistemic justification is a purely internal matter in that the factors giving rise to justified belief should be internal to the believer. Thus it suggests a distinctively internalist requirement for justified belief.\(^1\) But externalism denies any such internalist requirement on justified belief and suggests that epistemic justification mainly proceeds in terms of factors that are external to the believing subject.

As Greco (1990: 245) says, despite the fact that there are several forms of internalism, most epistemologists think that the deontological conception of epistemic justification supports internalism. That is, almost all internalists hold that what underlies the rationale for internalism is the deontological thought that justification is fundamentally a matter of how well an epistemic agent’s believing that \(p\) stands \textit{vis-a-vis} relevant epistemic duties, e.g., the duty to refrain from believing that \(p\) in the absence of having \textit{good reasons} for thinking that his belief that \(p\) is likely to be true, or in the presence of having cogent evidence against either \(p\) or his \textit{reasons} for \(p\).\(^2\) Alvin Plantinga (1990: 52), for example, traces internalism to deontology, and argues at length that the notion of deontological justification requires internalism. He says that deontology “is the \textit{fons et origo} of the whole internalist tradition. It is this notion of deontological justification that is the source of internalism: deontology implies internalism”. Matthias Steup (1996: 86) also claims that “deontological theories are, therefore, necessarily internalist”.

This claim is based on the following line of thought. Since justification depends on how well one is carrying out one’s epistemic duties and whether one could rightfully be blamed or held responsible for believing that \(p\), then justifiers, including relevant epistemic duties and principles, must be within one’s \textit{internal awareness}. For that is what is crucial for whether one can be held responsible, or blamed, for one’s believing that \(p\); insofar as one meets his justificational requirements, that is, if and only if one’s belief that \(p\) is adequately supported \textit{so far as one can tell}, one cannot be blamed for believing \(p\). If one cannot accurately ascertain one’s epistemic duty, how can one be expected to perform that duty, and how can one reasonably be held responsible for performing that duty? Hence, it follows from the deontological view of epistemic justification that justifiers must be \textit{internally accessible} to the subject. This constraint on the determiners of justification seems to imply that only subject’s internal states qualify as epistemically legitimate justifiers. And this, if true, leads to internalism

\(^1\) There are different versions of internalism, because they characterize this requirement differently. Internalist theories can be classified as: Perspectival internalism, access internalism, internal state internalism (mentalism), level internalism and norm internalism. See John Greco (1990), William Alston (1989: 186) and Richard Feldman and Earl Conee (2001) for a similar classification of internalist theories.

\(^2\) Examples of epistemologists who analyze epistemic justification in deontic terms are Descartes (\textit{Meditation 4}), Locke (Book IV, xvii, 24 of \textit{Essay}), Bonjour (1985), Chisholm (1977), Ginet (1975), and Steup (1999).
according to which justification is a purely internal matter.\textsuperscript{3} In Greco’s (1990: 245) terms.

Internalists argue that epistemically justified belief just is epistemically responsible belief, but since epistemic responsibility is a function of considerations internal to the believing subject, epistemic justification is also a function of such internal considerations.

However, in “Deontology and Defeat” Michael Bergmann (2000) raises doubts as to whether there is any cogent inferential route from deontology to internalism. He argues that the view that justification is to be analyzed in deontic terms does not motivate internalism, as many are inclined to suppose. On his view, the inference from deontological construals of justification to internalism is unsound. Bergmann’s (2000: 87) argument is briefly this:

Externalists can quite properly hold that: a subject knows that $p$ only if she does not think her belief that $p$ is defeated. But the absence of this sort of defeat (the sort that is present when one thinks one's belief is defeated) guarantees the only sorts of deontological justification that have a chance at inducing internalism. So, one can hold that knowledge requires these sorts of deontological justification while consistently rejecting internalism.

In this paper, I will argue that Bergmann’s argument does not establish its conclusion. It might well be that an analysis of epistemic justification that is carried out in deontic terms does not provide us with a good reason for endorsing internalism. But this is not what I will oppose here. Rather, I want to argue that Bergmann’s argument fails to show this. After presenting his argument, I will first argue that Bergmann’s definition of “the no-defeater condition (NDC)” is problematic. Second, I will try to argue that the notion of deontological justification is \textit{not} a sub-condition of NDC that is both internal and necessary for knowledge and justification. In a nutshell, Bergmann’s argument fails because it is simply based on equating S’s belief that his belief that $p$ is epistemically \textit{irrational} with the notion of epistemic defeat, the presence of which is sufficient but not necessary for epistemic irrationality.

\textbf{Bergmann’s Argument}

Using the term “warrant” to refer to that which is sufficient, together with truth, for knowledge, Bergmann points out that at least two of the necessary components of \textit{warrant} are “the no-defeater condition (NDC)” and “the deontological justification condition (DJC)”. For Bergmann (2000: 88), “\textit{NDC} is satisfied by a belief $B$ just in case the person holding $B$ does not believe $B$ is defeated.” Bergmann (2000: 90) defines two versions of NDC and says that both of them are internal conditions:

\textsuperscript{3} But not every internalist endorses internalism on such deontological grounds. For instance, Alston (1989: 115-152), Richard Foley (1987: 13), Paul Moser (1989: 173-76), and Richard Fumerton (1995: 19-20) reject the view that justification should be understood deontologically, and go on to propose a different rationale for their internalism.
NDC is satisfied by S’s belief B if and only if S does not consciously take B to be epistemically irrational.

NDC is satisfied by S’s belief B if and only if S would not on brief reflection consciously take B to be epistemically irrational.

Moreover, Bergmann (2000: 94) provides two versions of DJC which are also internal:

DJC is satisfied by S’s belief that p if and only if, in believing that p, S does not consciously take herself to be violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that p epistemically irrational.

DJC is satisfied by S’s belief that p if and only if, in believing that p, S would not upon reflection consciously take herself to be violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that p epistemically irrational.

On Bergmann’s (2000: 89) view, it is epistemically irrational for S to believe that p just in case “S believes that the considerations counting for and against p are so weighted that now believing truly and not falsely with respect to p is not best achieved by believing p.” With these in mind, he argues as follows:

1. NDC is an internal condition whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism.
2. Warrant requires DJC that is also an internal condition.
3. NDC entails DJC.
4. But if DJC is entailed by NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism, then the deontological conception of justification does not provide a good reason for endorsing internalism.
5. Therefore, internalism is not supported by deontology.

The crucial premises of the argument are (1) and (3). Premise (1) claims that, for externalists, S knows that p only if S does not believe that p is defeated. That is, externalists think that knowledge requires that “S would not upon reflection consciously take” his belief that p to be epistemically irrational. Calling this condition NDC, Bergmann (2000: 91) claims that there are two main reasons that support premise (1). First, most externalists clearly suggest that NDC is necessary for warrant. Second, some internalists hold NDC is an internal but not an internalist condition.

On the other hand, premise (3) says that the satisfaction of NDC guarantees the satisfaction of the notion of deontological justification (DJC) that internalists require for warrant. In other words, it claims that the requirement that S does not consciously take her belief that p to be defeated entails the deontological justification condition. Bergmann’s (2000: 94) argument for premise (3) — the claim that DJC is entailed by NDC — is this.

Suppose S’s belief that p fails to satisfy DJC. Then, in believing that p, S consciously takes herself to be doing something she conceives of as violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that p epistemically irrational. But then she
consciously takes her belief that \( p \) to be epistemically irrational. Consequently, S’s belief that \( p \) also fails to satisfy NDC.

The conjunction of (1) and (3) entails that, in requiring that NDC is necessary for warrant, externalists are committed to allowing that internal conditions such as DJC whose satisfaction is entailed by the satisfaction of NDC are also necessary for warrant. So, from (1) and (3), Bergmann concludes that since the satisfaction of DJC is entailed by the satisfaction of NDC whose necessity for warrant is compatible with externalism, then no internal version of DJC that is necessary for warrant motivates internalism.\(^4\) In what follows I will argue that Bergmann’s argument fails to establish its conclusion, because premise (1) is problematic and premise (3) is false. Let us begin with the first premise.

**Externalism and Epistemic Defeat**

According to premise (1), Goldman (1986: 62-63, 111-12) and Nozick (1981: 196) hold that “warrant” requires an internal version of the no-defeater condition (NDC) and says that this condition is satisfied by S’s belief that \( p \) if and only if S does not believe that \( p \) is defeated. It also says that S’s belief that \( p \) is defeated just in case S believes that it is epistemically irrational to believe \( p \). This, however, is not what Goldman and Nozick require for ‘warrant’, much less what epistemic defeat amounts to. According to Bergmann’s formulation, NDC requires that S does not “consciously” consider his belief that \( p \) to be epistemically irrational. On this definition, NDC is satisfied by S’s belief that \( p \) if and only if S does not believe, on the basis of her reasons for or against \( p \), that her twin epistemic goals of believing truths and avoiding falsity is not achieved by believing \( p \). But this is not how Goldman and Nozick interpret the notion of epistemic defeat. The way in which they interpret it is as follows.

In *Epistemology and Cognition*, Alvin Goldman gives the following principle: (P1) S’s believing \( p \) at time \( t \) is justified provided that S’s believing \( p \) at \( t \) is permitted by a right system of justificational rules (J-rules). According to P1, the justification of a belief is a matter of the belief’s being permitted by a system of right J-rules. J-rules permit cognitive state transitions, i.e., transitions from prior cognitive states to beliefs. They sanction certain basic psychological processes that produce the belief. A system of J-rules is “right” as long as all the processes so sanctioned are reliable. Goldman (1986: 62-63) clearly argues, however, that P1 is not sufficient for justification. According to him, the permission generated by a right system of J-rules could be “undermined”, e.g., by being permitted to believe that the belief that \( p \) is not permitted, or by S’s believing that the belief that \( p \) is not permitted.

\(^4\) Similarly, Goldman (1999: 274) and Kornblith (1988: 325-26) suggest that deontology is one of the main reasons most internalists have for endorsing internalism in epistemology, and go on to argue, however, that the inference from deontology to internalism via “the access requirement” or via “the doxastic presumption” is problematic. Greco (1990: 255) also thinks that the deontological conception of epistemic justification does not lend support to most versions of internalism: “perspectival internalism cannot be quite right if the responsibilist conception is correct.” On Greco’s view, deontology induces only norm internalism.
Goldman supplements P1 with a “no undermining” requirement: “S’s believing $p$ at time $t$ is justified if and only if (a) S’s believing $p$ at $t$ is permitted by a right system of J-rules, and (b) this permission is not undermined by S’s cognitive state at $t$”. Clause (b) requires no undermining of a belief’s permittedness. A given permission for S to believe $p$ is undermined if S has a belief, or is permitted to have a belief, in the denial of this (lower-level) permission. So defeat involves either the presence of having a belief against S’s reasons for $p$ or the presence of having evidence against $p$ or his reasons for $p$. Thus, on Goldman’s view, the non-defeater condition (DC) is satisfied by S’s belief that $p$ just in case S does not believe that S is not permitted to hold $p$, i.e., that his belief that $p$ is not reliably produced.

Similarly, although it is not something emphasized by him, Robert Nozick suggests that knowledge entails that S does not believe that her belief that $p$ does not track the truth. So, on Nozick’s view, the non-defeater condition (DC) requires that S does not believe that $p$ is not tracking the fact that $p$. In Nozick’s (1981: 196) terms,

Suppose that though the person’s belief that $p$ is tracking the fact that $p$, yet the person believes it is not. We might doubt in this case that he knows...Perhaps it is appropriate to require that he not believe the negations of (the conditions) 3 and 4. So Nozick says that DC is satisfied by S’s belief that $p$ just in case S does not believe that his belief that $p$ does not satisfy certain externalist conditions. Like Bergmann’s NDC, DC is internal because its satisfaction can cognitively be accessible from a first-person perspective. That is, it is internal because a person can tell by reflection alone whether or not she believes that her belief that $p$ does not satisfy certain reliability-making conditions.

But DC is different from NDC. According to DC, defeat is present if and only if (a) S has a belief against his reasons for $p$, or (b) S has evidence against either $p$ or his reasons for $p$. But, in saying that NDC is satisfied by S’s belief that $p$ if and only if S does not (or would not on brief reflection) consciously take his belief that $p$ to be epistemically irrational, Bergmann clearly suggests that defeat involves not only the presence of having a belief against the initial reasons for $p$ but also the absence of having good reasons for $p$. For, the latter is also sufficient for epistemic irrationality. S

5 By “S’s reasons for $p$” and “evidence”, I have in mind the externalist sense of reason and evidence. For instance, a belief’s being permitted by a system of right J-rules constitutes S’s reason for $p$ in the externalist sense. But when I say S’s reasons for $p$, I will have in mind the internalist sense of reason to which S has a cognitive access.

6 The condition 3 says that if $p$ weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that $p$; the condition 4 claims that if $p$ were true, S would believe it.

7 Nozick (1981: 196) seems to say that defeat only involves the presence of having a belief against the person’s reasons for $p$ and not the presence of having evidence against either $p$ or the person’s reasons for $p$. But he also says that DC handles Bonjour’s clairvoyant examples. In these examples, S has evidence against either $p$ or his reasons for $p$, and this is why BonJour thinks that externalism is inadequate. In order for Nozick’s DC to handle these examples, DC must also require the absence of having evidence against either $p$ or his reasons for $p$. For this reason, I simply take it that Nozick’s definition of DC is also similar to Goldman’s DC in this respect.
will consciously take his belief that \( p \) to be epistemically irrational, even when \( S \) has no *good reason* to think that his belief that \( p \) is likely to be true. That is, NDC will be violated not only when \( S \) believes that \( S \) has reason to doubt that his belief that \( p \) is likely to be true, but also when \( S \) has no *good reasons* for thinking that \( p \) is likely to be true, since the satisfaction of the latter also amounts to epistemic irrationality. But DC will not be violated when \( S \) has no good reason for \( p \), that is, when \( S \)’s belief that \( p \) is not reliably produced. So NDC and DC are not the same conditions. NDC is a kind of negative justification condition to the effect that the belief not be irrational from \( S \)’s own perspective. So, in order for Bergmann’s argument to do work he wants, premise (1) must be stated, not in terms of NDC, but in terms of DC. But the problem is that NDC isn’t DC. Hence, Bergmann’s first premise is problematic. Externalists do not seem to suggest that NDC is necessary for knowledge or justification.

**Epistemic Defeat and Deontology**

In this section, I will argue that premise (3) in Bergmann’s argument is false. Premise (3) says that the notion of deontological justification condition (DJC) is a sub-condition of the no-defeater condition (NDC). It simply claims that DJC is entailed by NDC. Before presenting Bergmann’s argument for this claim, let me give a very brief sketch of the deontological conception of epistemic justification. Epistemic deontologism is the view that being justified in believing that \( p \) is having fulfilled one’s epistemic duties with respect to believing \( p \). The idea underlying this view is that whenever a belief that \( p \) is epistemically justified, no epistemic duties and principles have been violated. If one’s belief that \( p \) is not in violation of relevant epistemic duties, then one is *permitted* to hold \( p \); one cannot be rightly *blamed* for believing that \( p \). One is in *the clear* in so believing. Ginet (1975: 28), for example, says that “one is *justified* in being confident that \( p \) if and only if it is not the case that one ought not to be confident that \( p \); one could not be justly reproached for being confident that \( p \).” According to most deontologist, a person’s epistemic duty is to regulate his doxastic attitudes in such a way that the person believes only what is epistemically probable with respect to his evidence.\(^8\) Bergmann’s (2000: 194) way of formulating the deontological thought is that DJC is satisfied by \( S \)’s belief that \( p \) if and only if, in believing that \( p \), \( S \) does not (or “would not on reflection”) consider herself to be “violating a duty the violation of which makes her belief that \( p \) epistemically irrational”; and it is epistemically *irrational* for \( S \) to believe that \( p \) just in case \( S \) believes that “the considerations counting for and against \( p \) are so weighted that *now* believing truly and not falsely with respect to \( p \) is *not* best achieved by believing \( p \).” Bergmann argues that this conception of justification (DJC) is entailed by NDC whose necessity for warrant is consistent with externalism.

Bergmann’s argument for this claim is as follows. (A) Suppose that \( S \)’s belief that \( p \) does not satisfy DJC. (B) This means that \( S \) believes that, in believing that \( p \), \( S \)

\(^8\) See Alston (1989: 85-90; 117) and Steup (1988) for this way of formulating the deontological conception of epistemic justification.
has violated certain sort of intellectual duty the violation of which makes his belief that $p$ epistemically irrational. (C) But then S believes that her belief that $p$ is defeated, that is, S consciously considers her belief that $p$ to be epistemically irrational. For, given the sort of duty S has violated, S believes that, in believing that $p$, S is being hindered from believing truly with respect to $p$. Therefore, if DJC is not satisfied by S’s belief that $p$, and neither is NDC.

I argue that premise (C) does not follow from premises (A) and (B), and neither does the conclusion. Hence, premise (3) is false. Premise (C) would follow from (A) and (B) if it were the case that S believes that his belief that $p$ is defeated if and only if S believes that his belief that $p$ is epistemically irrational. This is because, since the violation of the deontological justification condition is sufficient for epistemic irrationality, when S believes that, in believing $p$, S has violated a certain sort of epistemic duty S will believe that his belief that $p$ is epistemically irrational. Or S will consciously take his belief that $p$ to be epistemically irrational. But then, since the no-defeater condition (NDC) is satisfied by S’s belief if and only if S does not believe that his belief that $p$ is epistemically irrational, S’s belief that $p$ will also fail to satisfy NDC because S believes that his belief that $p$ is epistemically irrational. This conclusion would follow, if this definition of the non-defeater condition (NDC) were correct.

But this definition of the non-defeater condition (NDC) is not correct. For, it equates S’s belief that his belief that $p$ is epistemically irrational to the non-defeater condition, the presence of which is sufficient but not necessary for epistemic irrationality. It allows that the non-defeater condition is violated, if, for example, S has no good reason for thinking that his belief that $p$ is likely to be true, since the absence of having good reasons for $p$ is also sufficient for epistemic irrationality. The absence having good reasons for $p$ has nothing to do with defeat, though they both have something to do with epistemic irrationality. For instance, according to Goldman and Nozick, DC requires that S does not believe, or does not have a justified belief, that his belief that $p$ does not satisfy certain external or reliability-making conditions. On this interpretation of epistemic defeat, DC is satisfied by S’s belief that $p$ if and only if (a) S does not believe that his belief that $p$ fails to satisfy his reasons for $p$ and (b) S has no evidence against $p$ or his reasons for $p$.

Now, once we define the notion of epistemic defeat in this way, it will become apparent that premise (C) does not follow from premises (A) and (B). Here is why. The violation of the deontological justification condition (DJC) entails that S believes that his belief that $p$ is epistemically irrational. That is, if S believes that, in believing that $p$, S has violated a certain sort of epistemic duty, then S believes that his belief that $p$ is epistemically irrational. But, does this entail that the non-defeater condition is violated? The answer is No. For, the violation of the non-defeater condition is only sufficient but not necessary for epistemic irrationality. It might be that the other conditions necessary for epistemic rationality are violated. That is, it might be, for instance, that S has no good reasons or evidence for $p$ at all. The claim that, in believing that $p$, S has violated a

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9 This formulation is itself subject to both internalist and externalist versions, depending on whether ‘evidence’ and ‘reasons for $p$’ are understood externalistically or internalistically.
certain sort of epistemic duty the violation of which makes \( p \) epistemically irrational does not entail that \( S \) has evidence against \( p \) or his reasons for \( p \). Hence, premise (C) is false, and so is premise (3).

To conclude, Bergmann’s argument fails to show that an analysis of epistemic justification that is carried out in deontological terms does not motivate internalism, because it fails to show that the notion of deontological justification is a sub-condition of the non-defeater condition. It fails to show that the satisfaction of the non-defeater condition (DC) guarantees the satisfaction of the notion of deontological justification, because the former does not require that DC is satisfied by \( S \)’s belief that \( p \) if and only if \( S \) does not consciously take his belief that \( p \) to be epistemically irrational.
Epistemik Sarsıntı, Deontoloji ve İçselcilik

Özet


Fakat Bergmann (2000), yaygın olarak kabul edilen bu çıkarsamanın aksine, deontolojinin işceliçiliği asında desteklediğiğini göstermeye çalışır. Bergmann’a göre, deontoloji işceliçiliğe öncülük etmez, çünkü dışsalci bilgi kuramları, kendi bilgi ve gerekçelendirme analizlerinde, epistemik sarsıntı (defeat) unsuru da yer verir ki, deontolojik gerekçelendirmeye içsel ama işceli olmayan bu sarsılmazlık koşulunun mantıksal gerekçelermelerinden biridir. Fakat bu, deontolojik yaklaşımanın dışsalci öğretesiyle de uyuşu olduğu anlamına gelir ve bu nedenle, deontolojinin işceliçiliğin en iyi bir dayanak sağladığı söylenebilecektir.

Bergmann, gerekçelendirme (justification) teriminden ziyade teminat (warrant) kavramını kullanır; ona göre teminat koşulu, doğruluk ile birlikte bilgi için *yeterli* olup, epistemik sarsıntının-yokluğu (NDC) ve deontolojik gerekçelendirme (DJC) adı verilen unsurları gerekli kilar. *S* öznesin *p* gibi bir inancın NDC unsuruunu sağlaması için *S’nin, p’nin* sarsılmadığına inanması yeterlidir. İşte *p’,* NDC koşulu ancak ve ancak *S, refleksiyon* temelinde ya da *bilinceli* bir şekilde, *p’nin*

Bu makalenin temel amacı, Bergmann’ın bu argümanının eldeki sonucu temellendiremediğini göstermektedir. Bergmann’ın argümanı geçerli (valid) ama güvenilir (sound) değildir; çünkü (1) numaralı öncül problemli, (3) numaralı öncül ise yanlıştır. Dışsalcılar, Bergmann’ın yorumladığına aksine, kendi çözümlemelerinde NDC gibi bir içsel koşula yer vermedikleri gibi, deontolojik gerekçelendirmenin (DJC) epistemik sarsıntı (NDC) unsurunun mantıksal bir sonucu olduğu öncülü de doğru değildir. Şimdi birinci öncülün neden makul olmadığını göstermeye çalışalım.


sonucu savunabilmesi için, birinci öncülün NDC bakımdan değil, DC bakımdan ifade edilmesi gerekir. Ancak problem şu ki dışsalcılar, Bergmann’in düşündüğünün aksine, NDC’yı değil, DC’yi öne çıkarır. O halde, birinci öncül problemlidir; çünkü dışsalcılar bilgi analizlerinde NDC’ye değil, DC’ye yer verir.

Makalenin son bölümünde ise üçüncü öncülün yanlış olduğunu ile sürülecektir. Üçüncü öncül, deontolojik gerekçelendirmenin (DJC), NDC’nin mantıksal bir gerekçemesi olduğunu ifade eder. Bergmann’in üçüncü öncül için geliştirdiği argüman şöyle ifade edilebilir:

(A) Diyelim ki, S’nin p’ye olan inancı DJC’yi sağlamamış olsun.

(B) Bu, S, refleksiyon temelinde ya da bilinçli bir şekilde, ihlal edilmesi p’yi irrasyonel kılacak bir epistemik ödevi ihlal ettiğini düşündüğü düşünüyör olduğu anlamına gelir.

(C) Fakat bu durumda S, p hakkındaki inancının sarsıntıya uğradığına inanır; yani o refleksiyon temelinde ya da bilinçli bir şekilde p’nin epistemik olarak rasyonel veya makul olmadığı düşünür.

(S) O halde, DJC sağlanmadığı için, NDC de sağlanmamıştır.

Üçüncü öncülün yanlış olduğunu dile getirir, çünkü (C)’de ifade edilen öncül, (A) ve (B) öncüllerinden çıkarmaz; ama bu durumda, (S)’de belirtilen sonuç da çıkarmaz. Başka bir deyişle, DJC’nin sağlanmadığı bir durumda, NDC’nin de sağlanmamış olacağını sonucu doğru değildir. Eğer Bergmann’in epistemik sarsıntı tanımı doğru olmuş olsaydı, o zaman (C), (A) ve (B)’nin mantıksal bir sonuç oluştururdu. Dolayısıyla, üçüncü öncülün makul ya da doğru olduğunu söyleyebilmemiz için, NDC’de belirtilen epistemik sarsıntı tanımının kabul edilebilmeli olması gerekir.

Ancak NDC’de ifade edilen sarsıntı (defeat) tanımı doğru değildir. Çünkü bu tanım, S’nin p hakkındaki inancının rasyonel olmadığı inancı ile sarsılmazlık koşulunun birbirine eşdeğer turtar. Ama bu ikisi birbirine eşdeğer değildir, çünkü sarsılmazlık koşulunun ihlal edilmiş olması rasyonellik için yeterli ama gerekli değildir. Özne iyi nedenlere sahip olmadığı zaman da inançları epistemik bakımından rasyonel olabilir; ama iyi nedenlere sahip olmamanın epistemik sarsıntı ile bir ilgisi yoktur. Sarsılmazlık koşulunun sağlanması demek, öznenin, ne p’ye ilişkin nedenlerine karşı bir inancının ne de p’ye veya p’ye ilişkin nedenlerine karşı bir delilin olması gerekir. Sarsılmazlık koşulu böyle belirlenirse, (A) ve (B) gibi öncüllerden (C)’nin türetilmemeyeceği açık bir şekilde görülür. Böylece, (C) yanlış olduğu için, üçüncü öncül de— yani sarsılmazlık koşulu deontolojik gerekçelendirmeyi mantıksal olarak garanti eder iddiası— yanlıştır.

Sonuç olarak, Bergmann’in deontolojinin içselcilige öncülük etmediği yönündeki çikarsamasi temelsizdir. Çünkü söz konusu bu çikarsama, hatalı bir şekilde, mevcudiyeti rasyonallite için yeterli ama gerekli olmayan epistemik sarsıntı kavramını rasyonallite kavramına eşt tutar.

Anahtar Sözcükler
Deontoloji, İçselcilik, Epistemik sarsıntı, Bergmann, Sarsılmazlık.
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