THE EFFECTS OF THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES ON EUROPEANIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the concept of Europeanization as changes in European Union’s (EU) external boundaries within the context of enlargement, with a special focus on Turkey. Europeanization reoccurs as the EU expands its boundaries through accession of the member states. Expanding to culturally and geographically different area, its meaning may further be contested and redefined. This is based on the assumption that accession countries are likely to appeal to a shared collective identity, in order to evoke common standards. Concern here is with the definition is that the creation of new powers for the EU are largely different with conception of European integration. Drawing on various scholars, the concept relates specifically to the EU. The accession of Turkey into the EU offers significant theoretical and empirical insights into the way in which the concept of Europeanization is used to describe the changes in Union’s external borders. What may emerge from Turkey’s experience towards the EU membership is the evolutionary and contested nature of Union’s conditionality. The study provides useful conceptual insights into the transformative power of the EU and highlights the important policy legacies affecting the current EU enlargement strategy.

Keywords: Europeanization, Enlargement, European Union, Integration, Turkey

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ADAY ÜLKELERİN AVRUPALILAŞMA ÜZERİNDE ETKİLERİ:
TÜRKİYE’DEN BULGULAR

ÖZ

Bu makalede, Türkiye üzerine özel bir odaklanma ile, genişleme kapsamından Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) dış sınırlarını değişiklikleri olarak Avrupalılaşma kavramını incelmiştir. Üye ülkelerin katılım yoluyla AB kendi sınırlarını genişletme eylemlerine tekrarlar. Kültürel ve coğrafi olarak farklı bir alana genişlerken, onun anlamı için daha fazla itiraz edilebilir ve yeniden tanımlanabilir. Bu katılım ülkeleri yetkilendirme standartları uyanırdırmak amacıyla, ortak bir kolektif kimlik hitap olasılığı olduğu varsayıma dayanmaktadır. Bu noktada kayga, AB’nin içe yeni üye ülkeler dâhil edilmesinin Avrupa’nın bütünleşmesi kavramından büyük ölçüde farklı olması tansıdır. Çeşitli bilim adamlarından yola çıkarak, kavram önemlidir AB ile ilgili. Türkiye’nin AB katılımını, Avrupalılaşma kavramının Birliğinin dış sınırlarının değişiklikleri tanımlanmasının önemini kanıtladığı ve ampirik sonuçları sunmaktadır. AB üyeliği yolunda, Türkiye’nin deneyimlerinden neyin ortaya çıkarması bu koşulların evrimsel ve tartışmalı olduğunu gösterir. Çalışma, AB’nin kendini yenileyen gücüne ilişkin yararlı kavramsal çözümlerle sonuçlarda ve mevcut AB genişleme stratejilerini etkileyen önemli politikalari ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupalılaşma, Genişleme, Avrupa Birliği, Entegrasyon, Türkiye

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1. Introduction

In the literature, the term Europeanization is used to defined in a variety of ways. Recently it has become common to use the term with reference to the EU enlargement. Therefore, Europeanization is defined as changes in external territorial boundaries (Olsen 2004: 344). This process refers to the territorial reach of a system of governance, to the extent to which final goal is to establish a single political space in the whole European continent.

Focusing on the conception of “wider Europe”, the EU Heads of State and Government at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in December 2002, following decided that the Union should launch closer relationship with its neighbours in order to ‘avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’. This initiative reflects on new vulnerability of the enlarging Union. At the same time, this implies that Europeanization is taking place, since the EU expands its boundaries through inclusion of the new members.

The EU’s enlargement process has entered a new phase, with the inclusion of ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in 2004 and, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. This has led to a discussion of “enlargement fatigue” in the EU. In spite of this, the success of the European project continues. The countries of the Western Balkans, Iceland and Turkey are the next in line for the EU membership. Certainly, European transformations are not limited to the EU and its member states or to Western Europe. Cross-border relations have been, and are, managed through a variety of transnational regimes and institutions besides the EU (Wallace, 2000).

As Europeanization is defined as a kind of process that involves a process of rule following, Turkey’s accession reveals a shift away from traditional relations between the EU and the accession countries. The key to this is extension of territorial reach of Europe in terms of Europeanization process. This can be seen in the nature of the changing relationship between the EU and its member (and accession) states.

Given this, Europeanization process of the applicant countries is cause of concern. In the last decades, Europeanization process has been a prominent and paradoxical issue. This is particular true for Turkey. Its membership aspiration stirs although Turkey has entered the final stage of its bid to join the EU, with candidacy in 2005 there are significant reasons to delay for eventual membership. It is this question of the issue of Europeanness in relation to external territorial boundaries has set Turkey apart from other applicant countries.

The current debate over “the future of Europe” is to a large extent about where European borders should end and how importance of geographical space should be maintained. A working assumption of this paper is that the enlargement of the EU brings precise calculation including the costs and required internal reforms.
for the member states. This paper explores to what extent the accession countries can transform the Europeanization process, with a particular emphasis on Turkey. The article begins by examining theoretical approaches surrounding the EU enlargement. It overviews the Europeanization process of the applicant countries, notably Turkey. It then looks at the challenges and compliances that may be arisen with the inclusion of the new member states into the Union.

2. Theoretical Perspectives

In general, the entire range of theoretical approaches have been developed and put forward for analyzing Europeanization in the member states (for a brief overview, see Cini 2004, pp.109-126). Although Europeanization has been extensively studied in politics literature, only relatively recently has attention shifted to investigating the degree to which it became a contested concept. This is especially true for the extension of territorial reach in the context of post-2000 enlargement. Few theoretical approaches recently have been designed to highlight enlargement as changing boundaries of Europe. These approaches tend to identify the major tendencies in the process of Europeanization, pointing to historical and political, as well as economic disciplinary context.

An inclusive conceptualisation of Europeanization is provided by Dyson and Goetz (2002) who argued that the term as Europeanization is used in different ways. It is sometimes used narrowly to refer to implementation of EU legislation or more broadly to capture policy transfer and learning within the EU. It is sometimes used to identify the shift of national policy paradigms and instruments to the EU level (Dyson and Goetz, 2002). These broad definitions attracted broker criticisms of “conceptual stretching”. For Radaelli (2000), the term touches upon all things that have been Europeanized. They included cultural change, new identity formation, policy change, administrative innovation and even modernisation (Radaelli 2000).

From this perspective, Europeanization is difficult to define and thus it eventually becomes almost meaningless. Europeanization may, however, turn out to be less useful as an explanatory concept than as an attention-directing device and a starting point for further exploration. Possibly, Europeanization as political unification will turn out to be of most interest, because this conception combines internal and external aspects of European dynamics (Olsen 2002: 25).

Although studies on the accession countries as the impact on the Europeanization process have used different definitions of Europeanization, they reveal a number of common themes and conclusions. Jönsson et al (2000) assumed that European space may be politically organized and governed presupposes that Europe as a geographical concept, the external boundary of Europe as a space or territory, can be delimited and defined (Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist 2000: 7). Bache and George (2006) highlighted the changing nature of relations between the EU and the accession states. Olsen (2002) undertook a similar analysis using the term of Europeanization as changes in external territorial boundaries. Europeanization process
involves in political project with the objection of unifying politically stronger Europe. These studies relate to the creation of new powers in the EU which are more or less contributed to European integration.

Regarding the process of Europeanization of domestic policies, as well as the accession process of candidate countries, reorienting the direction and the shape of politics to the degree that the EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making (Ladrech 1994: 69). This definition seems particularly significant for European integration that has become instrument for the pursuit of national interest. The tendency is that the EU membership requires changes to domestic politics that is ultimately influenced by the domestic organizations.

It is perhaps not surprising that some commentators argue that what Europeanization really means is a process of rule following (see e.g. Glenn 2004; Wallace et al 2005). From this viewpoint, the bulk of literature is confined to rule following in terms of cooperation between the EU and the accession countries. Howell (2004) noted differences exist between Europeanization and European integration, however they do continuously interact; for instance the development of supranational institutions can be seen as European integration. This involves both Europeanization and European integration and it is the emphasis on ‘emergence and development’ of EU institutions that identified Europeanization in terms of up-loading and downloading in the context of “authoritative European rules” (Howell 2004: 9).

Hence, there is a significant relationship between the membership criteria and the degree of harmonization process of the applicant countries. It is arguable that this approach also explains some of the apparent costs of the enlargement. An effective strategy to maximize the benefits and minimize the cost of European policies is to upload national policy arrangements to the European level (Börzel 2002: 198). For Olsen, in less automatic situations the underlying process may be one of argument and persuasion on the part of the applicants. Where this applies, actors are more likely to appeal to a shared collective identity in order to evoke common standards of true and morals (Olsen 2004: 336).

Grabbe (2003) supports the trend towards asymmetrical relationship that gives the EU more coercive routes of influence. This is to say, the EU membership turns out to be beneficial in which the applicant countries have desires to implement the EU policies due to an appealing prospect of membership. The effects of such a following are very similar to those felt in the member states, but broader in nature and deeper in scope. A related study on the impact of membership by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2006) came to same conclusion. The idea that the candidate countries bear the cost of membership points to asymmetrical interdependence and credible accession conditionality. By all means they are of paramount causal relevance for the adoption of EU rules in candidate countries.
For decades integration studies focused on the building of a supranational system of European cooperation and rarely asked how this might affect the domestic social and political systems (Jachtenfuchs and K1ohler-Koch 2004: 109). As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have pointed out (2005), credibility is linked to the consistency of allocation of rewards, in other words the level of priority the EU accord to the fulfillment of its conditions in comparison with other considerations, for example security. Internal EU conflict about conditionality and cross-conditionality may also damage the credibility of conditionality awards (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier: 2005: 13). Structuring existing studies, Glenn (2003) was able to conclude that, given the unequal power relationship that results from the conditionality principle, it might be tempting to see enlargement as a one-way process of limitation, in which applicants simply adopt European laws and regulations. This would be an oversimplification and would obscure the varying legacies of the past which explain how and why particular countries respond to the challenges of adopting the acquis in the ways they do (Glenn 2003: 219).

Schimmelfennig’s (2007) work on “Europeanization Beyond Europe” highlights the importance of pre-existing domestic structures and internal developments are likely to have an important mediating effect on “external” Europeanization pressures. The result is likely to be ‘domestic adaptation with national colours’, but adapational pressure from EU decisions does not necessarily lead to domestic change. Europeanization is most likely to occur when there is both domestic administrative and political support for compliance (Schimmelfennig 2007: 18). So, the prospect of membership interacts with the prevailing characteristics of national policies, which appears to be a crucial condition of Europeanization.

3. An Overview of Turkey’s Europeanization Process

Attempts to reinforce Turkey’s modernization/ Westernization process span a very long time ago. The Crimean War of 1853 integrated Ottoman Turkey into the European state-system as two European great powers, Britain and France, allied themselves with Turkey against another European great power, Russia, for the first time (Tanrisever 2010: 2). The Ottoman Empire was included in the Concert of Europe. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1856, Europe’s great powers decided that the territorial integrity of the Empire was essential for European stability. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire and the European system of states began to emerge simultaneously. The two were separated by religion, culture and politics, and were constantly at war (Sezer 2010: 15). Given this, there is no question that, from the 15th to the 17 century, the Ottoman Empire was a significant world player in maintaining the European system of balance. Conversely, this role can easily be referred to the ability to resolve conflicts and provide consensus for peace settlement (Feroz 2005: 40).

From the early 17th century the Empire was no longer superior militarily and lacked capacity for technological developments, in comparison to European coun-
terparts. This inevitably led to the importation of European ideas, lifestyles, and ways of thinking (Feroz 2005: 40). The introduction of the Tanzimat reforms in 1839 marked the beginning of Europeanization. At this point, the Ottoman Empire achieved a remarkably compressed relationship with Europe during the reign of the first Sultan Selim, who transformed the Empire’s political and military landscape. In this period, the process of Europeanization placed a special emphasis on the strengthening the central state organization. These reforms were central to the modernization efforts of the Empire, which had immediate effects on literally every aspect of life including fashion, architecture, legislation, institutional organization and land reform. In this regard, the Sene-i ittifak was seen as the closest step towards constitutional harmonization. This was in itself a radical reform during the reign of Sultan Mahmud the Second in the process of Europeanization.

Simultaneously, Western ideas of democracy and government had been spreading into the minority Christian populations of the Empire. Western Christian missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, had been moving into the Ottoman Empire since 1820 (Nafziger and Walton 2005: 135). In 1856, the Islahat Imperial Edict was enacted, and with these two edicts, non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire were afforded the same rights as the Muslims of the Empire. However, these reforms could not stop the dissolution of the Empire, and the new Turkish state rose from the ashes of the Empire (Özcan 2010: 36).

As a matter of fact that a true sense of Turkey’s process of Europeanization began with the modernizing reforms of Ottoman Turkey at the beginning of the 19th century (Tanrisever 2010: 2). It is interesting to note that the idea of Europeanization was not attracted by some groups within the Ottoman administration until the last decades of the Empire. The various minor ethnic and religious groups within the Empire started nationalistic movements contributing to the decline in central authority and the eventual collapse of the Ottomans (Cavanaugh 2011: 2). The Ottoman elites reformed governing structures during the 19th century and transformed a multinational and multireligious empire into a nation-state with a modern administrative structure similar to European examples (Ulusoy 2009: 363).

Following the outbreak of the World War I, Turkey oriented itself firmly towards Europe. Undoubtedly, the formation of modern Turkey in 1923 reflected on its process of Europeanization. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Europeanization is equated with a polity-building process. There was soon more insistent pressure on modernizing reforms in political, economic and socio-cultural aspects of social life. The distinctive feature of Atatürk’s reforms is its focus on the political transformation of Turkish society into a secular and modern state, which aimed to build a secular, Western-style, democratic country with a liberal economy. In one sense, Europeanization was the result of this new country’s desire to survive and followed logically from the 19th century reform movements (Oran 2003: 50). In short, the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the path taken by the Turkish
state elite afterwards clearly looked towards Europe and the adoption of European norms and standards (Bac 2005: 18).

In the post-World War II European order, Turkey was granted a secure place for its role in containing the Soviet Union. It became clearly anchored in the Western system of states, when it joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952. Its membership in these institutions, on the one hand, served as a deterrent against perceived Soviet expansionism and on the other, worked towards the fulfillment of the state elite’s century-old dream of being accepted as part of Europe. In line with these two parallel foreign policy objectives, in 1959, Turkey applied for an Association with the newly founded Economic Community (EEC) and became an Associate member of the EC in 1963 (Bac 2005: 18). The significant of all these attempts suggests that European ideas alerted Turkey to participate in European based institutions and administrative rules. In its part, the adoption of Western values could be the best option to avoid the Soviet threat.

According to Eralp (2009), the initial period in the Turkey-EU relationship (1959 to 1970) was a quite exceptional period in terms of the time factor: there was a remarkable convergence in the dynamics of European integration and developments in the Turkish context (Eralp 2009: 17). In a sense, the EU membership aspiration triggered convergence of political systems as a part of Turkey’s democratization process. It is important to note that the single-party system ceased in 1945. Since then, the Turkish democracy has been functioned under a multi-party system. As many hoped, drawing closer to Europe would accelerate the process of democratization which was still infancy in this period. However, Turkey’s relations with the EC throughout the 1960s and 1970s were highly unstable. The hurdles that Turkish democracy passed through in the 1970s, which culminated in the 1980 military coup, did not help matters at all in terms of advancing relations with the EC. The crisis of the 1970s led to the suspension of the Association Agreement when the then Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, unilaterally froze the Ankara Agreement in 1978, invoking its self-protection clause. Following the 1980 Coup d’etat, the European Parliament suspended the Association in 1982 (Bac 2005: 19). As a result, "democratic deficit", mainly relating to human rights abuses, denoted the negative image of Turkey (Oğuz 2012: 29a).

In the late 1980s, the possible admission of Turkey called into question of its Europeanness. The success of Turkey’s integration with the EC depended on the compliance with the European values. At that time, it was not so much matter of how much Turkey’s contributed to the Community’s deepening process, rather the homogeneity thesis that became a pivotal factor for reluctance of the Community members to admit Turkey. Two main varieties of the clash of civilizations framings can be discerned: an ethnonationalist and a ‘liberal’ one. The first one draws explicitly upon the clash of civilizations rhetoric, arguing that Europe ought to be a white, Christian civilization, and sees Islam in general and Turkey in particular as a
civilization that is incompatible with that of Europe (Koenig et al 2006: 158-159). For a predominantly Muslim country, the admission was regarded by many as “civilizational defiance”. It may be that cultural differences played an important role in rejection of Turkey’s 1987 application for full membership, which was the most sensitive of all the arguments raised against Turkey. Obviously, Turkey’s European identity was a pragmatic argument to the extent to which its membership would make the EU more attractive to Muslim countries outside Europe, and to some, but not all, Muslims are currently largely unrepresented in EU institutions (Brewin 2002: 25).

It was of course true that Turkey would meet the conditionality principle. However, the issue here is rather that full membership would bring with more or less irresistible logic. Therefore, the question of Turkey’s “European-ness” continued to be a precondition for entering the EU in the 1990s. In principle, the matter was settled at the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999, when Turkey was accepted as a legitimate candidate country (Keridis and Arvanitopoulos 2011: 2). In this vein, the European integration project has understandably become a vital tool for Turkey to continue its policy of Europeanization. With the recognition of Turkey as a candidate state in Helsinki, a new era started in relations between Turkey and the EU (Özcan 2010: 37).

Based on Turkey’s progress in compliance to EU’s democratic norms and values almost through revolutionary steps, the Commission declared that Turkey has “sufficiently” fulfilled the political criteria and recommended the Council to open accession negotiations with Turkey. According to the historic decision of the European Council on 17 December 2004, accession negotiations with Turkey commenced on 3 October 2005 (Açıkmeşe 2010: 120). Decision of European Council provided the means of evaluating Turkey’s Europeanness. Therefore, the negotiation with Turkey is characterised by an “open-ended process”, assuming a very different role and the nature of Turkish political culture in terms of its integration with the EU.

3. Turkey’s Europeanness: A challenge for Conditionality or Compliance?

3.1. Changing Boundaries of Europe

The claim is that limits of European transformation are shaped by the prevailing geographical borders (see Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). Turkey’s geographical location is called into question as to whether it will act to defend the existence of political (cultural) and social order in the EU. A key question whether or not the definition of Europeanization will be changed by the inclusion of Turkey because it is located geographically different area. In a sense that Europe is geographical context, a strain of conflicting interests between the EU and Turkey will probably prevent a more constructive relationship based on concrete steps in many policy areas. However, Europeanization is not only limited to the member states, but also it
comprises candidates even the neighbours. Besides, it is not just a Turkey’s location is a product of exposure to Europeanization debate. Rather, the accession of Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro of whom accession negotiations are currently under way – may be said to include a serious of assumptions.

On the face of it, much has been written and predicted in the run-up to the first round of Eastern enlargement in May 2004 regarding the political and institutional effects of this “big bang” enlargement round. In many respects, the 2004 enlargement round appeared to be unique in terms of the number of the acceding states, their size, the comparatively low level of economic development, the size and predominance of their agrarian sector and their communist past (Faber 2009: 21). Moreover, major decisions continue to be adopted relatively smoothly and the overall quantity (and substance) of output has not changed significantly: even in a Union of 27, it continues to insert vital national issues into the EU arena, without altering its internal dynamics (Best et al 2009: 109).

Perhaps what may be concluded that cross border relations in the EU have been continued smoothly through enlargement. This suggests that enlargement is appealing prospect for the applicant countries, as well as most member states regardless of a variety of transnational regimes, and institutions beyond the European continent. From this perspective, it is reasonable to ask why the member states have not prepared to welcome Turkey. The argument about Turkey’s Europeanness in geographical terms should be considered in conjunction with other developments. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and is a vital Western ally and regional power that has sought to link its destiny to Europe for more than 40 years (Strauss 2004: 1). Unfortunately, this fact is still overlooked, while disproportionately intensive efforts are expended on dealing with questions of widening by the member states.

Any assessment will in fact have to base on the perception of European leaders. The former French President Giscard d’Estaing stated, the problems of Turkey’s geography is that most of it lying in Asia. As the EU now reaches the geographic boundaries of what is generally accepted to be “Europe”. A shared history as well as a commitment to values enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria, and even some outside them, is being used, whether openly or not, to judge applications (Garner et al 2009: 312). Indeed, Turkey’s geographical position as a natural bridge between Europe and Asia can explain why it should be considered to be inclusive of European geography. Clearly, this statement suggests that Turkey belongs to the EU periphery in geographical terms.

3.2. A Common Vision of Europe

It is often claimed that the EU’s “deepening” and “widening” processes will create economic and social challenges. A common European project will make it almost impossible for the applicant countries to align with the EU policies without
transformation of their national policies. Essentially, this alignment refers to the
global role that Europe has to play on the international stage, adding to the complex-
ity of the task. A supra-nationalism has been envisaged as the part of community
project of European integration.

The key to this is the unity vision, with its aspiration of a common foreign
policy. The EU foreign policy is in a process of constant evolution, and the recent
period is testimony to the fact that this evolution can be both rapid and cumbersome
(Tonra and Christiansen 2004: 10). There is now more concern about the utility of
Europeaization as a concept to grasp the interactions between national and European
levels. It is crucial to find out the EU impacts on the national level of policy, poli-
ty and the politics of the accession countries and how the role of nation states within
the European political system has changed as a result.

Historically, Turkey experienced the direct impact of the post-Cold War at-
mosphere of insecurity, which resulted in a variety of security problems in Turkey’s
neighborhood. The most urgent issue for Turkish diplomacy, in this context, was to
harmonize Turkey’s influential axes within the new international environment. Dur-
ing the Cold War, Turkey was a “wing country” under NATO’s strategic frame-
work, resting on the geographical parameter of the Western alliance (Davutoğlu
2010: 1). Moreover, Turkey demonstrated the unity vision regarding the crisis
management in the Caucasus, the Balkan, and the Middle East. It largely showed
capacity to establish harmony between its current strategic alliances and and
neighboring regions. Despite these positive steps, Turkey is still facing pressure to
assume an important regional role. There is now more concern about its existing
strategic alliances and its emerging regional responsibilities. What needs most is that
the development of a new positive agenda to enable a more constructive relationship
in EU-Turkey relations.

In parallel, there has been a dramatic increase in the EU’s external relations
“output”, but this has not always matched expectations that the EU will act decisive-
ly, consistently, influentially in international relations (Smith et al 2003: 78). For the
applicant countries, the EU-accession process is the most effective framework for
promoting reforms. In this regards, Turkey’s progress report in 2011 showed that
Turkey has taken concrete steps in areas of common interest (i.e., developing dia-
logue on foreign and security policy issues). The dynamics of foreign policy has mo-
tivated Turkey to pursue European interests and has continued to cover international
issues of common interest in various part of world. Its contribution to the Middle
East peace process, Western Balkans, Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Southern Caucasus
and developments in North Africa and in the Middle East is particularly significant.
There has been an intensifying dialogue between the EU and Turkey on issues of
mutual interest. The progress report also noted Turkey aligned itself with 32 out of
the 67 relevant EU declarations and Council decisions (48% alignment), so far. As
the process of Europeanization requires, it is still crucial to know how far Turkey
will contribute to such an output.
As a rule, the candidate countries wishing to join the EU have no say over the rules of accession; they merely have to abide by them (Anastasakis 2005: 17). Turkey is not an easy fit, either in Europe or in the Middle East (Bac 2005: 18). As Özcan (2005) suggested, Turkey stands as a “domino” that has the power to disrupt or maintain the balance in an area stretching from the Balkans to China (Özcan et al 2005: 73). Perhaps, it is more accurate to say that Turkey has pursued a “softer” approach towards the Turkic Republics of Central Asia being geographically close, culturally united and potentially economically important to Turkey. At the same time, Turkish accession will increase the EU’s interests in the Black Sea region, through the prior accession of Bulgaria and Romania will already have given the Union’s borders with Black Sea countries (Littoz-Monnet and Villanueva 2004). From Europeanization logic, Turkey’s overall impact will vary depending on the development of more coherent and coordinated EU foreign policy in these regions.

3.3. Common Values

Europeanization process refers to the development of common ideas and new norms. One view is that it merely strengthens an organizational capacity of the EU for collective action. This debate was central to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE). Explicitly, common values are specified in the Articles 1 and 1-2 of the Constitution including human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minority rights Assuming Europeanization relates to liberal values and aspirations in the applicant countries must declare adherence to these principles, it is possible to make rational choice in the process of rule following.

One possible source of understanding Europeanization dimension is the necessity of transformation. As the most delicate issue in this context, identity constructs are powerful factors in explaining the less than enthusiastic support for the EU membership for the Western Balkan countries, as well as Turkey (Emerson et al 2006: 17). The essential argument is that the cultural factor plays a key role in Turkey’s membership application. Of course, unlike the other candidate countries, there is debate over the extent to which Turkey’s national identity uniquely differs somewhat from other Western European nations.

An important element of testing Turkey’s capacity for embracing European values is, of course, the implementation of the acquis. From the Europeanization perspective, it is expected that the significant and the nature of reforms depends on the degree of Turkey’s institutional configuration. There have been greater efforts by the Turkish authorities to meet the accession criteria. Since the adoption of the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership adopted in May 2001, 8 reform packages have been passed as regards to the legislative safeguards in terms of the political rights and civil freedoms. In particularly, with regards to minority rights, some of the restrictions on minorities’ ability to learn their languages have been lifted. This may sign of Turkey’s movement towards pluralist democracy. It is vital that the EU focuses on
the actual situation of minorities in Turkey and ensures that all minorities are considered equally. These reforms conform with liberal democratic principles of the Union’s new Constitution, which is unratified and replaced by Treaty of Lisbon. Despite such impressive legislative progress, human right abuses in Turkey still causes for concern. According to Turkish progress report in 2012, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a total of 418 judgements finding that Turkey had violated rights guaranteed by the ECHR. In spite of progress, Turkey’s handling of human rights issues still falls short of European standards.

And these reforms on the human right front do not appear to contribute to Turkey’s membership credibility. According to a public opinion survey, net support for Turkey’s accession among the EU-25 member states was the lowest compared to other candidate countries (see Figure 1). Probably, this negative public opinion is reflection of Turkey’s Europeanness and will likely impact on for its membership. There is also a growing concern for the integration of Muslim minorities in some EU member states. Ever since 9 September 2001, a new image occupied the minds of Europeans to show that democracy and liberal economies are incompatible with Islam (Armstrong 1995: 1). Especially, the aftermath of the world economic crisis, unresolved political issues of the Western Balkans, with more negative attitude of the public towards further enlargement (Bozovic et al 2010: 2). While net support for any of the possible future member states has increased due to more supportive of further enlargement since 2004, there is some strong opposition to Turkey’s accession. In particularly, the question of Turkey’s membership in the EU became a debating point during consideration of the Treaty for a European Constitution in 2005. As Morelli (2011) has pointed out, one of the factors contributing to the defeat of the Treaty in France and the Netherlands was voter concern over continued EU enlargement and specifically over the potential admission of Turkey, which was considered by many as too large and too culturally different to be admitted into the Union (Morelli 2011: 28).
Figure 1: Net Support For Future Member States (Supporters Minus Contesters, EU-15 and EU-25)


Notes: Mean net support for the EU-15 is an average taking into account EU-15 net support for each country in Eurobarometer surveys 54.1 (2000), 56.2 (2001), 57.1 (2002) and 58.1 (2002). The EU-25 net support is derived from Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005) data.

A possible framework of understanding the dynamics is a sense of belonging. With the regards to the issue of Turkey’s Europeanness, it is often assumed that Turkey belongs to the East and Islam, not Europe. In 2005, the former French President Giscard d’Estaing declared that Turkey was not European, the famously made clear what a majority of Europeans are likely to believe. This has become particularly true today with the rise of anti-Islamic right-wing populist parties in Northern Europe, which are strongly opposed to Turkey’s EU membership (Keridis and Arvanitopoulos 2011: 2). Thus, the perception of Turkey’s image is bound to be greeted with skepticism.

It should also be pointed out that the Ottoman Empire was held together by the “faith of universal Islam”, but the Turkish Republic would be held together by “unconditional faith in the nation”. Secularism would be one of the main principles of the official ideology (Kemalism) (Oney and Halilsoy 2011: 8833). The state elite that established the Turkish Republic of 1923 formulated the recognition of Turkey as a European state as one of its official foreign policy objectives. The political re-
forms in the early years of the Republic, from 1923 to 1938, were adopted in order to make a break with the Ottoman past and to create a “modern” European state. Interestingly, as the Europeanization process stimulated democratic change in Turkey, the anti-European reactionary conservatives gained strength (Bac 2005: 17). Undoubtedly, the EU has played a very central role in this transformation. It is not at all surprising that the above changes started subsequent to the Helsinki European Council summit’s decision to recognize Turkey as a candidate country. The condition in the form of having to meet the Copenhagen political criteria was central to the series of reforms that were adopted.

3.4. Political Unification of Europe

Thinking theoretically, Europeanization implies a process whereby a fragmented European state system becomes unified, as the boundaries of political space are extended beyond individual member states. Europeanization in a sense of (strong) political unification is an aspiration, then, which is present in some reform programmes (Olsen 2004: 341). From the political point of view, Europeanization relevance of the question has been raised whether Turkish accession will lead to any changes at the European level when it joins the Union.

A particular point to make is that how far Turkey can be a viable and accountable member regarding its compliance of the provisions set out in the EU’s new Constitution. The failure of the referenda in ratification of the Constitution in France and in the Netherlands in the year 2005 posed a serious setback for the common European Project. This development reveals a modest reassertion of national interests of the existing member states against the discursive resources in Europeanization process. The Constitution might provide with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, making new member states fit better with the new structures. The whole question lies in the intensity of Turkey’s Europeanization process.

In fact the European Commission repeatedly points to shortcomings in the ability of Turkey to meet the political criteria, given lack of human rights that has emerged as a direct challenge to the European values. Of greater significance is the authoritarian-spirit of Turkish Constitution which protects the state over the individual. At the same time it provides weak protection for individual rights and civil liberties. Since 1961 all Turkish Constitutions have been formulated in the wake of military coups d’etat (the current revision is also included). As many claim, the 1982 Constitution is any longer fits the purpose for its many provisions (Oğuz 2012: 78b). It is reasonable to suggest that the creation of a new civilian constitution, which is underway, will be a key test in future EU-Turkey relations.
The prospect for Turkey’s compliance with the EU political system is remote. Here, an emphasis has placed on the more fragmented context of party politics. Turkey has the experience of a record number of coalition governments. They correspond to three relatively short periods: namely the early 1960s, the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1990s. Out of these three separate waves, the experiences of the late 1970s and the 1990s proved to be extremely unstable, both in political and economic terms. Indeed, the two major economic crises of the post-war era, from 1978-1979 and 2000-2001, both erupted at the end of successive waves of coalition governments. The problem lies not with coalition governments per se but with the quality of democracy or the level of democratization. Turkey’s democratic deficits in terms of the weakness of democratic institutions and checks and balance mechanisms as well as the weakness of democratic culture are at the heart of the problem (Öniş 2009: 55). It is important to note that the phenomenon of unstable coalition governments was finally ended after twelve years of rule by a landscape victory of the Justice and Development Party (AK) at Turkey’s elections of 2002. In June 12 2011, AK Party won the elections for the third time. Conversely, the creation of political stability by the rise of AK Party will unlikely be mindful of future difficulties in terms of Turkey’s efforts towards Europeanization.

From this perspective, for the last two decades, Turkey has been characterized by ongoing politicization of religiosity fuelled by contemporary manifestations of Islamist resurgence in the face of the secular framework upon which the state has been founded. While secularization has transformed every aspect of Turkish society ever since the end of the Ottoman Empire, Islam has concomitantly shown remarkable resilience. Most notably, Islamist influences have permeated deeply and widely with real impact upon a range of political outcomes (Pak 2004: 2). Such a trend is nowhere more evident than with the emergency of the AK Party. From the early stage, it was clear that in 2001 the AK Party was founded by politicians, who experienced the failure of a pro-Islamist policy. Not surprisingly, ever since the crushing victory, the debate has been focused on whether the AK Party would blur the boundaries between secularism and religion. The period witnessed a shift, when the political discourse of mainstream Islamic groups embraced a passive form of secularism. A growing concern is that Turkish Islam may become much more effective in constructing an authoritarian model of political system. This rhetoric is linked to the prospect of Turkey’s EU membership. In fact the AK Party has continued its predecessors’ quest for the EU membership, displaying an even deeper commitment to this goal than previous governments (Turan 2007: 320). Even so, the rise of the dominant party system and the need to promulgate a specific ideology or programme may lead to the rethinking of the nature of Turkish democracy.

Quite apart from this, as a result of the experience of the 2007 enlargement greater emphasis is now placed on the need for candidate countries to combat crime and corruption effectively (Nello 2010: 10). While considerable reforms were made as regards to the process of Europeanization, it is important to consider bribery and
corruption, which are deeply rooted in Turkish political system and society. Reports from Transparency International (TI) indicates that Turkey’s Global Corruption Ranking Worsens. In 2009, Index included 180 countries, of which Turkey’s ranking fell to 61, from 2008’s place at number 58, despite of launching Turkey’s Third National Programme on EU. As anti-corruption measure, the Government adopted a 2010-2014 strategy for enhancing transparency and strengthening the fight against corruption in February 2010. The Strategy aims at developing preventive and repressive measures against corruption as well as improving public governance by introducing more transparency, accountability and reliability into the public administration. Further measures are essential to overcome corruption practices. According the 10th Global Fraud Survey, 68 percent of executives of international firms surveyed believed that measures against bribery and corruption were not sufficiently strong in Turkey. Given this outlook, many Europeans are skeptical about Turkey’s Europeanness, assuming that Turkey is a "closed society" and easily liable to misinformation. An impact becomes apparent as regards to the competencies and the limits of a European polity.

Finally, considering that not all member states share the same vision for the EU, noting the ‘institutional reform fatigue’ following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, and lacking an open debate over the future of Europe, some might be tempted towards another “temporary solution” (Matteis 2010: 6). This line of reasoning suggests that, as the number of member states increases, the diversity of member state preferences is likely to increase, making it more difficult to agree on common policies, institutional reforms and more difficult to sustain collective action, and produce public goods more generally (Kelemen et al 2011). As for Turkey, a package of key democratic reforms formally approved by the Turkish government designed to improve the country’s chances of EU membership. If properly implemented, the recent reform of the Turkish Constitution will indeed make Turkey a more democratic country according to the EU standards.

4. Conclusion

In recent years, the EU enlargements greeted with scepticism with an eye on the need to address the issue of Europeanness. The “realities” of the territorial reach of a system of governance have invoked in a spirit of inclusiveness of the applicant countries. As such, the larger EU brought a focus on the Europeanization of the new comers as necessary attempts. It is not possible to soute one applicant from another and, at the same time, view non-European countries’ future with cautious optimism.

1Corruption Perceptions Index, Number of Countries according to Perceived Levels of Public-Sector Corruption, 2011, Transparency International, Ernst & Young.
210th Global Fraud Survey, Corruption or Compliance - Weighing the Costs, 2007-2008 - Ernst & Young. http://www.ncc.co.uk/article/?articleid=15621
The prospect for Turkey’s membership aspiration provides an intriguing case study of how and why the concept of Europeanization should be redefined as the EU’s external boundaries changes. It raises the question as to the European transformations is only apply to the EU and its member states, but also applicant countries which are even not located on the Union’s border. Regardless of European or not-European, these countries are expected to undertake the required reforms in line with the EU’s conditionality to change their own faith. It also serves as an instance of the identity difference and norms that seem to indicate a process of rule following.

To the extent to which limits of European transformation point to the prevailing geographical borders, Turkey’s geographical location seems to add value to the existence of political (cultural) and social order in the EU. A possible frame for understanding the dynamics and outcomes of Turkish membership is Turkey’s geographical position. Within this frame, its link between Europe and Asia implies an inclusive of European geography. There is also an explicit focus on the success of Turkey to establish harmony between its current strategic alliances and neighboring regions. This is especially true for its crisis management in the Caucasus, the Balkan, and the Middle East. Regarding changes in territorial reach as rule application, Turkey lacks in establishing strategic alliances and building with a collective action capacity for its emerging regional responsibilities. Thus, the development of a new positive agenda is understood as purposeful constructive relationship in EU-Turkey relations.

The assumption of an incompatibility of Turkey’s integration logics has some substance, but some recent reforms, which are required by the EU within the Accession Partnership framework, seem to have had a more decisive bearing on the socio-economic dimension than the European political project itself. Such reform will likely to serve as confirmation for the success of its Europeanization strategy for a foreseeable future. Of no less importance is the undeniable fact that Turkey’s candidacy is intimately intermingled with Europe’s current identity politics and its anxiety about the rising number of immigrants, especially Muslims.

Perhaps, most obviously, Turkey is required to be more democratic state in the global system, with the support of human rights, rule of law, and participatory democracy, while cultural difference is a hidden reason for delaying its membership application. The case of Turkey will likely to continue to impact on the EU public policy makers in terms of cost-benefit analysis of admitting non-European country to the Union as long as it application delays. At the same time, the Europeanization process carries in itself a positive vision for Turkey.
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